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Seriality has maintained a pervasive presence across media for over a century. Despite 
widespread critical and popular interest into seriality and serial texts, very few book-
length theories of seriality have been attempted. Though uncommented upon critically, 
Sigmund Freud and Jacques Lacan have both offered insights into seriality that this 
dissertation puts in dialogue with serial media texts. My dissertation begins in the 
Victorian era with Freud’s encounter with serial fiction through Charles Dickens. I 
then turn to looking at new media texts such as the “Twitterature” of Jennifer Egan 
and Joshua Clover, the first season of Sarah Koenig’s and WEBZ-Chicago’s Serial 
podcast, and Netflix’s streaming television series Stranger Things. This dissertation 
imagines a double intervention into the study of seriality and into psychoanalytic 
theory: I explicate and develop the extant serial concerns of psychoanalysis and then, 
through serial media examples, I advance a theory of seriality. This is a new reading of 
psychoanalytic theory as a body of thought primarily concerned with seriality and the 
consequences of theorizing the gap constitutive of seriality. I find that by attending to 
the psychic impact of the serial form in early Freudian psychoanalysis, and later in 
work from Jacques Lacan, we can understand the foundational influence of media 
texts in understanding our psychic lives. While it is common to find in scholarship 
today that psychoanalysis is a theoretical relic of the past and has nothing new to teach 
us, I argue that—amidst a so-called crisis of theory in the academy since 
deconstruction—psychoanalysis may be the only theory that is ready to grapple with 
our contemporary serial media landscape, as it is uniquely able to examine serial 
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Seriality has maintained an increasingly pervasive presence across media for 
over a century. From the nineteenth-century novel, to early film, to popular radio 
broadcasts including the soap opera, up to the contemporary moment’s podcasts, 
television, short experimental fiction, and even the form of digital content in Twitter 
or Instagram stories, the form has defined the last hundred or so years of transatlantic 
media experience. Media theorists have long sought to understand why the serial form 
has been so pervasive, and what its lasting hold means. Some say that it is a brand of 
consumerist interaction with media. Others find it part of the critical interpretive 
process through reader or reception theory. Still others find it to be an element in 
service of assessing the Victorian novel’s development, of television’s rise in the mid-
twentieth century or what is called television’s second Golden Age in the early 2000s. 
Others find seriality a component of narrative theory or operating within new 
television theory. But in these examinations, seriality rarely reaches a full theorization. 
In this dissertation, I set out a theory of seriality that—while it does have ties 
to capital, consumerism, and interpretation—supersedes these typical categories of 
meaning that media scholars have voiced. I argue that psychoanalysis is primarily a 
theory of seriality. The serial form of cultural production is one that philosophers, pop-
cultural critics, sociologists, and economists have all acknowledged as a dominant and 




discrete instances of the serial form, such as Sigmund Freud’s reading of Charles 
Dickens, Jacques Lacan’s reading of coinflips in “The Purloined Letter,” the 
Twitterature of Jennifer Egan and Joshua Clover, the first season of the Serial podcast, 
and Netflix’s streaming television series Stranger Things, this dissertation reaches a 
theory of seriality by thoroughly considering the serial gap—the one immanent 
requirement for anything to be considered serial—and what it does to texts and how it 
corresponds to a fundamental gap in the psyche discovered by psychoanalysis.  
 
What Is Seriality? 
The Oxford English Dictionary defines seriality as a “Serial arrangement; the 
fact or state of being arranged or ordered in a series” (“seriality” n.). The Library of 
Congress adds that “A serial is expected to continue indefinitely.”1 Media scholars 
such as Jason Mittell and Shane Denson add additional characteristics, such as 
temporality and consumerist production, to the form’s necessary qualities. Perpetuity, 
for example, is a seemingly natural component of seriality. Two further contexts show 
us slight differences in other resonances of seriality that are worth noting. In music, 
the serial is “a method of composition based on a fixed sequence of tones” (“serial” 
adj. A. 8). In linguistics, “Of, relating to, or designating a pattern of syntax in which 
constituent words appear in a series” (“serial” adj. A. 6).  
Defined as it is above, as a pattern or arrangement existing in perpetuity, 
seriality appears to be a structure secondary to other concerns – from audience or 
reception trends, to the development of other genres, to the commerciality of the form. 




surge as topic of scholarly interest. At stake is more often an inquiry into something 
else. Whether it is the Victorian novel, early film serials, soap operas, serial television, 
or simply narrative in general, seriality appears as a necessary term to use while 
illuminating some other text, context, or concept. As such, seriality itself has rarely 
been theorized across media, leaving us with a gap in media scholarship.2  
Lauren Goodlad summarizes the recent surge of seriality studies over the past 
twenty years in a January 2019 issue of Narrative devoted to the subject: 
 
Though seriality broadly defined is as old as the human capacity to experience a 
sequence, serialization had its first big bang in the nineteenth century with the 
advent of cheap paper and the arrival of such celebrity serialists as Honoré de 
Balzac, Alexandre Dumas, George Eliot, Anthony Trollope, and many others 
whose names we no longer remember. At the turn of the millennium, when 
groundbreaking HBO shows such as The Sopranos and The Wire triggered a new 
wave of critically acclaimed and commercially successful serials, a new 
consciousness of seriality was bound to emerge. (Preface to “Contemporary 
Seriality: A Roundtable” Narrative Vol. 27, No. 1 [January 2019], 107). 
 
As Goodlad indicates, the last few years have yielded significant academic work 
published on seriality. There are excellent serialization studies (histories of the book 
and textual materiality during the Victorian era especially) and, of course, serial 
television and media studies. This includes a Velvet Light Trap special issue, Rob 




Frank Kelleter’s edited collection The Media of Serial Narrative. While there is no 
shortage of engagements with serial texts, there are few attempts to organize or define 
a theory of seriality itself. For example, in his edited collection, Kelleter calls seriality 
a “practice of popular culture, not a narrative formalism within it” (15, emphasis 
original). For Kelleter, one of the key aspects of seriality is that one can see it evolving 
through fan and audience practices (12-13). This widens the scope of seriality studies, 
importantly pushing beyond the concerns of narrative. As Kelleter writes, one of the 
popular territories for the expansion of serial concerns is to look at fan communities 
and new ways of measuring or accounting for reception. While a valuable point, this 
approach still uses seriality to consider something else. 
Since the theory of seriality presented in this dissertation prioritizes seriality as 
such and not its secondary characteristics, I am pushing for a reorientation of the field 
of seriality studies. I therefore am prioritizing form, which I will later explain is 
intimately bound to psychic form, as my engagements with psychoanalysis will 
confirm. To discuss seriality as form, we need to theorize the gap that breaks and 
binds any given series, be it a group of people or a television narrative. The study of 
seriality needs a thorough consideration of the gap—that which is immanent to all 
forms of seriality, narrative and non-narrative—or else the field itself, seriality studies, 
is simply playing whack-a-mole in an attempt to understand various discrete iterations 
of seriality. While excellent and challenging work has been done in understanding 
various and diverse serial pieces this will not eventually give us insight into a serial 
whole. For this reason, this dissertation focuses on the hole in the whole. That is, the 




By the serial gap, I mean the interruption that confronts viewers, readers, and 
listeners in the serial experience as its constitutive element. For this reason, I use the 
phrase “serial gap” and “interruptive gap” to refer to the same constitutive element of 
seriality. The gap is always an interruption that—at the same time that it breaks—
binds. Typically, this gap has attracted scholarly interest only along the lines of what 
readers and viewers of serial fiction do with this serial gap. Sean O’Sullivan writes 
that it is “in that between state [of old episodes and new episodes] that we as readers 
or viewers do most of our interpreting” of a series (“Old, New, Borrowed, Blue” 123). 
We are in the middle “bobbing on the narrative,” O’Sullivan writes (ibid).3 O’Sullivan 
determines, ultimately, that it is in this interruptive gap that viewers “luxuriat[e] in the 
details” of a story’s construction (ibid). Jason Mittell agrees that this in between 
state—the serial gap—is the “constitutive element of serial fiction,” allowing viewers 
and series creators to ‘reflect on old tales and imagine new possibilities’ (Complex TV 
41). Emphasizing the rabid readership of the Victorian era and the equally rabid 
viewing of soap opera viewers, Jennifer Hayward (in Consuming Pleasures) argues 
that serial fiction is defined by audience activity rather than its form. While Chapter 
Five will be argue for a specific understanding of audience engagement, I will be 
emphasizing the opposite of what O’Sullivan, Mittell, and Hayward do. Theorizing the 
serial gap is important as it enables us to see what it does to narrative and viewers. 
Popular narrative seriality has perpetuated and reshaped itself across aesthetic 
and media forms. Serial literature turned into serial radio specials, serial films, serial 
television, and serial podcasts. My interest lies in two central moments in seriality’s 




is at the serial’s peak and psychoanalysis’s beginnings, from the nineteenth century 
into the early twentieth century. For Sigmund Freud, seriality is used to problematize 
and think through the consequences of the clinical practice of analysis itself. The 
second is through the mid-to-late twentieth century, as Jacques Lacan and Jean-Paul 
Sartre attend to seriality. For Lacan, seriality shows how the symbolic order is 
structured by an impossible hole—a gap—which he calls the real. Extracting and 
explicating a theory of seriality derived from under researched references to seriality 
made by Freud and Lacan is central to this dissertation.  
The connection between psychoanalysis and serial forms is intimate. In 
Chapter Two, I will pursue the argument that it is through serial fiction that Freud may 
have had cause to first theorize retroactivity, repetition, desire, and drive—all concepts 
often used in discussions of serial media, whether in a psychoanalytic context or not. 
Theorizing the serial as gapped structure shows seriality is a confrontation with the 
self, as the self is also a gapped structure. Attention to this aspect of seriality, 
however, fundamentally changes the accepted notions of how the serial form affects 
its viewers, readers, and audience. In the below survey of serial media writing, we will 
see the typical territory charted by scholars and the gaps (as in the absence of a 
rigorously theoretical consideration of seriality as such) present in this discussion. We 
will then move to make some initial claims about how excavating the serial 
underpinnings to the psychoanalytic theory of Freud and Lacan can ground a 
challenging and vibrant notion of the serial gap and, thus, serve as the ground for a 





What Seriality Can Do 
Many of the most prominent theorists of narrative seriality—such as Jason 
Mittell, Sean O’Sullivan, Elana Levine, Michael Z. Newman, Jeffrey Sconce, and 
Roberta Pearson—are in the field of television studies. Looking to serial television 
pushes scholars on the brink of speculative territory. Specifically, television studies 
seems to want to articulate a theory of the subject when it writes about audience and 
reception, or “the viewer,” but there is not really a theory of the subject present. It is 
the subject that is accounted for, in terms of quantitative focus such as social media 
presence, paratextual engagement, and viewership numbers. As we will see, seriality 
in the following accounts is—at best—relegated to a supporting role in the 
development of television as an art form or—at worst—is an incidental structural 
element that must be managed. In some, but not all of these accounts, a compensatory 
argumentative thread appears that puts developments in narrative complexity in 
tandem with shifting values of economic necessity (see Wittebols and Crary below). 
While I think it is fair to gesture at things like advertising, network profits, and 
audience satisfaction as productive constraints on serial storytelling, I do not think it is 
appropriate to imply (intentionally or unintentionally) that the economic is the 
condition of possibility for the creative.4 To fix our analytic gaze on market factors for 
seriality pushes us away from developing a theory of it. Still, it is useful to establish 
this thread in television studies as it neatly parallels some of Sartre’s claims, which we 
will eventually demonstrate a need to move beyond.5   
The role seriality typically plays in television studies is as a necessary narrative 




something such as Gilligan’s Island toward the complex plotting of something like 
Lost. More specifically, when the serial storyline form of the soap opera migrated to 
prime-time dramas in the late 1970s to early 1980s, “quality” (Robert Thompson’s 
term), “narratively complex” (Jason Mittell’s), or “prestige” (a common term in 
popular television criticism) television was born. In fact, the serial influence in prime-
time television today dominates to such an extent that deviation from it has become 
noteworthy. When a TV series unexpectedly moves toward the episodic and self-
contained, like the second season of Netflix’s Master of None, it has recently been 
considered laudable and significant.6 It’s worth taking a step back to look at how we 
got to the current era of “Peak TV” (as FX CEO John Landgraf dubbed it).7  
Steven Johnson, in Everything Bad is Good for You: How Today’s Popular 
Culture is Actually Making Us Smarter, looks to quantify the growing complexity in 
television narrative. Johnson, who begins his analysis by “put[ting] aside for a 
moment the question of why the marketplace is rewarding complexity” identifies three 
elements that form the spine of complex television storytelling (65). Johnson’s 
elements are: multiple threading (two or more storylines happening concurrently), 
flashing arrows (a more sophisticated form of signposting or foreshadowing), and 
social networks (audience engagement on the internet). “Multiple threading” is the 
most interesting for a study of seriality. As Johnson writes: 
 
According to television lore, the age of multiple threads began with the arrival 
of Hill Street Blues in 1981 . . . Watch an episode of Hill Street Blues side by 




for instance, or Dragnet—and the structural transformation will jump out at 
you. The earlier shows follow one or two lead characters, adhere to a single 
dominant pot, and reach a decisive conclusion at the end of the episode . . . A 
Hill Street Blues episode complicates the picture in a number of profound 
ways. The narrative weaves together a collection of distinct strands—
sometimes as many as ten, though at least half of the threads involve only a 
few quick scenes scattered throughout the episode. The number of primary 
characters—and not just bit parts—swells dramatically. And the episode has 
fuzzy borders: picking up one or two threads from previous episodes at the 
outset, and leaving one or two threads open at the end. (65-66, 67) 
 
Johnson provides visual aids in his analysis that track how many narrative threads 
there are per minute per episode in examples from Dragnet, Starsky and Hutch, Hill 
Street Blues, and The Sopranos to show the growing narrative complexity in 
contemporary television. We can see the veritable explosion of not just story threads 
over this time period but how constitutive repetition is to seriality. In other words, the 





Figure 2. Steven Johnson, Story threads per minute table, from Everything Bad is 
Good for You, 70. 
However, Johnson acknowledges that “the Hill Street innovations weren’t all that 
original” and that the series—and its generational influence—is indebted to the 
structure of the soap opera (68). Johnson hedges against crediting the heavily 
serialized structure of the soap opera as being solely responsible for complex narrative 
revolution, as the “genius with Hill Street was to marry complex narrative structure 
with complex subject matter” (ibid).  
Jason Mittell follows Johnson’s line of argumentation somewhat in Complex 
TV, separating developments in television narrative from the influence of the soap 
opera. While disagreeing slightly with Johnson on where/ when/ what show first 
brought the soap opera to serious television, Mittell agrees with the general premise of 
multi-threading changing television narrative: “Soap offered a more popular and 




technique seen in subsequent 1980s innovators that became major television 
landmarks: the sitcom Cheers, the cop show Hill Street Blues, and the medical drama 
St. Elsewhere” (243). Like Johnson, Mittell is careful not to credit the soap opera 
structure too much: 
 
It is in the prevalence of melodrama in nearly all modes of serial storytelling 
that we can find the most commonality between daytime soap operas and 
prime time serials, but we should not assume that the latter is somehow 
mimicking or transforming the former; instead, we need to understand 
melodrama as a much more widespread facet of television narrative that is not 
unique to daytime soaps or any single genre category. (ibid) 
 
Mittell defines complex prime-time serials against their daytime counterparts by 
relying on Linda Williams’s definition of serial melodrama developed in On The Wire. 
For Williams, what makes The Wire a significant work is the way it explores the 
dynamic emotional consequences of institutional failure. It is the seriousness with 
which it plays in the genre of serial melodrama that The Wire breaks ground and 
stands as a marquee work of television fiction. Mittell refers to serial melodrama as a 
“mode” of television narrative rather than a genre, but accepts the thrust of Williams’s 
argument: it is serial melodrama that is pervasive and studying television in terms of 
genre or mode is more clarifying than approaching the serial as form. Mittell pursues 
this argument further in Keywords for Media Studies. Seriality—being chiefly aligned 




“serial melodramas” like The Wire and Mad Men are constructed—is used to blur 
genre categories for Mittell, so that “genre categories function not by clear formal 
definitions, but by cultural assumptions of value, identity, and hierarchy” (340). 
Mittell’s interest is in defining or hybridizing genre and he sees seriality as a term that 
muddies the waters.  
Whether we are referring to it as “multi-threading,” “serial plotting,” or “serial 
melodrama” what we are seeing is an inclination against theorizing seriality itself. It is 
the seriousness and complexity of the content of Hill Street Blues and The Wire (in the 
above examples) that elevate each show above the serial form. We can see in these 
above examples that seriality as an organizing structure must be managed in two ways: 
it must first be managed by television series producers (do not lapse into soap opera) 
and it must then be managed by television scholars (the soap opera cannot define 
contemporary “serious” television). Genre distinctions must be erected to separate 
soap operas from primetime dramas. Further “serial melodrama” must be defined as a 
mode of television and not a genre to itself. Seriality is always in the process of 
negotiation in these examples. It is never itself theorized.  
We see a different expression of the critical inclination to theorize and quantify 
developments in television content over theorizing serial form in Jeffrey Sconce’s 
“What If? Charting Television’s New Textual Boundaries.” Sconce identifies an 
aesthetic trend in American television: stylized and narratively conjectural episodes 
that push the diegetic limits of a series. While, as Sconce writes (echoing Johnson and 
Mittell), the movement to more complex television narratives involved the merging of 




detective show (Magnum P.I.), the cop drama (Hill Street Blues), and the medical 
drama (St. Elsewhere), it is in the staging of episodes that push the diegetic storyworld 
of a given series where television establishes its unique aesthetic. The X-Files is a 
consistent touchstone for Sconce. Episodes such as “War of the Coprophages,” which 
sees FBI agent Fox Mulder investigate a cockroach infestation as though it was an 
invasion of an alien species, is a deadpan comic send up of The X-Files’s own 
premise. As Sconce writes:  
 
…these one-off ‘comedy’ episodes gradually transformed into fully conjectural 
narratives. These stand-alone stories appear to have no apparent motivation in, 
relation to, or impact on the larger universe of the series. They stand as wholly 
speculative exercises, as ungrounded fantasies that recast, through radical 
stylistic and narrational deviation, the already well-established series 
architecture. They all for elaboration and possibilities unavailable to the ‘real’ 
story line of the series . . . Because they are not framed and/or contained by 
traditional realist devices for such deviation . . . they leave viewers wondering 
about the episode’s status in the larger X-Files universe. (108) 
 
These episodes, such as Buffy the Vampire Slayer’s near silent “Hush,” and Seinfeld’s 
“The Betrayal,” better known colloquially as “the backwards episode,” puncture the 
realist architecture of a series. (Sconce wants us to think of these episodes like so: 
“What if they couldn’t speak on Buffy?” or “What if a Seinfeld episode reversed its 




artistic merits of television. “However dirty, compromised, or implicated in operations 
of power,” Sconce writes, “television is an art” (111). Episodes, such as the one-off 
“comedy” episodes of X-Files, are crucial to Sconce’s argument for what constitutes 
televisual art. These episodes form part of television’s unique poetics.  
By locating the art of television in the one-off, radically self-contained episode, 
however, Sconce’s argument sets up an implicit binary: the one-off experimental 
television episode is art. The pervasive serial situation is the background upon which 
the art is performed. The one-off experiment is postmodern, challenging realist 
expectations of television as a medium. It is a mark of viewers who are “willing to 
watch their favorite shows with greater fidelity and attention” (110). As Sconce writes, 
“television must produce ‘parts’ that each week embody the whole while also finding, 
within such repetition, possibilities for novel and diverting variations” (101). The 
repetition constitutive of seriality is here something that must be managed. Sconce’s 
argument operates according to the following unstated premise: seriality establishes 
the rules for a given series and it is when the rules are broken that the poetic enterprise 
of television can truly be seen.  
Michael Z. Newman, in “From Beats to Arcs,” identifies basic storytelling 
principles of prime-time serial television. Newman, like Johnson, Mittell, and Sconce, 
defines his terms against the soap opera. For Newman, “the [prime-time serial] is 
really a hybrid of episodic dramas and serials such as soaps and miniseries” (16). 
Pushing in a slightly different direction than the aforementioned media scholars, 
Newman looks to audience investment and satisfaction as his organizing principle 




Newman advances a consideration of “beats” (the micro-level of a television episode 
which focuses on character development, emotion, and interaction), episodes (which 
must balance “closure and serial deferment”), and “arcs” (coherent segments of 
emotional movement on the macro-level of a narrative that is “designed to best please 
the audience”) (20, 25).  
For Newman, the audience is the productive constraint for prime-time serials. 
While audience interest is key at the corporate and marketing levels of television 
production, I think Newman undercuts his own accessible account of television by 
over considering the “commercial imperative,” as he calls it, behind the invention and 
innovation in television (17). Newman essentially leaves the reader in the same place 
they began the essay. He begins by writing that prime-time television “rewards its 
audience and its advertisers at the same time,” and he concludes by saying that prime-
time television series “are at once a source of handsome profits and intense pleasures” 
(17, 25). An analysis of narrative that renders itself co-equal with economic factors 
has no place to go: the narrative invention cannot exceed market factors and the 
market factors cannot determine the creative content. We are left wanting a little more 
of one or the other.8 Seriality, in this account, is simply a necessary production reality 
from which to consider beats, episodes, and arcs and the profits of advertisers.  
Seriality, in these television readings, does not itself have substance. It is 
incidental, at best. A necessary condition of complex television, but not a sufficient 
one. Seriality acquires substance through something else. It is by reversing this 
relationship that Freud and Lacan approach seriality.9 The formation of a series creates 





Psychoanalysis and the Serial in Theory 
As Sean O’Sullivan has recently reminded us, Jennifer Hayward and Robyn 
Warhol are “authors of what remain, somewhat astonishingly, the only two single-
author book-length studies of seriality across media and periods” (“Six Elements of 
Seriality” 50). Hayward and Warhol stage their studies of seriality primarily through 
the activity of audiences and readerly affect. Since this dissertation treads along a 
more theoretical and speculative path it will need to begin its intervention from 
different sources. It is here that we find two overlapping scholarly gaps that this 
project deems central: the gap in media scholarship, which does not theorize seriality 
as such, and the gap in psychoanalytic theory, which does not properly reckon with the 
importance of seriality to both Freud and Lacan. Freud and Lacan help us to see that 
seriality has a psychical and symbolic structure. 
I’ll begin with the initial link between psychoanalysis and seriality by tracking 
its importance to Sigmund Freud and Charles Dickens. I will demonstrate that 
psychoanalysis is always already linked with serial media form, substantiating and 
setting groundwork for my claim that these are significant to connect in understanding 
media today. Freud sees from the beginning of his career that analysis has the same 
problems as seriality does. Seriality is a form that, for Freud, first helps explain the 
problems of analysis in the clinic. He then he uses it as jumping off point to articulate 
his wider theory. Since its popular inception in 1836 through Dickens, serial media has 
been a form that people have clung to and waited for expectantly. Psychoanalysis 




form itself corresponds to the way that psychoanalysis sees the mind working. There is 
an intimacy to the serial form that psychoanalysis interrogates. It is this intimacy that 
makes serial media so pervasive. Freud immersed himself in serial media and 
discovered that it had clear resonance with the workings of the psyche. Chapter Two 
fully explores the relation between Freud’s encounter with serial media and his 
development of psychoanalytic theory, but for now it suffices simply to note this 
connection. It is necessary to proceed with this idea in mind before our next brief 
foray into the history of seriality and psychoanalysis. 
To discuss what the serial means in Lacanian theory, I begin with a thinker 
who utterly rejected seriality and to whom Lacan aimed to respond on the subject, 
Jean-Paul Sartre. Despite the fact that his account of seriality appears in the relatively 
unexamined Critique of Dialectical Reason, Sartre articulates what has become 
common sense: seriality is just an aggregate of particulars and thus complicit in 
capitalist ideology. For Sartre, seriality can only be a superficial grouping. While 
Sartre believes seriality is only embedded in capitalist logic, and thereby, has little 
connection to the constitution of the self as subject, Lacan breaks fundamentally with 
him on this issue, as we will see when I put each thinker’s work in dialogue. What 
Lacan sees is that seriality is its own demanding logic that adheres to something like 
his own notion of the real (this argument is explored at length in the third chapter of 
this dissertation). Through the very aspect that Sartre criticizes—the gap between the 
parts—Lacan articulates his own critically ignored notion of seriality.  
This is where Sartre and Lacan begin to support what I am deeming a theory of 




seriality includes in it a necessary structural interruption—the gap constitutive of its 
own construction—a theory of seriality lays bare the relationship between the 
ideological social order and the point of the real (where ideological order loses its 
hegemony). The break is not arbitrary or coerced but structurally necessary. Seriality 
reveals that an order of connected installments must include within itself points of its 
own suspension, precisely the points that psychoanalysis makes its central concern.  
Both Sartre and Lacan developed their ideas during roughly the same period of 
time, from the late 1950s into the early 1960s. It is therefore perhaps not a stretch to 
say that Lacan’s clarification of the “Purloined Letter” seminar was explicitly 
formulated against Sartre, such is the specificity of difference between the two French 
thinkers. For Lacan, as I have said, the serial is aligned with real, the impossible hole 
in the symbolic. In a sense, seriality is the point of non-articulation in the symbolic. 
Since rules emerge to form a series, as Lacan explains in his seminar on “The 
Purloined Letter,” we can see the effect of the real in the way the signifying chain 
curves to accommodate the rules that the series introduces. Seriality, then, has no pre-
existing character. Seriality constitutes itself as the series forms. Understanding how a 
series forms is crucial to understanding signification as such and understanding the 
signifier is one of the consistent tasks of Lacan’s seminars. 
Sartre articulates his theory of seriality, or what Fredric Jameson refers to as 
“the only philosophically satisfactory theory of public opinion, the only genuine 
philosophy of the media,” in Critique of Dialectical Reason (xxviii). Seriality, for 
Sartre, is that which separates people politically into artificially arranged groups, what 




formation is first and foremost an attempt to overcome the serial situation” (xxviii). 
Sartre’s seriality needs to be thought of as a “series” of individuals grouped by capital 
and given superficial reasons to relate to each other. Sartre’s most famous example of 
seriality—people in a queue waiting for a bus—shows “the intensity of isolation, as a 
relation of exteriority between the members of a temporary and contingent gathering, 
express[ing] the degree of massification of the social ensemble, in so far as it is 
produced on the basis of given conditions” (257 emphasis original). Rather becoming 
a collective—or “group-in-fusion,” to use Sartre’s terminology—seriality is what 
keeps people a series of individuals. In other words, the demands of modern life and 
capital produces groups of individuals who, passively engaging in the same activity 
(waiting for a bus), are alienated from each other. This alienation is key for Sartre and 
it is the element that can turn a series into a “group-in-fusion,” a politically motivated 
collective.  The group-in-fusion is predicated on the awareness that “everyone is the 
same as the Others in so far as he is Other than himself” (260). (There is overlap with 
Lacan here about the necessity of alienation in subjectivity.). This is what Sartre 
means when he says that “members of the group are third parties” (374). The group-
in-fusion must remain alienated from their circumstances, as “the most lively and 
united group is always in danger of relapsing into the series from which it came” (67). 
For Sartre, “the group-in-fusion emerges from seriality as a reaction against it, its 
subsequent development and fate governed by the danger of its dissolution back into 
seriality again” (Jameson xxvi). 
Where Lacan sees seriality as an immanent principle by which order and 




For Sartre, the problem of seriality is as a group of individuals rather than a group that 
functions as a collective. Seriality is an aggregation of particulars, for Sartre, that can 
never form a collective. The only way a group-in-fusion can form is by overcoming 
seriality. Part of this involves overcoming an “anti-dialectic” that helps us see how 
Hegelian and Marxist thought manifest in Sartre’s idea. As Sartre writes, “This anti-
dialectic, or dialectic against the dialectic (dialectic of passivity), must reveal series to 
us as a type of human gathering and alienation as a mediated relation to the other and 
to the objects of labour in the element of seriality and as a serial mode of co-
existence” (66-67 emphasis in original). In other words, rather than a dialectic which 
is driven by the recognition of internal contradiction, as Hegel would have it, this anti-
dialectic is premised on inertia and passivity. It turns the way the world works 
(currency exchanges, let’s say) into a kind of magic. Viewed this way, we can see that 
Sartre’s theory of seriality constitutes, for him, a theory of ideological formation. If 
ideology is that which eliminates contradiction in the world (as Marx and Althusser 
have formulated in various ways), seriality, for Sartre, is the prime mover, so to speak, 
in that formula. Seriality is all about eliminating the appearance of contradiction. It is 
about grouping people superficially in a way bereft of political potential. 
And it is here, at the level of contradiction, where we must turn away from 
Sartre in favor of Lacan, who gives us room to move forward. While Sartre sees 
seriality as a structure that eliminates contradiction and must be done away with, 
Lacan’s seriality is all about bringing recognition of impossible contradiction in to the 
symbolic (i.e. how can order and memory emerge ex nihilo—from the gap, the real—




unconscious found in Being and Nothingness. In proposing his own notion of 
“existential psychoanalysis,” Sartre lays bare the difference between his 
presuppositions and what he offers as the orthodox psychoanalytic view: “Empirical 
psychoanalysis in fact is based on the hypothesis of the existence of an unconscious 
psyche, which on principle escapes the intuition of the subject. Existential 
psychoanalysis rejects the hypothesis of the unconscious; it makes the psychic act co-
extensive with consciousness” (728). Lacan’s seriality, explained above, absolutely 
“escapes the intuition of the subject.” It is only something one can register 
retroactively. This does mark a stark difference between Sartre and Lacan where it is 
perhaps unfair to criticize Sartre. For Lacan, seriality is in the foundation of the 
function of the signifier. It is embedded in the structure of how meaning arises in 
language. Seriality does not travel along similar terrain for Sartre. 
Still, in continuing to think with seriality, we can perform nuanced work both 
politically and narratologically. There is a point at which we need to leave Sartrean 
seriality (but also a point worth coming back to). If we follow Sartre’s ideas to the 
letter and push them to their conclusion, we are obliged to reject seriality wholesale 
and favor something else in its place (the group-in-fusion is Sartre’s answer). 
Following Sartre, we would have to acknowledge the insidiousness of seriality and 
capitalism, perhaps drawing conclusions similar to James H. Wittebols, who makes 
seriality and capitalist expansion the cornerstone of his analysis in The Soap Opera 
Paradigm. As Wittebols argues “[serial] storytelling has increasingly overtaken other 
forms of storytelling on television over the last few decades, and that this storytelling 




leads always to its own prior conclusion: we need to get out of seriality. Or, as 
Wittebols later argues, it is “the emphasis on profit to the diminution of social and 
aesthetic values has had an effect on the creative process behind television 
programming and has resulted in a sameness to all television programs regardless of 
the particular genre” (6). The point is not that Sartre and Wittebols are wrong, the 
point is that neither study of seriality can think with contradiction. The solution is 
always to reject seriality.  
 We could say the same of Jonathan Crary’s 24/7, a study of sleep and 
capitalism, which turns to Sartre’s Critique of Dialectical Reason in the book’s final 
pages. Sartre looks at the role of media, specifically radio, in producing “indirect 
gatherings” of people in modern life (his example is a disconnected group of people 
all listening to the same radio program but separated—alienated—from each other). 
Relevant for this dissertation is how Crary marries a suspicion of television with 
Sartre’s notion of seriality. He maybe has reruns in mind when he writes “Seriality is 
the numbing and ceaseless production of the same” (117). Further, Crary writes that 
“it is regrettable that [Sartre’s] plan for a study of television in Volume 2 of the 
Critique was never fulfilled” (117). This interests Crary who, as he demonstrates in 
one chapter, has a serious misgivings about television and, by extension, seriality. 
Citing a widely criticized and discredited 2006 Cornell University study on the link 
between television viewing and autism, Crary lauds the researchers for “bypass[ing] 
the notion that television is something one watches in some attentive manner, and 
instead . . . [treats] it as a source of light and sound to which one is exposed” (86 




“distracted” and writes of them as though they are victims of the image, exposed to 
something that harms them. It is easy to dismiss Crary’s paranoia, especially when he 
writes “The precise nature of the physiological attraction of television has yet to be 
specified, and may never be, but a large amount of statistical and anecdotal evidence 
obviously has confirmed the truism that it has potent addictive properties” (87). Crary 
cites none of this supposed “large amount of statistical and anecdotal evidence” and is 
content simply to pathologize television as being part of a wider milieu of 
technological addictiveness. Following this screed against television, Crary’s next 
chapter uses Chris Marker’s La Jetée to “affirm the indispensability of the imagination 
for collective survival” in contradistinction to the oppressiveness of television and 
seriality (92). Ironically, Marker himself remarks in the DVD booklet to La Jetée that 
“I no longer watch many films . . . I feed my hunger for fiction with what is by far the 
most accomplished source: those terrific American TV series like Deadwood, Firefly, 
or The Wire” (qtd. in Williams 1). Again: it’s easy to dismiss Crary’s argument on 
many levels. However, Crary, Wittebols, and Sartre crystallize an important attitude 
for us: media is dangerous—especially serial media. In fact, it is so volatile and 
threatening that we must censor ourselves from it or protect our children from it. We 
should not overexpose ourselves to something like Netflix, even though we want to 
immerse ourselves in it. (In chapter four, on Netflix’s binge serials, we will take a 
closer look at how this pathologizing of media—particularly television—manifests 
itself in popular and academic criticism). This is a perhaps naïve approach to media, 
particularly serial media forms, but it’s important to note the kind of suspicion the 




Whatever merits there are in Sartre’s notion of seriality as a theory of public 
opinion, in Jameson’s phrase, it leaves us very little room to continue an investigation 
of seriality itself (or even narrative, or political narratives and how they form, 
something Sartre would have doubtlessly been interested in). There is certainly a 
political dimension to Sartre’s thought that is more immediate than in Lacan’s. This is 
absolutely worth holding on to. Further, it is worth remembering the sense of scandal 
and suspicion associated with seriality in both Wittebols and Crary. Seriality, in the 
view of this short survey of thought from Sartre to Crary, is a contemporary pathology 
that needs interrogation and rejection. The only conclusion to fully accepting a 
Sartrean view of seriality is to overthrow seriality, expose the evils of the “Soap Opera 
Paradigm,” and urge for the group-in-fusion to forge a “possible route out of the 
nightmare of serialization and isolation” (Crary 118). We need a way forward that 
does not aim at dismissing seriality, however. Still, it is worth remembering the almost 
violent reaction to seriality we see in Crary. It is possible that, though their sense of 
the insidiousness of seriality differs greatly from mine, Sartre, Wittebols, and Crary 
see the real of seriality (in all that word’s Lacanian meaning). Seriality is not a neutral 
or neutered form in these accounts, it is a priori filled with manipulative and 
damaging content. It is a confrontation, as Sartre, Wittebols, and Crary see. It is a 
confrontation worth grappling with, however, not one in need of rejection for 
something else.  
The move Lacan’s analysis of seriality helps us to make is precisely this: if we 
position the real at the center of seriality then we can see clearly how a series is 




foregrounding the gap—the real at the heart of seriality—Lacan allows us to work 
with and theorize seriality. How we move forward and develop this theory will be in 
the proceeding chapters. 
 
Chapter Outline (or Stay Tuned!) 
The general thrust of Lacan’s theory of the signifier and its application to serial 
media studies is not as far away as we might think. Shane Denson and Ruth Mayer, in 
“Border Crossings: Serial Figures and the Evolution of Media,” claim that characters 
that recur throughout serial fiction, or “serial figures,” “reflect and document the 
evolution of media forms in a marked and condensed manner” (“Border Crossings”). 
Their interest is in complicating serial authorship to discuss the transmediality of such 
figures as Frankenstein’s monster, Dracula, Sherlock Holmes, Fantômas, and comic 
book figures like Superman and Batman. As they write: 
 
The material dimensions of serial narration, which we conceive as a process of 
autonomous unfolding, come to the fore in the imbrication of seriality and 
modality. This means that stories about serial figures appear, in a sense, to 
write (and to update) themselves: they gain a momentum of their own . . . such 
that references to the authority or intentionality of an author must appear 
obsolete or at least insufficient. (“Border Crossings”) 
 
The fluidity of serial figures across media shows that these figures are malleable, thus 




the serial figure in determining the boundaries of media, for Denson and Mayer, acts 
in way similar to the signifier of Lacan. The third chapter of this dissertation will 
pursue in greater detail the signifier of Lacan and the emerging of rules, order, and 
meaning in seriality. For now, it is important to make clear that the organizing 
argument of this dissertation proceeds in the opposite direction from a media analysis 
such as Denson and Mayer’s: seriality is not the umbrella term that allows individual 
focus on different kinds of media. Such a disquisition ends up telling us about media—
which is a fine and worthwhile project—but not seriality. By way of contrast, this 
dissertation uses diverse media texts to understand seriality itself. To understand it not 
just as form but as force.  
In the chapters that follow, I build a theory of the serial gap starting with two 
theoretical encounters (Freud’s and Lacan’s) before moving on to case studies that 
show the exigence for theorizing the serial gap. The first chapter discusses Freud as a 
reader of Victorian serial fiction and position that experience as important to his 
development as a thinker of psychoanalysis. The next chapter explains and develops a 
Lacanian theory of seriality, using significant works from the beginning and end of 
Lacan’s career. As chapter two discusses with regard Jennifer Egan’s Black Box and 
Joshua Clover’s “How I Quit Spin” (a novella and short non-fiction story originally 
published on Twitter), rules and order emerge ex nihilo to bind a narrative. Lacan 
explores this idea relative to the play of the signifier in his second seminar (of which 
the lecture on “The Purloined Letter” has been popularly excised). As Lacan says 
often in his seminars, the signifier is the subject for another signifier. This is a radical 




signified (S2) that has substance. For Lacan there is no signified nor a referent that 
endows meaning to the signifier. It is the signifier as such that allows for the 
possibility of meaning. 
The next chapter discusses seriality as a form of desire through the first season 
of the Serial podcast. The podcast’s serial structure, airing episodes weekly as its own 
investigation into the murder of Hae Min Lee progressed, has been lauded by critics as 
showing unprecedented “transparency” in investigative journalism. It has also been 
derided, for the very same reason, as a breach of journalistic ethics (i.e. airing 
speculations and theories as they occur to the investigators, rather than determining 
their truth first). Working with and through the overlap/ divergences between Lacan's 
and Foucault's ethical projects, Serial’s first season helps to underline the following 
claim: seriality is a confrontation with unconscious desire laid bare. The “what” of the 
confrontation is variable (journalistic ethics, the value and aesthetic of the cliffhanger) 
but why the serial constantly confronts us is chiefly related to its gapped form. 
The final chapter deals with binge watching and Netflix’s “binge model” of 
seriality. Jason Mittell, in Complex TV, comments that Netflix original series 
“forgo[…] the gap-filled serial broadcast experience altogether . . . raising the question 
as to whether these multiepisode narratives can be considered serial at all” (41). 
Mittell only raises this question and does not take it up in his book. This chapter will 
explore the case of Netflix seriality and take aim at this view that Netflix has actually 
found a “gap free” way of delivering serial narrative. This chapter will engage 
meaning and totality, obstacle and impetus, closure and disclosure. The binge model is 




the heart of seriality. In other words, serial narrative—being premised on a dialectic of 
closure and disclosure—is itself an obstacle to a totality of meaning. If the obstacle to 
serial meaning can be removed—that is, episodic installments that disrupt totality—
then the “riddle” of seriality is solved. We can get the best of the seriality (long form 
storytelling, engaging characters who viewers “live with” over the life of the show) 
without the “worst” of it (having to wait for anything and being interrupted by gaps). 
Such is the promise of the binge model. What we will see is that bingeing—both as 
method of production and viewership practice—is an attempt at consciously 
overcoming seriality that nonetheless sustains it unconsciously. The question the 
chapter answers is not Jason Mittell’s, “is the Netflix narrative serial” but “how is the 
Netflix narrative serial.” Or, perhaps another way of putting it is this: what do the 
serial gaps look like when there are—allegedly—no gaps? 
Psychoanalytic theory allows us to view seriality as a primary structure of our 
own psychic life. It offers a non-pathological answer to the popularity of seriality and 
to the pervasiveness of a phenomenon such as binge watching. Most importantly I’d 
like to position psychoanalytic theory as already a theory of seriality, so involved as it 
is with thinking through seriality as a form that needs confronting. Given how early 
Freud’s references to seriality and analysis are we might further claim that 
psychoanalysis proper begins as a theory of seriality almost as much as it begins as a 
treatment for hysteria. This story of psychoanalysis as a theory of seriality is as yet 
untold. This dissertation will begin with repositioning psychoanalysis as an encounter 
with seriality and chart the consequences of this move in subsequent chapters. We will 





Before the Break… 
This project imagines a double intervention, where each chapter explicates and 
develops the extant serial concerns of psychoanalysis and then, through examples of 
serial media, advances a theory of seriality. Positioning psychoanalytic theory in this 
manner is fitting, given that psychoanalysis is a mode of inquiry primarily concerned 
with media and formations of the symbolic. I turn to psychoanalysis because the 
serial’s operation upon temporal, textual, and other forms of narrative gaps is 
important for what it does to narrative and viewers, readers, and listeners. In other 
words, it plays with the symbolic as it forms us as media consumers, and as the serial 
form dictates to us—including serial creators.12 This project emphasizes that the serial 
gap is important for what it does to narrative and viewers. The serial gap confronts us 
the way slips of the tongue or mishearings do: showing a desire we are not conscious 
of, an order we have no control over. The unconscious is wild uncultivated territory. It 
has an order all to its own, forming without our consent and against our wishes. It is 
because of this that I approach seriality as a theory of the gap that requires 
psychoanalytic theory to understand, maintaining the resonance a gap constitutive of 
narrative has with a gap constitutive of the subject. 
There is real necessity and stakes for developing a theory of serial media that is 
grounded in psychoanalytic theory. As I argue, the formation of psychoanalysis itself 
occurs against the cut of seriality. My move in linking psychoanalysis and media 
through seriality explores aspects of psychoanalytic texts that have received less 




fully developed a theory of seriality as such. We see the unique space that affords a 
psychoanalytic theory of serial media in the following section of Hayward’s 
Consuming Pleasures: “Linda K. Hughes and Michael Lund comment that ‘we no 
longer live in the age of the literary serial.’ This is true only if we feel compelled to 
emphasize the adjective here. True, the function of literature for nineteenth-century 
society as social cement, as focus of discourse is no longer fulfilled by printed texts. 
But literature has been replaced by television and to some extent film.” (5). Hayward’s 
notion of seriality as “social cement” is evocative of the idea I am pursuing here. If we 
literalize Hayward’s metaphor, seriality is the cement beneath our feet, that which 
grounds the social tie. This dissertation argues that the serial gap—the indispensable 
and immanent element to seriality—is psychic cement. The serial gap is the hole in the 
whole that paradoxically introduces a break at the moment it binds a series (and the 
subject).  
There is a correspondence between the gap in the subject, as explored 
extensively by Freud and Lacan, and the gap in the serial that this dissertation sees as 
crucial to understanding seriality theoretically. The break is where the real 
psychoanalytic work takes place. It exposes a gap in the subject. As Lacan tells us in 
Seminar II: 
How should one locate the ego in relation to common discourse and to the 
beyond of the pleasure principle? . . . In the end, there exists a kind of mirror 
relation between the subject-individual and the decentred subject—the subject 
beyond the subject—the subject of the unconscious. The ego is itself one of the 




unconscious. As such, and in so far as it is image, it is caught in the chain of 
symbols. It is an element indispensable to the insertion of the symbolic reality 
into the reality of the subject, it is tied to the primitive gap of the subject. On 
account of that, in its original sense, within the psychological life of the human 
subject it is what appears as closest to, as most intimate with, as on the closest 
of terms with death. The relation of the ego to death is an extremely close one, 
for the ego is a point of intersection between the common discourse, in which 
the subject finds himself caught, alienated, and his psychological reality. In 
man, the imaginary relation has deviated, in so far as that is where the gap is 
produced whereby death makes itself felt. The world of the symbol, the very 
foundation of which is the phenomenon of repetitive insistence, is alienating 
for the subject, or more exactly it causes the subject to always realise himself 
elsewhere, and causes his truth to be always in some part veiled from him. The 
ego lies at the intersection of the one and the other. (210 emphasis mine) 
There is much to unpack here, which I will do below in piecemeal fashion. There is, 
however, so much to unpack that it will take this entire dissertation to satisfactorily 
tease out and develop the ideas Lacan suggests here about the project of 
psychoanalysis, the gap, the serial chain of signifiers, and the subject of the 
unconscious. For now, let’s parse this long quote in stages:  
How should one locate the ego in relation to common discourse and to the 
beyond of the pleasure principle? . . . In the end, there exists a kind of mirror 
relation between the subject-individual and the decentred subject—the subject 




The notion of a “mirror relation” is evocative of Lacan’s famous “mirror stage,” 
though the payoff for this idea comes later in the passage, so I will instead turn my 
attention elsewhere. Lacan is trying to establish that, in the view of psychoanalysis, 
the subject is subject to the unconscious. As opposed to ego-psychology or a more 
commonplace notion of a “subconscious,” there is no possibility of mastering or 
getting a grip over the unconscious. The unconscious has its grip over the subject. 
There is an echo here to Freud’s famous statement from “A Difficulty in the Path of 
Psycho-Analysis” that “the ego is not master in its own house” (143 emphasis 
original). What this means is that the subject needs to be thought first in terms of an 
intimate relation—that of the conscious “subject-individual” and the “decentered” 
subject of the unconscious. The crucial twist here is that the thing most intimate to the 
subject—the unconscious—is extimate, which is to say that the unconscious occupies 
a space beyond intention and mastery. Again, as Freud has it, the unconscious makes 
the subject feel not at home in their own house. 
Since what appears on a first approach to be an intimate or interior relation—
that of the subject to the unconscious—is really an extimate one that decenters the 
subject from itself, Lacan sees the necessity of discussing a more literal outside: the 
social-symbolic space. He continues: 
The ego is itself one of the significant elements of ordinary discourse, which is 
the discourse of the unconscious. As such, and in so far as it is image, it is 
caught in the chain of symbols. It is an element indispensable to the insertion 
of the symbolic reality into the reality of the subject, it is tied to the primitive 




Lacan makes a complex move very quickly here. Discussing the ego is not just a way 
of describing the speaking “I” in all its interiority. Since we are not purely individuals 
removed from a group, the social complicates the subject in a foundational way. 
Children attempt to understand the meaning behind dictates given to them by their 
parents. “Don’t pick your nose” is a common uncomplicated directive—and it needs to 
be—because the truth is, of course, everybody picks their nose. What parents mean is: 
“Don’t pick your nose in public.” But this entails a complicated and, for a child, an 
arbitrary kind of logic. The following is a brief but reasonable imagined dialogue 
between a parent desperate to curtail their child running afoul of social mores and a 
(probably meta aware) child trying to understand everything:  
Why can I not do something in front of everyone that everyone does?  
It’s embarrassing.  
Why?  
It’s gross.  
But everybody does it.  
But it’s done in private.  
Why though? (etc…) 
The child fails to see the symbolic necessity of not picking their nose in public. The 
point is not to say that the world of adults is childish in its adherence to contradictory 
rules, rather that coming to grips with the demand of the other is exactly what 
psychoanalysis attempts to unravel. Symbolic reality, as Lacan puts it above, is 
inserted into the “reality of the subject.” We can take this to refer conscious 




is tied to “the primitive gap” of the subject. There is, again, a double relation between 
the intimate and the extimate. Here Lacan is unfurling the demands of a more literal 
extimate, that of social and symbolic reality. Further, what Lacan refers to as “the 
primitive gap of the subject” refers to unconscious. It’s important not to read this gap 
as an emptiness or an incompletion. The gap, rather, is a space with an interior logic to 
it that can only be glimpsed in the external world of the symbolic. In other words, we 
see the structure of the unconscious when the illusion of conscious mastery over the 
speaking “I” breaks down through slips of the tongue, mishearings, and misreadings. It 
is this understanding of the gap that Lacan explores elsewhere in Seminar II when he 
performs a critical reading of Edgar Allan Poe’s “The Purloined Letter.” What Lacan 
gets into in that lecture is the logic of the serial gap. This notion of a gap that is not a 
blank or emptiness but a space with rules and the order that curves signification 
around it is at the forefront of this dissertation’s understanding of what it means to say 
“serial gap” as a phrase. (The third chapter will talk explicitly about Lacan and “The 
Purloined Letter” but it is important to lay down a definition of the serial gap now.) 
In the next section of text, Lacan emphasizes that the ego is a “point of 
intersection.” Before moving on to looking at what it is a point of intersection 
between, we need to state that the ego is site of enormous tension. The ego is not a 
pass-through for stacks various stimuli that, in a sort of quasi math equation, amounts 
to what the subject is. The subject, rather, is caught in a relation between the intimate 
(what the subject consciously knows) the intimate-extimate (the unconscious, which is 
barred from the speaking subject) and the social-symbolic, an extimate-intimate. The 




above example where the child attempts to understand and internalize contradictory 
social rules that will guarantee the consistency of its public acts (i.e. why it’s proper to 
not pick their nose even though everybody dose it).  
With this preamble in mind, Lacan brings the idea of death into the equation 
for the ego and the subject seemingly out of nowhere:  
On account of that, in its original sense, within the psychological life of the 
human subject it is what appears as closest to, as most intimate with, as on the 
closest of terms with death. The relation of the ego to death is an extremely 
close one, for the ego is a point of intersection between the common discourse, 
in which the subject finds himself caught, alienated, and his psychological 
reality. 
Lacan, importantly, links the ego with being closest to death. Why link the ego with 
being closest to death? The answer is that Lacan is moving the specter of death away 
from the body and into the realm of, as he says at the end of this section, 
“psychological reality.” The move here is designed to separate psychoanalysis from 
biology.13 Death is figured here as a social-symbolic element, part of that which the 
subject finds themselves “caught, alienated.” This alienation is doubled for, as we 
have already established, the subject is alienated from their own psyche. The subject is 
alienated, decentered, unmoored from their interior life and their daily interactions in 
the social-symbolic. We see that this is another valence to the “mirror relation” Lacan 
mentions at the top of this long quote section. The distance the subject feels internally 
(psychically) is reflected externally (socially). 




In man, the imaginary relation has deviated, in so far as that is where the gap is 
produced whereby death makes itself felt. The world of the symbol, the very 
foundation of which is the phenomenon of repetitive insistence, is alienating 
for the subject, or more exactly it causes the subject to always realise himself 
elsewhere, and causes his truth to be always in some part veiled from him. The 
ego lies at the intersection of the one and the other.  
Lacan’s mirror-stage, which this dissertation will codify further in Chapter 3, operates 
on the premise that the subject sees in the image an illusory totality (this is what Lacan 
also calls the imaginary). Lacan will later reorient his terms to position the imaginary 
as that which covers the gaps in the symbolic—the impasse of the real—but here it is 
important to note how Lacan sees the world of symbols generated by “repetitive 
insistence.” This is an idea I want to import into our thinking about the serial, as 
repetitive insistence. This repetition creates gaps, as repetition does not mean 
replication. Repetition creates and ensures difference, thus producing gaps in what we 
might otherwise see as a totality. Through this alienating phenomenon of repetitive 
insistence—which, it is tempting to call “seriality” full stop, but this brings Lacan in 
line with Sartre and ignores the clear differences between their approaches to 
seriality—the subject is confronted with two gaps: one in the social and one internal. 
Because of these gaps, the ego is not fully realized in either the psyche or the social. It 
is this mirrored relation (mirrored not in the sense of the mirror stage, rather in the 
sense of doubling), that indelibly influences the subject. The ego lies at the 
intersection of the other of language and symbols and the other of the subject (the 




 A psychoanalytic theory of seriality—as this dissertation presents—relies on 
my argument that the subject and the series are inextricably linked via the gap. The 
concepts explained above—the gap, the subject, the serial chain of signifiers, the 
subject of the unconscious—are not static, however. In other words, this introduction 
has laid down provisional definitions for key terms that chapters will later develop. 
Taking its cue from Lacan’s seminars—the serial endeavor that defines his thought—
these dissertation chapters will offer a progression of understanding on what the serial 
gap is and does. We have thus far established in a preliminary way the field of seriality 
studies that this dissertation is intervening into. We have done important introductory 
work into Freud and Lacan. We have started to understand the psychic cement that is 
the serial gap. 
                                                 
1 http://www.loc.gov/issn/issnbro.html 
 
2 Sean O’Sullivan echoes this claim in “Ingmar Bergman, Showrunner,” which he uses to preface his 
own intervention, “…I would like to sketch out four provisional terms, as a way of considering seriality 
across media. By way of preface, I should say that few have really attempted such a catalogue, perhaps 
with good reason. The most prominent exceptions are Jennifer Hayward and Robyn Warhol, both of 
whom have broached definitions in books that considered seriality in particular relation to audiences 
and affect” (114). 
 
3 O’Sullivan does not seize on the drowning implications of this image, which will become more 
important in this project’s fourth chapter. 
 
4 Lee Erickson, in The Economy of Literary Form, opines that consumer capital creates the conditions 
of possibility for artistic expression:  
 
Since readers read within a framework of desire, the economy of literary forms can be 
described from the perspective of reception as well as that of production. In this way, literary 
forms can be viewed as historical, aesthetic products of market forces reaching a momentary 
equilibrium between the aspirations of writers and the desires of their audiences . . . literary 
form is as much a product of the marketers and the readers as it is of the authors (8). 
 
It is disappointing that Erickson does not consider or reckon with the inverse of his claim: that it is 
artistic expression that creates avenues for capitalist enterprise. (But perhaps this is a “Chicken or the 
Egg” problem.) Regardless, Erickson usefully equivocates consumption with desire. From the 
standpoint of Erickson’s economics, desire is that which can be counted, charted, and marketed to. As 
he writes, “The aggregate calculus of such individual desires is then reflected in the market by the 
demand both for individual literary works and for genres. The more a work or a genre provides intense 




                                                                                                                                            
about desire as though it can be counted in book sales and markets only. Despite writing otherwise, 
Erickson is quantifying consumption, not theorizing desire. Furthermore, there is no unconscious at 
work in Erickson’s consuming subject. Consumption is conscious and can be accounted for whereas 
desire is unconscious and cannot be satisfied. The argument being made here is no mere pedantry. 
Desire is in the realm of theory, it is not in the realm of the practical, the logical, or the market. The role 
of unconscious desire and seriality will be taken up in Chapter Three. 
 
5 Not move on entirely, as we will see. (No spoilers…) 
 
6 See: Alison Herman’s “Master of None is a Love Letter to the Episode.” https://theringer.com/master-
of-none-season-2-alan-yang-aziz-ansari-7be1ecffa87e Television critic Alan Sepinwall has twice 





8 It is no surprise, then, that in Newman’s Legitimating Television, co-written with Elana Levine, that 
the Newman pushes back on the economic factors behind television’s current Golden Age. The authors 
question the efficacy of television’s current privileged position in the media landscape and argue that 
TV is currently successful at reaffirming hierarchy and regressive cultural binaries. 
 
9 It’s tempting to think here of Derrida’s notion of the supplement as a way of reversing this 
relationship. Derrida, in Of Grammatology, argues that the supplement, which is ordinarily seem as 
secondary to something, is precisely what the primary thing depends upon. 
10 Crary leaves out that the Cornell study was authored by economists and that the paper was 
immediately criticized by other economists. The fact that no significant research since this tendentious 
Cornell study has confirmed or furthered the findings is hardly a feather in its cap, either. Something 
that, again, Crary leaves out. http://freakonomics.com/2006/10/17/tv-causes-autism-i-doubt-it/ 
 
11 It is true that seriality—especially American televisual seriality—adheres to capitalist friendly notions 
of accumulation and the projection of satisfaction ever forward into the future. Wittebols in particular 
does well to show the “soap opera paradigm” at work in news reporting, sports telecast, and fantasy 
football leagues. In thinking about Sartre, Wittebols, and Crary, we might say that seriality is not a form 
of capital, though it is a capitalistic form. Understanding seriality as a form—the logic of its sequence—
helps to us to understand the logic of capitalistic accumulation. Another way of putting it is to state that 
a seriality informed by the real is not a tool of capital (nor is it necessarily wieldable in total) and that 
understanding seriality can demonstrate one way of understanding how capital expands and proliferates. 
 
12 I mean “media consumers” not in the consumerist sense, but as a catch-all term to name those 
receiving the serial form whether it is visual, audio, or textual. I’d like to preserve the active 
connotation the word consumer has over something like “audience” which connotes more easily as 
passive.  
 
13 When Lacan talks about death here, he likely has Freud’s death drive in the back of his mind. Freud 
himself first attempts to locate the death drive in the realm of the biological, though his later thinking on 
the topic moves it firmly into the realm of the drive being a psychic organ. This dissertation will explore 






SERIAL FORM, SERIAL PSYCHE: FREUD’S ENCOUNTER WITH DICKENS 
 
This chapter will chart a brief history of the development of a few major 
psychoanalytic ideas showing their indebtedness to thinking through seriality. I will 
advance an understanding of the role seriality plays in the discovery and structure of 
psychoanalysis by working through an initial explanation for why psychoanalysis has 
the unique capacity for enabling us to theorize seriality. Showing the dynamic 
connection between the serial structure as such and psychoanalytic thinking is the 
central objective of this chapter. Exploring the consequences of this connection will be 
the task of future chapters. Here the goal is to show the primary relationship seriality 
has to psychoanalysis through Freud’s encounter with the serial fiction of the 
Victorian era (primarily the work of Charles Dickens).1 Scholarly work on the 
serialized fiction of Charles Dickens often explains Dickensian characters, plots, or 
storyworlds through psychoanalytic ideas. This chapter’s main claim is that we should 
acknowledge that the reason psychoanalytic theory grafts so well onto understanding 
the serial fiction of Charles Dickens is because the serial fiction of Charles Dickens 
heavily influenced Freud’s own understanding of the psychoanalytic project. Freud 
encounters serial fiction, particularly the works of Dickens, and it is through that 
encounter that the fundamentals of psychoanalysis foment.  
 




Advances in print technology and periodical distribution allowed the 
production and distribution of serial novels, magazines, and journals to flourish during 
the Victorian Era. It was during the latter stages of the nineteenth century when Freud 
began to articulate in writing the clinical practice that would come to be known as 
psychoanalysis. The roots of psychoanalysis, I argue, lie in the serial form itself. In 
1836, when Charles Dickens makes the decision to not just distribute The Pickwick 
Papers serially but to write the novel concurrently with its publication, he legitimates 
the serial form’s commercial viability and literary potential.2 While, historically 
speaking, Freud missed this initial boom of serial production, he was well positioned 
to observe the way the serial structure was present and apprehendable in everyday life. 
His observation of the practice of reading daily serials in newspapers will serve as a 
touchstone for his thinking through one of the most basic problems of the clinic and 
we can see the evidence of how much the serial form occupied his thoughts through 
the written correspondence with his wife Martha (which will be discussed later). 
Before diving into those references, however, it is instructive to see how Dickens 
scholarship has often noted the corollary between Freudian psychoanalysis and 
Dickensian characters, plots and themes. There is, in these references, a teasing gap of 
causality, with the advent of psychoanalysis seeming to afford the opportunity to read 
back on Dickens. Exploring the possibility of a more direct causality between Freud, 
Dickens, and the serial form will be taken up after. 
As Peter Gay writes in The Naked Heart, "Half a century before Freud, 
Dickens knew that the most innocent can damn themselves as the most guilty" (270). 




criticism, particularly at the level of character analysis. Lawrence Frank looks to 
Dickens as a way to extend Freudian ideas beyond the scope of their typical usage in 
literary scholarship with “In Hamlet’s Shadow: Mourning and Melancholia in Little 
Dorrit.” In it, Frank painstakingly pulls together critical readings of mourning and 
melancholia in Hamlet to show their applicability to Little Dorrit. Frank builds brick 
by brick to the following conclusion: the story of Dickens’ Arthur Clennam—by 
insistently pointing to a time before the father—anticipates Kleinian and Kristevan 
amendments to the orthodox Freudian interpretation of mourning and melancholia as 
concepts (886). Most intriguing for our purposes is the connection Frank makes 
between Dickens’ description of Rome in Little Dorrit and Freud’s description of it in 
Civilization and Its Discontents. Frank classifies both of these references as an 
“archeological figure of speech,” writing that Dickens and Freud use Rome as a way 
of imagining a physical site as having a psychic life (883-4). Frank stops short of 
drawing a clear line of influence between Dickens and Freud here. His interest is more 
in showing how Dickens can be read to extend the discourse of mourning and 
melancholia we see in Shakespearean readings of Hamlet. In so doing, he shows the 
territory that exists for seeing Freudian ideas in Dickensian characters and a shared 
metaphorical language (in the Rome example) between Dickens and Freud.  
For the purposes of this chapter, the most interesting study of Freud and 
Dickens comes from Albert Hutter’s in “The High Tower of His Mind: Psychoanalysis 
and the Reader of Bleak House.” Hutter pushes against the growing tide of 
postmodern literary criticism in the late 1970s to argue that psychoanalysis can 




for variation and difference in readerly experience. His project in this essay is not 
unlike the overarching goal of this dissertation, which positions seriality as a universal 
logic that nonetheless allows for radical break and difference to emerge.  
Hutter writes that Dickens’ style of serial writing “exploits a process of 
splitting and reintegration” (310). Splitting, in Hutter’s terms, separates characters 
from larger social institutions, from family, or from the group in general, and allows 
Dickens to explore isolation and individuation as a thematic. Fragmentation, for 
Hutter, “creates caricature, and the caricatures themselves—like the Jellybys or Mrs. 
Snagsby—recall the novel’s preoccupation with parental care and parental loss” (ibid).  
For Hutter, psychoanalysis is best used as a theory of universal subjective 
development. “We are, at birth absolutely dependent,” he writes, “but we always 
remain ‘relatively dependent on a mother,’ or on some nurturing relationship” (311). 
Hutter positions a psychoanalytic theory of individuation as central to Bleak House, 
writing “it accounts for the thematic core of Dickens’ story, the relationship between 
Esther and Lady Dedlock, between mother and child, which derives its dramatic 
impact from a traumatic separation, a subsequent reintegration which cannot be 
maintained, and the ultimate loss of the mother” (ibid). Ultimately, Hutter asks and 
answers the most important question, “How can psychoanalysis account for readers’ 
various backgrounds, assuming a reasonable ability and sensitivity to the text on the 
part of different readers?” (312). His response, which partly echoes the claims made in 
this chapter: 
The answer, I think, must be that it cannot account for response if it equates 




for a wide range of response if it analyzes psychological structure. The 
combination of Esther’s story with the complex plot and narration should 
evoke in the reader of Bleak House a response to a psychological problem 
(separation) which continues through life, and to a universal adaptive process 
(splitting). Different readers are bound to respond in different ways, but it is 
possible to describe broadly the nature of their psychological response and to 
relate it to the structure of the text. (312-313 emphasis in original) 
Hutter’s emphasis on a structure of the psyche supports the inquiry being made here. 
The further move is to see how Freud’s encounter with the serial form itself 
occasioned the psychoanalytic ideas that Hutter is making use of in his analysis of 
Dickens above.   
We see more tantalizing connections in John O. Jordan’s Supposing Bleak 
House. Jordan focuses on how Freudian psychoanalysis can help a reading of the 
content of Bleak House. Jordan is particularly influenced by Cathy Caruth’s approach 
to trauma.3 The way Cathy Caruth describes trauma as “an event that . . . is 
experienced too soon, too unexpectedly, to be fully known and is therefore not 
available to consciousness” grafts nicely onto Jordan’s disquisition on Esther 
Summerson (qtd. in Jordan 46). Caruth’s “emphasis . . . on the ways in which trauma 
speaks belatedly and from displaced sites of articulation,” pushes Jordan to make a 
connection with the displaced temporality of Esther’s narration in Bleak House (46). 
He further proposes that understanding Freud’s notion of Nachträglichkeit shows us 
that Esther’s trauma stems not from being separated from her mother but from the 




not to delve into trauma studies but to establish how Freud is first given to understand 
trauma. In the following sections, we will explicate nachträglichkeit, show how, for 
Freud, trauma is a series, and that it relies on retroactivity to be apprehended. As the 
chapter and dissertation will go on to show, the encounter between psychoanalysis and 
seriality is no mere chance nor a cute coincidence. Rather it is a formational 
encounter.  
The argument I am pursuing here is not that the psychic life of Dickensian 
characters grafts well onto psychoanalytic concepts and could thus be argued to 
anticipate Freudian psychoanalysis. Rather it is at the level of form that I wish to make 
my argument. Jordan refers to the story of Esther and her mother as a “proto-
psychoanalytic mythic structure” (44). My claim is that the serial form itself provides 
propulsion to Freud’s thinking through the problems of analysis. In this sense, the 
serial form itself is the “proto-psychoanalytic mythic structure.” Another way of 
putting it is that what fascinates John O. Jordan about psychoanalysis with regard to 
Dickens is possibly what fascinated Freud while he read Dickens. Where Jordan takes 
repetition compulsion and the return of the repressed to understand the disturbed 
temporality of Bleak House, I am proposing that it is Freud’s encounter with serial 
fiction that sets the stage for Freud’s own later breakthroughs in understanding 
repetition compulsion, retroactivity, trauma, and the unease of endings. We can see in 
the following personal and professional references to seriality that what interests Freud 
in the serial is nachträglichkeit—the idea of deferred action or backwards causality so 
critical to Freud’s understanding of trauma—as a formal narrative device. He is 




Studies on Hysteria to the “To Be Continued” of serial fiction. In other words, it is not 
surprising that the Freudian idea of nachträglichkeit grafts so well onto the study of 
Dickens when it is Freud’s affection for serial fiction that first provided him a 
structure for understanding the fundamentals of analysis in the first place. Further, the 
Victorianists’ recourse to Freud attests to the pervasive presence of seriality as 
structuring force of both Dickens’ texts and Freud’s thought. 
 
The Poets Knew It First 
Freud left us with two smoking guns to proffer this discussion. Focusing on two 
statements—one made in his personal correspondence with his wife, Martha, and the 
second made in Studies on Hysteria, the first major psychoanalytic text—I will pursue 
the argument that it is through serial fiction that Freud first theorized retroactivity, 
repetition, desire, and drive—all vital concepts in discussions of serial media 
discourse. 
With the serial moment of the nineteenth century reaching its later stages, Freud 
reaches maturity as both reader and thinker. S.S. Prawer, in his invaluable A Cultural 
Citizen of the World: Sigmund Freud’s Knowledge and Use of British and America 
Writings, opens the door for us to approach Freud and his thinking along the axis of 
his personal and private thoughts as well as his published work. Prawer does this by 
focusing his book’s treatment of Freud on his personal correspondence, particularly to 
his wife Martha. While Freud’s letters to Fliess are well-known both in and out of 




used in critical thinking on Freud. It is my intention to show the value of these letters, 
serving as they do as a missing link in his published writings. 
In his letters to Martha, Freud wrote frequently about literature, with the work of 
Charles Dickens occupying a special place in those letters. Freud admired Dickens so 
much that the first gift he ever gave his wife was a copy of David Copperfield. Such 
was Freud’s love of Dickens that he wrote brief critiques to his wife, like the 
following “review” of Dickens’s Bleak House dated 5 October 1883: Freud tells 
Martha it “ranks far below [David Copperfield],” or as Freud refers to it, “that 
incomparable work” (Prawer 71-72). He thought Bleak House “tendentious and hard,” 
like most of Dickens’s later writings but, he adds, “I don’t want to spoil it for you; its 
beauties are obvious, while its faults have to be sought for” (ibid). I write only half-
kiddingly that this may have been the first “spoiler alert” in the history of written 
communication. Significantly, Freud notes that he felt so involved with Dickens’s 
characters and narrative world that he found it hard to write to his wife in German 
rather than “Dickens’s English” (ibid). To the extent that we can take these brief 
statements from Freud’s personal correspondence as representative for things he was 
thinking through in his mental life, we can see that he was often given over to the 
contemplation of serial fiction (lest we forget that letter writing is also itself a serial 
endeavor). 
In fact, Freud’s experience with seriality parallels 21st century consumption 
much more closely than one might think. Freud seems to have engaged in what we 
might call “binge reading” with George Eliot’s Daniel Deronda. In a letter to Martha 




interest until an hour ago, discounting a few hours of sleep. My well-known 
impatience made me hurry to get to the end” (Prawer 74).4 It’s easy to see how 
Freud’s future notion of repetition compulsion could have fomented from this 
serialized conception of analysis as practice. For example, when we are talking about 
serial stories we are already talking about repetition, just as we are talking about 
repetition in the very act of going to analysis. So, when Freud discovers the repetition 
compulsion of the death drive in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, we should not fail to 
note the resonance it has with encountering serial narrative: 
But how is the predicate of being ‘instinctual’ related to the compulsion to 
repeat? At this point we cannot escape a suspicion that we may have come upon 
the track of a universal attribute of instincts and perhaps of organic life in 
general which has not hitherto been clearly recognized or at least not explicitly 
stressed. It seems, then, that an instinct is an urge inherent in organic life to 
restore an earlier state of things which the living entity has been obliged to 
abandon under the pressure of external disturbing forces; that is, it is a kind of 
organic elasticity, or, to put it another way, the expression of the inertia inherent 
in organic life. (43 emphasis in original). 
James Strachey, as is well-known, translates both the German words “instinkt” 
(biological instinct) and “trieb” (drive in excess of biological necessity) as the English 
word “instinct.” Nevertheless, what Freud is getting at here is the drive— “an urge in 
organic life to restore an earlier state of things.” The Freud who stayed up late to finish 
reading Daniel Deronda is here, endeavoring to “return to an earlier state of things”—




help us with the above statement, we need to look at the Lacanian reading of this 
passage from Beyond the Pleasure Principle.  This “earlier state of things” is a prior 
state of loss or lack. Like characters in a sitcom, we agitate to return to the very state 
of lacking the object that troubles us (breaking up with partner with whom we long 
lusted after…before actually getting to know them; leaving the job we thought we 
always wanted…until we actually did it). Freud is stuck in the middle and wishes to 
return to the Freud who was not troubled by the encounter with the serial. The drive 
delights in this middle space—this failure to obtain closure. The death drive enjoys 
failing to obtain its object rather than obtaining it. It doesn’t desire the end but to 
remain stuck in the middle. In fact, we might even see that the Freud who wanted rid 
of Daniel Deronda is a Freud attempting to rid himself from the drive. It would not be 
until 1920—thirty-eight years after he sent the above letter to Martha—that he 
discovers the drive and ever after it remained a concept that challenged Freud’s entire 
thought process. As he writes in Civilization and its Discontents, his last major work, 
“To begin with it was only tentatively that I put forward the views I have developed 
here [that of death drive], but in the course of time they have gained such a hold upon 
me that I can no longer think in any other way” (79). We see though that Freud does 
not first encounter the drive in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, but that the radicality of 
the drive first foments in Freud’s thought through his encounter with serial fiction. It 
was a preoccupying notion, for Freud, one that would later be taken up and explored 
by Jacques Lacan.5  
For now, we see that from the very beginning—Studies on Hysteria—Freud is 




ways I want to position psychoanalysis in this project—as a mode of narrative inquiry 
that was influenced by seriality and a mode of narrative inquiry that later influenced 
narratively inclined theories.6 Any account of seriality should consider Freud in light 
of his own experience with seriality and the echoes that experience has in ideas such 
as retroactivity, repetition compulsion, desire, and drive. As he writes in Three Essays 
on the Theory of Sexuality, “the finding of an object is in fact a refinding of it” (88). 
Freud’s mature theories are the “refinding” and rearticulation of thinking through 
serial narrative as he first outlined in Studies on Hysteria. 
 
Studies on Hysteria 
In 1895’s Studies on Hysteria, the text that announced the psychoanalytic 
method to the world, Freud recognizes that analysis has a serial problem. While the 
talking cure requires the analysand’s narrative to form free of interruption, the analytic 
session itself has to end at some point. It is these “interruptions . . . imperatively 
prescribed by incidental circumstances in the treatment, such as the lateness of the 
hour,” which occur “at the most inconvenient points, just as one may be approaching a 
decision or just as a new topic emerges,” Freud writes (297). In short, the purely 
practical endpoint to a session means that an analyst and analysand cannot talk about 
everything in a single session. The interruption, the end of the session, confronts the 
analysand with an ending that occurs before the analysand is really ready to leave. 





Every newspaper reader suffers from the same drawback in reading the daily 
installment of his serial story, when immediately after the heroine’s decisive 
speech or after the shot has rung out, he comes upon the words: ‘To be 
continued.’ In our own case the topic that has been raised but not dealt with, the 
symptom that has become temporarily intensified and has not yet been 
explained, persists in the patient’s mind and may perhaps be more troublesome 
to him than it has otherwise been . . . since by themselves they cannot take any 
steps towards getting rid of it, they suffer more, to begin with, than they did 
before the treatment. (297-298) 
The phrase “to be continued” interrupts the narrative in a serial story. It announces that 
continuation is not forthcoming at the moment and this is what makes the serial 
interruption so fascinating: it imposes an ending while announcing itself as a link to 
the next installment. The interruption cuts the narrative—“To be continued” makes the 
reader aware of the structure of the story, breaking the continuous fictive world—but 
also binds it to the next installment.  
 It’s worth pausing again on the weight that interruptions give to that which 
precedes them. Freud writes, “the topic that has been raised but not dealt with . . . 
persists in the patient’s mind and may perhaps be more troublesome to him that it has 
otherwise been” (298). The acknowledgement here is what form does to content. 
Whatever “topic” the patient brought up may have been innocuous but, because that 
discussion could not end of its own volition (through a formal interruption), the 




This is the same kind of trouble—wanting rid of the topic raised but not dealt with—
that Freud attempts to eliminate by binge reading Daniel Deronda.  
 Freud draws a corollary between the patient who “suffers more” as a result of 
the psychoanalytic session ending abruptly and the newspaper reader who is 
confronted by “To Be Continued.” Freud here is describing the effect of a cliffhanger. 
Possibly invented by Thomas Hardy—who literally has a character hanging off a cliff 
between two installments of A Pair of Blue Eyes—the cliffhanger is one of serial 
storytelling’s trademark narrative tools. A cliffhanger—by interrupting a narrative 
scene before its resolution—holds the reader/ viewer/ listener in suspense, causing 
them to “suffer more” than if the tense situation had simply reached its conclusion. 
What both serial narrative and analytic experiences share, as Freud shows here, is a 
gap that breaks continuity at the same moment that it binds it. Just as we feel we are 
on the verge of some knowledge—knowing who the killer is in a serial story, or 
realizing why we acted with unexpected hostility to a family member the week before 
in analysis—time is up, the narrative suspended. We have to get off the couch and 
wait a week to take up the same topic again.   
By referencing the structure of the serial, Freud notes the interruptive and 
retroactive continuity of analysis in Studies on Hysteria. Despite identifying these key 
aspects of psychoanalysis early on it is possible that even he did not understand how 
profoundly seriality is ingrained into the analytical structure. The canonical story told 
of Freud’s development in understanding trauma post-1919 is that the experience of 
treating soldiers after World War I changed Freud’s understanding of neurosis.7 




seriality as an analytic structure. I say this because the next step in our look at 
psychoanalytic theory’s encounter with seriality is to see that serial fiction has the 
structure of trauma as understood by Freud. Deferred information in a serial always 
makes sense of a prior question, to the point where it seems the later revelation caused 
the initial event. This is what Freud comes to understand with greater clarity after 
WWI and, to my mind, it is not an observation that grows out of Freud encountering 
an entirely new situation (i.e. analyzing postwar patients) but one where the new 
situation makes sense of Freud’s prior thinking on seriality. It is how Dickens 
happens—serially—that matters for Freud, not the “what” of Dickens—the dead 
babies, the disappearing/ reappearing parental figures, the orphans, the problematic 
mothers)—we see above.8  
 
Retroactivity and Serial Trauma 
One of the links between psychoanalysis and seriality is the vexed relationship 
both have to the idea of an ending and how intermittent ends, in effect, rewrite what 
came before. Nachträglichkeit is one of Freud’s most important concepts for 
understanding this (one he gets, possibly, from Hegel and the movement of dialectical 
thinking). In “Sexuality in the Aetiology of the Neuroses” Freud says, “The sexual 
experiences are bound to have a pathogenic effect. But they produce their effect only 
to a very slight degree at the time at which they occur; what is far more important is 
their deferred effect, which can only take place at later periods of growth” (281). 
Nackträglichkeit, “belatedness,” or “deferred action” is best thought of along the lines 




from effects that posit their own cause. German film and media critic Thomas 
Elsaesser glosses the concept: 
Freud was interested in temporality (as rupture, gap or discontinuity rather than 
as time’s linear arrow of sequence and succession). He speculated that time 
was a dimension that mankind had invented to protect itself from discontinuity 
and the contingent, and that it was a subjective category (rather than the 
physical, thermodynamic principle of entropy); this is why he introduced the 
notion of Nachträglichkeit, or deferred action, suggesting that in our thinking 
about ‘time’ we let effects rewrite their own ‘causes.’ (“Freud as media 
theorist: mystic writing pads and the matter of memory”102) 
Nachträglichkeit is an important early term for Freud. Though he will stop using the 
term with such regularity after 1898, the idea of retroactive meaning and backwards 
causality never leaves his thought.9 He returns to the concept most explicitly in “The 
Wolf Man” case (published in 1918) where he even re-explains the term (45). Most 
important for our purposes is that deferred action depends upon a gap. Seriality shares 
the structure of trauma as understood by Freud. 
In Freud’s Project for a Scientific Psychology (written in 1895 but unpublished 
until 1950), he first outlines the difference between what we might understand as a 
common-sense notion of trauma—that trauma is unary and single-event focused (e.g. a 
car accident is traumatic)—and the idea of trauma pursued by Freud. “We invariably 
find,” Freud writes, “that a memory is repressed which has only become a trauma by 
deferred action [Nachträglichkeit]” (356 emphasis original).10 Freud recounts the 




being able to go into shops alone” (410 emphasis original). Emma attempts to explain 
her behavior by reference to an incident which occurred at a shop when she was 
twelve. As Freud recounts, “[Emma] went into a shop to buy something, saw the two 
shop-assistants . . . laughing together, and rushed out in some kind of fright. In this 
connection it was possible to elicit the idea that the two men had been laughing at her 
clothes and that one of them had attracted her sexually” (ibid). The patient explains 
her symptom—not being able to enter shops alone—by reference to this singular prior 
event.  
Freud, however, is unconvinced of this unitary explanation for the symptom. 
Referring to this initial event as “Scene 1,” analysis unearths another “Scene,” an even 
earlier one, that both better explains the symptom and shows how trauma is made 
apprehensible through a series: 
Further investigation now revealed a second memory, which she denies having 
had in mind at the moment of Scene 1. . . . On two occasions when she was a 
child of eight she had gone into a small shop to buy some sweets, and the 
shopkeeper had grabbed at her genitals through her clothes. . . . We can now 
understand Scene I (with the shop-assistants) if we take it in conjunction with 
Scene II (with the shopkeeper). All we need is an associative link between 
them. She herself remarked that a link of this kind was provided by the 
laughter. The shop-assistants’ laughter had reminded her of the grin with 
which the shopkeeper had accompanied his assault. (411) 
What Freud engages with here as analyst is a search for coherence in a discontinuous 




into relation discontinuous or broken time. The analysand’s narrative is an interruptive 
one that can only be made sensible retroactively. These two scenes were four years 
apart. The first scene, being laughed at by shop-assistants, is determined by the 
analysand as the genesis of her present compulsion to not go into shops alone. To have 
such an extreme reaction to this laughter suggests to Freud that there must be 
something else imbuing the laughter with its powerful content. This unearths another 
memory, again at a shop, but this one far more serious—a sexual assault. What Freud 
realizes is that the sexual assault suffered by Emma at age eight was not registered as 
a sexual assault until her visit to a shop at age twelve.11 The laughter of the shop-
assistants at her clothes felt assaulting in nature and brought to light “an affect which. . 
. had not [been] excited as an experience” initially (413). So, it was the laughter of the 
shop-assistants that retroactively called forth the trauma of the prior assault. 
(Remembering, of course, that the prior assault occurred through Emma’s clothes.) Or, 
as Freud puts it regarding this incident, “We invariably find that a memory is 
repressed which has only become a trauma after the event” (ibid, emphasis in 
original).  
Trauma, for Freud, relies on deferred action, or a seemingly innocuous incident 
calling forth the trauma of a previous event. The registration of this trauma is 
retroactive, it does not occur continuous with the subject’s experience of time.12 This 
makes trauma a series. We might recall Marx’s famous correction of Hegel that 
history repeats itself, first as tragedy then as farce. We might imagine Hegel’s riposte: 
that one needs the farce to be able to fully register the tragedy.13 Regarding trauma and 




compulsion to repeat repeats is not some traumatic and hence repressed experience, 
but something which could never register as an experience to begin with. The trauma 
which is being repeated is outside the horizon of experience (and is, rather, 
constitutive of it). This emphasis is absolutely crucial: the trauma is real, but not 
experienced” (107). Trauma is an impossible hole in our symbolic experience. It 
cannot be recalled like an innocuous memory, it confronts us—just as Emma was 
confronted by the shop-assistants’ laughter at her clothes.  
Seriality confronts us with a gap that interrupts closure. This interruptive gap 
causes the analysand to “suffer more,” as Freud tells us, linking seriality and the gap to 
distress and tension. The gap is always already fraught. There are no empty or blank 
gaps, only confrontations with the serial form.  
 
The Death Drive and Repetition 
In Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Freud first begins to articulate his discovery 
of the death drive. The importance of the death drive to Freud’s theory cannot be 
overstated. The acceptance or rejection of Freud’s theory of the drive is something that 
separates psychoanalytic theorists and practitioners. Jacques Lacan’s oft-mentioned 
“return to Freud” positions the drive as Freud’s most indispensable logic. Freud first 
defines the death drive as “an urge in organic life to restore an earlier state of things,” 
or the “inanimate state” (43, 46).14 (We will need to complicate this definition but for 
now it will suffice.) Importantly, this is not a singular or linear “urge” but a circuitous 
repetitive path carved against biological interest. As Richard Boothby puts it in Freud 




animal behavior—and the idea of “instinct”—is “[the drive’s] complete detachment 
from biological need and from any naturally designated object of satisfaction” (137-
138).  
While Freud was developing his own notion of the death drive in the aftermath 
of Beyond the Pleasure Principle he was aghast to see that his colleagues attempted to 
find a drive for every possible behavior (i.e. a drive to hoard, for example, which is 
separate from a drive to eat excessively, which is separate from a drive to explore, 
which is separate from…). What's wrong with these ad hoc “drive inventions” is that 
they all have an aim or an end (i.e. a drive to hoard aims at accumulating something or 
accumulation in general). Drive, for Freud has no other aim than to repeat itself. 
Responding to this “mini-tradition” of misreading the drive, Lacan famously claims, in 
“Position of the Unconscious,” that “every drive is virtually a death drive” (719). 
What Lacan means is that the death drive is not simply one drive among many, rather 
it is fundamental to the subject as conceived by psychoanalysis as such. It designates a 
gap in being that cannot be filled in, as the subject is constituted around this gap.  
The above quote from Beyond the Pleasure Principle may seem to indicate a 
linearity or teleology for the subject in psychoanalysis. If there’s an urge in organic 
life to reach an “inanimate state” that makes life an uncomplicated path toward death 
(the most inanimate of states), right? Not exactly. As Freud writes, the death drive is 
responsible for inspiring the human subject to “diverge ever more widely from its 
original course of life and to make ever more complicated detours before reaching its 
aim of death. These circuitous paths to death . . . would thus present us today with the 




motor in the subject that allows us to “die differently,” as Alenka Zupančič puts in in 
her recent What IS Sex? (106).  
The “circuitous paths” Freud identifies above hint at the core of repetition 
embedded in the death drive and, thereby, in the subject. Helpfully clarifying the 
crucial aspect of repetition involved in the drive, Zupančič writes,  
Now, instead of conceiving the death drive proper as the fundamental 
omnipresent tendency to return to the inanimate (a kind of magnetism of the 
inanimate), we have to conceive it as originating in another (kind) of repetition 
occurring within this “conservative” repetition; as repetition within repetition: 
namely, repetition of some (partial and, so to speak, extracurricular) 
satisfaction accidentally produced within this conservative repetition. This is 
very much in tune with how Freud, in “Three Essays on the Theory of 
Sexuality,” deduces sexuality and sexual drives: as a surplus 
satisfaction/excitation that occurs in the course of the functioning, and 
satisfaction, of different organic functions. (Like the famous “pleasure of the 
mouth” occurring in the course of satisfying the need for food.) This surplus is 
not an external but an internal cause of tension, and of constant pressure; and, 
paradoxically, the drive originating in this surplus does not aim at lowering or 
annihilating that tension/excitation, but on the contrary at repeating it, again 
and again. (103) 
It is repetition that becomes central to understanding the death drive, as Zupančič 
clarifies. The drive does not simply involve the subject in constitutive repetition, 




This repetition is both constitutive of the subject and continuous for the subject. Since 
constitutive and continuous repetition is at the heart of seriality and Freud’s drive, we 
might be moved to state that the drive is serial. Grasping the logic of a seriality that 
forms against our conscious wishes or acknowledgement will be Lacan’s project, 
which he articulates through the signifier (though it has a clear correlation with the 
unconscious as well).  
It is worth pivoting back to Dickens here. The earlier survey of Freud’s place 
in Dickens scholarship will not have been much use in establishing a causal link 
between the two if a notion as critical to Freud’s thought as the drive is absent in the 
study of Dickens. Robert E. Lougy’s “Desire and the Ideology of Violence: America 
in Charles Dickens’s Martin Chuzzlewit” deals principally with Dickens’s conflictual 
relationship with the United States of America, offering that evidence of this tension is 
embedded in Martin Chuzzlewit. His interest in both the Dickens text and 
psychoanalysis amounts to more than psycho-biography, as he argues that Martin 
Chuzzlewit is a text that explores Freud’s death drive: “America in Martin Chuzzlewit, 
like the landscape of Eden, is both tomb and womb, the place of beginning and end, 
both Alpha and Omega . . . Dickens was fascinated by the struggle between the forces 
of life and those of death and his characters are often death-haunted, drawn towards 
those landscapes of cessation and ease” (586).  The death drive, as we have seen, is 
such a crucial notion for Freud. It is hard to overstate how the drive caused a revision 
to Freud’s previous ideas of the body being, in some ways, homeostatic (e.g. the 
pleasure principle regulates psychical or bodily excitation to extend it). After the 




to repeat loss. Lougy’s phrase “tomb and womb” is a nice way of seeing the overlap of 
Freud’s idea in Dickens’s fiction. The idea “tomb and womb” is seen specifically in 
Beyond the Pleasure Principle when Freud notes the tendency in fish to live close to 
where they are born rather than move toward necessary resources, thus securing an 
easier or longer life.   
Lougy’s scholarship in particular makes for an excellent mini-case study. His 
2002 essay, “Filth, Liminality, and Abjection in Charles Dickens’s Bleak House” 
returns to the Freudian idea that “filth is unavoidable” to examine the unavoidable 
excrement of/ in Bleak House. Like Lawrence Frank, Lougy is compelled to explore 
Kristeva and “the relationship between filth, the feminine and the symbolic order” 
(475). He finds in Bleak House, however, a strong illustration of Freud’s uncanny: “In 
his final prefatory remarks to Bleak House . . . Dickens tells us that ‘I have purposely 
dwelt upon the romantic side of familiar things,’ thereby alerting us to the fact that his 
novel will be situated at the site of Freud’s uncanny, the unfamiliar in the familiar” 
(477). Seven years later in “Dickens and the Wolf Man: Childhood Memory and 
Fantasy in David Copperfield,” Lougy is compelled to write a meta-critical note on 
why “Freud and Dickens, yet again?” (407). His explanation leans in to one of the core 
arguments proffered here: Freud was a reader of Dickens (ibid). The task then is to 
take note of the radiating consequences and connections of Freud’s encounter with 
Dickens. For Lougy this means he is “especially intrigued by their shared interest in an 
unknowable past and a haunted present . . . For Freud and for Dickens, the problematic 
dynamics and origins of memory, especially childhood memories, are similarly 




unknowable past and a haunted present,” as Lougy puts it, but the thinking of each is 
structured and ruptured by seriality. 
I will now attempt to pull all of the above terms and ideas (retroactivity, 
repetition, the drive, the unconscious, seriality) together. Psychoanalysis, at bottom, is 
a retroactive investigation of the psyche. What psychoanalysis effects, with its discrete 
sessions, is the exact form of a serial, in this respect. On the one hand these sessions 
are discrete and self-contained but on the other they are connected via the gap that 
both separates and binds them. This is both the problem of the structure of analysis 
that Freud considers in Studies on Hysteria and a problem in the content of sessions 
themselves. As Freud notes in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, “Patients repeat . . . 
unwanted situations and painful emotions in the transference and revive them with the 
greatest ingenuity. They seek to bring about the interruption of the treatment while it is 
still incomplete” (21). In 1895’s Studies on Hysteria, Freud notes that sessions end too 
soon, always in the middle of the analysand recalling or thinking through something. 
This creates a gap in the session itself, a gap of unresolved content. This lack of 
resolution causes the analysand to suffer more as they cannot rid themselves of what 
has been left unsaid. In 1920’s Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Freud is moved to 
observe that this meta-structure to the scheduling of psychoanalysis is active in the 
individual sessions themselves, where patients “seek to bring about the interruption of 
the treatment while it is still incomplete” (21). This self-sabotaging action is, as Freud 
understands, the work of the drive and its compulsion to undermine and repeat. The 
drive, being the motor of the unconscious as Freud discovers, ingrains repetition into 




progress—like the patients Freud observes in Beyond the Pleasure Principle—but 
nonetheless moves forward, recalling the Library of Congress’s definition of 
seriality—a publication expected to continue indefinitely. Theorizing the serial gap, 
and its influence on psychoanalysis, is to fully consider the mind as understood by 
psychoanalysis. While not every psychoanalytic concept can be understood with 
recourse to seriality, the core of how psychoanalysis understands the subject and the 
function of analysis itself is deeply rooted in the logic of seriality. 
 
“Make them laugh, make them cry, make them wait.” 
As much as Dickens’s characters and worlds occupied Freud’s thoughts it is 
the serial form, its constraints, and its dialectic of closure and disclosure that affected 
the development of Freud’s professional thinking. Most importantly it is the problem 
of the gap that captured Freud. Variously attributed to Charles Dickens, Wilkie 
Collins, or Charles Reade, the phrase “Make them laugh, make them cry, make them 
wait” neatly summarizes the serial writing ethos.15 (We might also easily imagine 
Freud having said this, perhaps cynically, about analysis.) Peter Barry, in his literary 
and cultural theory primer, Beginning Theory uses this phrase to explain the inner 
workings of narrative and one of its primary appeals, “The central mechanism in 
stories is delay, to be specific, delay in imparting . . . information—the Victorian 
novelist Wilkie Collins famously said that the formulae for writing a successful novel 
is ‘Make them laugh, make them cry—make them wait’” (217). The gap is represented 
here as an active feature of the writing and content itself. It is not simply an absence 




of a publishing schedule. It is alive in the text and it is not reducible to the “live” 
experience of a serial.16 The serial writing ethos urges making readers wait. In other 
words, a serial publishing schedule forces readers to wait by design but that delay 
means nothing if the content is not itself gapped in some way. 
As we saw in Freud’s letters to Martha, it is the gap that he responded to as a 
reader. As we saw in Studies on Hysteria, it is the gap that troubled him as an analyst. 
Freud understood the virtue of “make them wait” as a reader, as evidenced by his 
hurry to get to the end of Daniel Deronda. He also understood the imposition of the 
gap for analysis. Understanding the formal necessity and the psychical cut of the serial 
gap is the connective tissue for many of Freud’s most important insights and 
discoveries (as discussed above). In fact, Barry hits on something with the punctuation 
of the “make them laugh, make them cry—make them wait” that we can see in Freud. 
Most iterations of the phrase use commas or semi-colons to separate the clauses. Barry 
puts a dash after the first two clauses thereby emphasizing the importance of the final 
clause. More important is the punctuation itself. The dash cuts the line. It is not just a 
stylistic flourish on Barry’s part but a piece of punctuation that alerts us to the 
presence of the gap.  
Rebecca Comay and Frank Ruda draw our attention to the stakes immanent to 
just this kind of punctuation in their recent The Dash—The Other Side of Absolute 
Knowing, a new look at Hegel’s speculative notion of absolute knowing formed 
through a study of two dashes (one at the end of Phenomenology of Spirit and the 




Hegel and the development of his thought here, but they might as well be writing 
about the logic of seriality, the gap, and the function of repetition: 
Every repetition is the echo of an earlier repetition. Between these two dashes 
opens up the interstitial space in which thinking learns what it means to move 
from one side of the Moebius strip to the other and back again. Within this 
transitional space philosophy rehearses the question of what it means to begin 
anew. The beginning move seems to vanish, but there is a compulsion to 
reinscribe this vanishing move in every step that follows, and this repetition 
throws us back to an even earlier rehearsal . . . We move on, yet we keep 
repeating, we seem to make progress, yet only in returning, we backslide, and 
yet we lurch forward. Ent-schluss and Er-innerung, repetition and advance, 
repetition in advance. (108) 
As Comay and Ruda see with Hegel’s dash, the dash Barry puts in the middle of 
“make them laugh, make them cry—make them wait” helps us to visualize the 
opening up of the interstitial space of the serial form that this chapter has taken on. 
The gap is the decisive element in seriality. It is the condition of possibility for 
repetition and iteration, which narrative seriality is premised upon. Gaps, as we saw in 
the example of Freud’s patient named Emma, allow for the retroactive articulation of 
meaning. Gaps haul us back, force us to repeat or rehearse. They push us forward (or 
perhaps we only “lurch” forward, as Comay and Ruda suggest).  
It is worth mentioning that the first line of the above quotation is itself a self-
conscious echo of Freud’s own declaration in Three Essay on the Theory of Sexuality 




section of this chapter. Repetition, central to the serial form, has been a constant 
source of inquiry for Freud. Indeed, psychoanalysis—from the very beginning—has 
been deeply invested in thinking through the consequences of seriality, as we have 
seen through references to both personal and professional writings of Freud’s. 
Through positing a serial starting point for his thinking of the psychoanalytic project, 
we can see how understanding such core psychoanalytic notions as Nachträglichkeit, 
the unconscious, repetition, and death drive require a theoretical consideration of the 
gap. Refinding the gap at the heart of Freud’s theory fills in a gap of scholarly 
attention and sets the stage for our continued exploration of seriality as a gapped logic. 
 
                                                 
1 My work on seriality in this context complements that of many foundational scholars in the fields of 
Victorian seriality and periodical studies.  
 
Among the first in the field to discuss the theoretical complexity offered by serial forms is Margaret 
Beetham. Beetham attends to a central concern of periodical studies – that periodicals are so diverse in 
type and form that it is difficult for scholars to draw appropriate conclusions or theories of the works. 
These issues, she notes, can be drawn together under the umbrella term of “boundary problems” (97). 
But, Beetham finds, these problems actually form the genre’s distinctiveness across its varied iterations. 
She writes, “it seems that the essential quality of the periodical, its serial form and the other ways in 
which it seems to resist closure, can be read as a sign of its strength as a potentially creative form for its 
readers. In other words, we could argue that the difficulty of defining the periodical in terms of 
recognized genres and publishing modes is associated with a set of characteristics which make it a 
potentially disruptive kind of text” (98). This includes the operations of structure and closure: these 
operations may refer to these periodical texts’ divisions, regularity of release, beginnings, and/or 
endings; as well the very physical, concrete structures of their readers’ lives including the developing 
discipline of clock-time, such as the planned release of particular periodical papers on Sunday because 
of its new function as a “leisure day” for workers within capitalist industrial societies. 
 
Building upon Beetham’s work, Mark W. Turner has observed the interpretive possibilities made 
available when scholars consider not only the material content of serial works, but what he deems the 
temporal “periodical-ness” (310) of periodicals. By this, he means how these works construct or 
challenge Victorian notions of time – from the past including play with the English pastoral, to the 
present’s “newness,” to the “forward-moving culture” of the future (310). As Linda K. Hughes and 
Michael Lund have pointed out, this temporal condition of the periodical means that the “progress and 
pause” (Hughes and Lund 63) of serials has real critical significance. Turner ultimately suggests that 
“part of the periodical-ness of the periodical is exploring the various ways that time was imagined and 
experienced by nineteenth-century readers” (312).  
 
Additional concerns of textuality, textual forms, and gender comprise a significant body of current work 
in periodicals. Laurel Brake, for example, takes up the genre’s paratexts, looking at the “supplement” as 
literary form. Lyn Pykett brings critical attention to the roles of Wilkie Collins, Mary Elizabeth 




                                                                                                                                            
of the sensation novel and publication through syndication. Most recently, Caroline Levine argues that 
Victorian utilization of serial forms for narrative suspense means that writers and readers understood 
suspense not as corruptive “pleasure,” but rather, as stimulus for active speculation in The Serious 
Pleasures of Suspense: Victorian Realism and Narrative Doubt (University of Virginia Press, 2015). 
Lauren M. E. Goodlad devotes a final chapter of her The Victorian Geopolitical Aesthetic: Realism, 
Sovereignty, and Transnational Experience (Oxford University Press, 2015) to connecting the trope of 
Babylon as hallmark of modernity within the realist narratives of AMC’s contemporary television serial 
Mad Men (2007-2015) and Anthony Trollope’s The Prime Minister (November 1875-June 1876). 
 
2 Jennifer Hayward, in Consuming Pleasures, 3, 24. 
 
3 There is a difference between the way Caruth and Freud approach trauma. For Caruth, the traumatic 
event is always inaccessible. For Freud, as we will see below, the traumatic event is called forth 
retroactively (though, like Caruth, Freud observes that direct confrontation with the prior traumatic 
event is not possible). The second event in a series allows the prior one to be symbolizable through the 
process of analysis. While the patient cannot access directly the traumatic event, the analyst can see 
how the patient’s subjectivity is curved around the trauma. This may be a way to understand Lacan’s 
order of the real. The real, as we will see in the next chapter, is included in the symbolic, though it is 
inaccessible. We can apprehend the real by seeing how the symbolic curves to accommodate it. The real 
is a point of impossible articulation that which escapes symbolization itself, but which nonetheless 
affects symbolization and signification around it. 
 
4 Freud is reading a bound volume copy of Daniel Deronda, rather than reading it in its initial eight-part 
serial print run in 1867 (when he would have been 11 years old). One might be tempted to say that this 
no longer makes the novel serial, which is an argument explored in depth in Chapter Five (with 
recourse to Netflix television, which bind and then release an entire serial television show all at once). 
The position of this dissertation is that the serial gap cannot be eliminated by printing Daniel Deronda 
as a single novel or releasing The Wire in a single DVD/Blu Ray boxset. Believing only in seriality as a 
momentary and transient phenomenon makes it elusive. Further, it disobeys one of the cardinal rules of 
seriality: that meaning can only be apprehended retroactively.    
 
5 Lacan will turn to the signifying chain to make sense of the drive, removing it entirely from the 
biological context Freud first puts the drive in. As he writes in Seminar VII, “If everything that is 
immanent or implicit in the chain of natural events may be considered as subject to the so-called death 
drive, it is only because there is a signifying chain. Freud’s thought in this matter requires that what is 
involved be articulated as a destruction drive, given that it challenges everything that exists. But it is 
also a will to create from zero, a will to begin again” (212). 
 
6 Peter Brooks’ Reading for the Plot: Design and Intention in Narrative is possibly the most well-
known use of psychoanalysis in narrative theory and will be engaged with extensively here. While 
Brooks writes often of desire and the death drive, he seems to conflate death drive with Heidegger’s 
being towards death. For Heidegger, death is the cause of anxiety in life, an anxiety that works to set 
the ground for meaning. So death drive, for Brooks, is more at work in the desire to reach the end of the 
narrative than it is a concept useful for viewing the failure to master the compulsion to repeat. He 
writes, “The desire of the text (the desire of reading) is hence desire for the end, but desire for the end 
reached only through the at least minimally complicated detour, the intentional deviance, in tension, 
which is the plot of narrative” (102). Brooks’ understanding of psychoanalysis in evidence here is an 
example of a critical development in psychoanalytic thinking. Current understanding of psychoanalysis 
actually sees this “minimally complicated detour” as not just the thing that causes desire, but desire 
itself (the objet a of Lacan). It is the impediment that creates conditions for desire and it is the drive that 
enjoys the failure of satisfying desire. In this one line we can see the difference between how Brooks 
understood psychoanalysis in his time and how—through the intervention of thinkers like Žižek and 
Zupancic—we understand it now. Brooks understands textual desire as a desire for the end but it has to 





                                                                                                                                            
Much important work linking psychoanalysis to narrative theory has occurred in Queer theory. Judith 
Roof’s Come as You Are: Sexuality & Narrative pushes back on Peter Brooks’ end oriented and 
teleological notion of narrative desire, arguing that it valorizes a heterosexual and masculinist 
conception of pleasure. Lee Edelman, in No Future, offers a theory of the drive—focusing on what he 
sees as a raw negativity—in his reading of Hitchcock’s The Birds. Val Rohy’s Lost Causes: Narrative, 
Etiology, and Queer Theory argues that the backwards causality favored by Freud in his notion of 
sexual etiology and Nachträglichkeit is crucial to claiming causality for queer sexualities that is not 
simply biological.  
 
7 The common textual references in support of this view are “The Uncanny,” footnotes added to the 
“Wolf Man” case study, and Beyond the Pleasure Principle. See Cathy Caruth’s “Parting Words: 
Trauma, Silence, and Survival” (intervalla 2 [2014-15]: 20-33); Shoshana Ringel’s “Overview: History 
of Trauma Theory” in Trauma: Contemporary Directions in Theory, Practice, and Research, edited by 
Ringel and Gerrold R. Brandell (Sage Publications, 2011); and Marc-Antoine Crocq and Louis Crocq’s 
“From shell shock and war neurosis to posttraumatic stress disorder: a history of psychotraumatology” 
(Dialogues in Clinical Neuroscience vol. 2, 1 [2000]: 47-55). 
 
8 While this chapter focuses on the close connection between Freud and Dickens, we’ve already seen a 
wider consideration of psychoanalysis in the work of Dickens scholars. Frank draws his readers to the 
ideas of Melanie Klein and Julia Kristeva toward the end of his essay on Little Dorrit. In an allied 
move, Dickens scholars have made use of the psychoanalytic theory of Jacques Lacan. Beginning his 
“Desire and the Ideology of Violence: America in Charles Dickens’s Martin Chuzzlewit” with a lengthy 
quotation from Lacan, Robert E. Lougy argues that Dickens’s early writings evince a fascination with 
“how [people] are born into a network of signifiers that govern not only our birth into the social order 
but also our exit from it” and how “we are the unconscious heirs of codes and laws that constitute 
human culture” (569). The ease with which Klein, Kristeva, or Lacan can be brought to bear on Dickens 
can hardly be surprising given how important Dickens and the serial form is to Freud. The psychical 
effects of the serial form on Dickens, however, is a topic beyond the scope of this chapter and 
dissertation. 
 
9 Lacan will later expand Nachträglichkeit through his emphasis on the importance of punctuation, seen 
both in his idea of le point de capiton and the punctuated or “short” psychoanalytic session. This will be 
explored in Chapter II. 
 
10 Strachey translates nachträglich, which is an adverb, as “deferred action.” The word “retroactively” 
might be closer to Freud’s meaning and it is the sense of term that this dissertation will use most often.  
 
Relatedly, Jean Laplanche uses the term après-coup, translated as “afterwardsness” in English, to 
understand Nachträglichkeit. See Jean Laplanche “Notes on Afterwardsness” in Essays on Otherness. 
New York: Routledge. 1999. 
 
11 This, Freud suggests, has to do with Emma being much closer to puberty and this aware of her own 
sexuality and the sexuality of others than she would have been at age eight. 
 
12 We might even be moved to recall that in Dickens scholarship it appears that Freud caused the 
Freudian to appear in Dickens, rather than the other way around. 
 
13 In the revealed religion section of the Phenomenology, Hegel makes the point that only the comic 
consciousness of Christianity allows us to full recognize the tragedy of unhappy consciousness: “We 
now see that the unhappy consciousness constituted the counterpart and the culmination of the 
consciousness that was perfectly happy within itself, namely, the comic consciousness. All divine 






                                                                                                                                            
14  Sigmund Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, trans. and ed. James Strachey (New York: Norton, 
1975), 43. 
 
15 This is hardly an exhaustive compilation of references, but it is a representative one. Goodreads, a 
website for sharing book recommendations, has a page listing “make them laugh, make them cry, make 
them wait” as a Charles Dickens quote.  https://www.goodreads.com/quotes/914125-make-them-laugh-
make-them-cry-make-them-wait 
 
William Cane’s Fiction Writing Master Class teaches aspiring writers lessons based on the methods and 
techniques of famous authors. His section on Dickens attributes the “make them laugh” phrase to him, 
using it as a model for developing intricate tone and plotting (qtd. in Freese “Write Like Charles 
Dickens”  https://www.writersdigest.com/editor-blogs/there-are-no-rules/write-like-charles-dickens). 
 
GW Dalquist’s Guardian article on serial writing attributes the “make them laugh” quote to Wilkie 
Collins. Interestingly, the article has a correction at the top say the Dalquist misattributes the quote to 
Collins and that it is “usually ascribed to Charles Reade.” 
https://www.theguardian.com/books/2007/jan/06/featuresreviews.guardianreview1 
 
Tellingly, none of the references to the “make them laugh” phrase—Barry’s included—point to where 
any of these authors are alleged to have said this.  
 
16 Toby Miller briefly offers the repetition typical of a serial to discern the difference between genres in 
Television Studies: The Basics and later to quantify temporal audience engagement with a serial text 
(i.e. that the wait between episodes is used as a proxy for the characters in the fictional world) (82-83, 
126). Miller sees, in a different way, the relationship between time and seriality that Freud thinks is so 







LACAN AND THE SERIAL REAL 
 
Dickens scholar Grahame Smith has urged fellow scholars to observe a change 
in the way they discuss Dickens’ seriality: “if I could change one aspect of Dickens 
studies with a wave of my magic wand, it would be to substitute the phrase ‘serial 
writing’ for ‘serial publication’” (“Dickens and Critical Theory”).1 Smith argues that 
the phrase “serial publication” obfuscates the reality of Dickens’ working methods” 
(ibid). The difference between “publication” and “writing” is in the “distinction 
between becoming and being” (ibid). For Smith, a novel such as Bleak House is in a 
“continuous state of becoming” and observing the seeming liveness of seriality is 
crucial to appreciating that aspect of Dickens’ writing (ibid). Smith is not alone in 
emphasizing the “becoming” of seriality. This is why contemporary scholars of serial 
narrative such as Frank Kelleter put so much weight on audience interactivity: there is 
an exchange between audience and author where the two inform and alter each other 
thereby affecting the serial text. Perhaps there is not a more famous example of this in 
literature than Dickens changing the ending to Great Expectations on the suggestion 
of a reader (Edward Bulwer-Lytton, to be exact).  
In the last chapter, Freud shows exactly the attraction to and problematic of the 
gap for analysis. What Freud enables us to see is that the serial form itself produces its 
own kind of suffering. This is because the serial gap is a priori fraught and a site of 




the death drive. Jacques Lacan will pick up where Freud left off and seize the gap to 
articulate the logic of his notion of the real, thereby showing that the serial gap 
influences and orders outside the control of authors or audience. Where Sean 
O’Sullivan has recently designated six elements for seriality that are “choices,” Lacan 
allows us to see that conscious choice is simply not the way seriality works.2 In the 
beginning of his career, Lacan talks about how the rules that govern the internal 
functioning of a series emerge and toward the end he links seriality with the real. 
Putting these two moments together shows us something I am calling “the serial real.” 
It also lets us understand how Lacan is a thinker of structure—literally how a series is 
structured, by what internal rules is a series structured or ordered—and of the real. I 
will refer to him as a structuralist of the real as a result. 
After establishing how Lacan understands seriality and how he extends some 
of the Freudian ideas discussed in the previous chapter, we will use long form 
“Twitterature” examples—written by Jennifer Egan and Joshua Clover respectively—
to advance Lacan’s ideas into the realm of new media seriality.3 
 
Lacanian Seriality Part I: Rules ex nihilo 
Jacques Lacan makes a key contribution to the psychoanalytic theorization of 
seriality by bringing structural linguistics to psychoanalytic theory. In fact, the engine 
behind his “return to Freud” is not just an emphasis on the death drive but the 
discovery of Ferdinand de Saussure’s linguistic model.4 Lacan, through his friend 
Roman Jakobson, became interested in linguistics and quickly understood the role it 




simultaneously a theory of signification, which possibly accounts for Lacan’s 
seemingly outsized impact on the world of cultural analysis. Lacan theorizes the 
structure of signification in terms of a relationship between his three famous 
categories of symbolic, real, and imaginary.  
Lacan’s three orders of the symbolic, imaginary, and real all need to be thought 
together (though the imaginary is the first to emerge in Lacan’s work). As Lacan says 
in Seminar II: Ego in Freud’s Theory and in Technique of Psychoanalysis:  
In the symbolic order the totality is called a universe. The symbolic order from 
the first takes on its universal character. It isn't constituted bit by bit. As soon 
as the symbol arrives, there is a universe of symbols . . . however small the 
number of symbols which you might conceive of as constituting the emergence 
of the symbolic function as such in human life, they imply the totality of 
everything which is human. Everything is ordered in accordance with the 
symbols which have emerged, in accordance with the symbols once they have 
appeared. (29)  
Lacan is here talking specifically of the symbolic as term but is keen to note that the 
world of symbols and signification does not emerge “bit by bit” or, in other words, 
does not emerge first with the imaginary, then the symbolic, and then the real (or any 
other ordering). As Lacan says later, “one shouldn’t think the symbols have actually 
come from the real” (238). Lacan is saying that the whole order emerges all at once, 
seemingly out of nothing, which he will prove later in the seminar with recourse to 
Edgar Allan Poe’s story “The Purloined Letter.” The symbolic, then, is a structure that 




Seminar XI: The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, points to openings 
and breaks within the symbolic structure. In the “Tuché and Automaton” lecture from 
that seminar, Lacan frequently refers to the real as an encounter, laying out its 
traumatic valence: “The function of the tuché, of the real as encounter—the encounter 
in so far as it may be missed, in so far as it is essentially the missed encounter—first 
presented itself in the history of psycho-analysis in a form that was in itself already 
enough to arouse our attention, that of the trauma” (55).5 The imaginary is what we 
use to cover over the real—the points of break or trauma that Lacan mentions above—
and apprehend a cohesive whole. It is the imaginary that allows us to believe that 
when we are dealing with the symbolic, we are dealing with a coherent world (as 
Lacan explains most famously in his essay on “The Mirror Stage”). The imaginary 
repairs the rift of the real that opens up in the symbolic, although it does so in a way 
that leaves the rift, albeit obscured to consciousness.  
Lacan’s way of thinking about the symbolic order—which is threatened by the 
real and cohered by the imaginary—allows us to understand the way seriality 
functions beyond even what Freud himself makes possible in his early writings. Let’s 
begin with a jumping off question: Why does Lacan need to separate these orders if 
they all arrive together, intrinsically tied? Lorenzo Chiesa explains that “the Symbolic 
as Symbolic is inherently prevented from symbolizing itself” (Subjectivity and 
Otherness: A Philosophical Reading of Lacan 122). We need to negotiate the gaps in 
signification to understand anything at all and, most importantly for our investigation 




The key for a theory of seriality is the relationship that Lacan lays out between 
the symbolic and the real. This relationship preoccupies him throughout his 
intellectual career but it finds a perfect expression in his account of serial relations in 
the Appendix to “The Seminar on the Purloined Letter.” The Appendix systematizes 
the structural logic of seriality that Lacan finds lurking in Poe’s short story. In Seminar 
II, he already investigated how a symbolic structure has a determinative effect on the 
ways in which subjects act and on what they can or cannot do. After being consulted 
by the French police, Auguste Dupin helps the police return a stolen letter to an 
unnamed woman who is well-known in French society. The stolen letter in question, 
the police tell Dupin, is being used to blackmail the woman on behalf of an unsavory 
man referred to as Minister D—. The police search D—‘s house and are bewildered at 
not being able to find the letter. Dupin manages to find it seemingly without trouble 
and explains his method to the police. The short version is that Dupin realized that 
D—would know the police would search his home so he hid the letter in plain sight. 
The long version of how Dupin knew this is explained by Dupin recounting how an 
eight-year old boy made a fortune predicting results in a game of “Odds and Evens.” It 
is this game that fascinates Lacan and underpins his thinking on seriality. 
 Lacan imagines a game of coin tosses being played in consecutive fashion. 
Obviously, the relationship between one coin toss is strictly accidental or by chance. 
The idea of “chance” is important to Lacan. In “The Unconscious and Repetition” 
lecture of Lacan’s Seminar XI: The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, he 
says, “What is repeated, in fact, is always something that occurs . . . as if by chance” 




seeming chance to push back on the core Saussurean idea that the relation between 
signifier and signified itself is arbitrary and the ideological belief that chance governs 
our life within the symbolic order. He recognizes that while the result of each toss of 
the coin is arbitrary if we group coin tosses all of a sudden certain results emerge as 
impossible. As Lacan says, “Simply connoting with (+) and (-) a series playing on the 
sole fundamental alternative of presence and absence allows us to demonstrate how 
the strictest symbolic determinations accommodate a succession of [coin] tosses 
whose reality is strictly distributed ‘by chance’” (Ecrits 35). Lacan is saying that while 
the factor of chance does not on its own eliminate symbolic necessity because it is 
serially structured the symbolic order takes up chance events and inscribes them in a 
system of necessity. This necessity enables us to see the way in which the symbolic 
does not just determine what is possible but also enables points of impossibilities—
what Lacan calls the real—to emerge.  
In Lacan’s example, + and – stand in for heads and tails. Through this he 
generates a rudimentary “language” and “chain of signifiers.” Taking the following 
example from Bruce Fink’s The Lacanian Subject, we see this instructive chain: 
  
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  Toss Numbers 
+  +  –  – +  –  –  –  +   Heads/ Tails Chain 
 
There is, obviously, a 50/50 chance that an unloaded coin will flip either heads or tails 




sequence, what seems to be arbitrary and random is ordered by rules that emerge from 
the gaps in the serial sequence itself.  
Such an order can be seen when grouping the tosses. For example, grouping 
tosses in pair combinations gives us four possible pairs: ++, – –, + –, and – +. Fink 
designates pair + + as 1, “the first level of coding we are going to introduce, and it 
marks the origin of the symbolic system we are creating” (17). The two alternating 
combinations of + – and – + are given the number 2 and the tails-tails (– –) pair is 
given the designation 3. These numeric designations form a signification matrix that 
changes random coin tosses into a system with memory and order. As Fink shows: 
 
 +  +  –  – +  –  –  –  +   Heads/ Tails Chain 
     1  2  3  2  2  3  3  2   Numeric Matrix Category 
 
Reading this random set of coin tosses in terms of pairs already produces the kinds of 
memory and order that Lacan’s notion of the serial is premised on. As Fink explains:  
It is already clear at this point that a category 1 set of tosses (+ +) cannot be 
immediately followed in the lower line (i.e., the line representing category 
numbers) by a category 3 set, as the second throw in a category 1 is necessarily 
a plus, whereas the first throw in a category 3 has to be a minus . . . We have 
thus already come up with a way of grouping tosses (a ‘symbolic matrix’) 
which prohibits certain combinations . . . We have generated an impossibility 
in our signifying chain, even though we have not determined the outcome of 




Fink follows this up by equating the above coin toss rule with “a spelling rule” such as 
“I before e except after c” though he is keen to note that “the rule we have just created 
knows no exception” (18). Again, Lacan’s claim is that these tosses constitute a 
language, with all the order and memory that implies. Fink, noting the appropriateness 
with bringing a notion of a “chain” to language, writes “most rules of spelling and 
grammar concern the way letters and words are strung or chained together, dictating 
what can and cannot precede one letter or term and what can and cannot follow it” 
(18). Fink pushes this observation further and discovers other rules dictated by this 
system of groups of coin tosses. Playing the string out with more tosses shows that 
“the chain prohibits the appearance of a second 1 until an even number of 2s has 
turned up” (18). This prohibition is Lacan’s justification for his claim that the 
signifying chain “remembers or keeps track of its previous components” (18).  
Though it seems hard to imagine that a series of coin tosses can include 
possible or impossible results, Lacan demonstrates this must be the case, as he shows 
that observing a series of coin tosses allows for groups, order, and rules to emerge as 
though they constitute natural laws (noting the corollary to how he describes the 
symbolic, imaginary, and real emerging at once as an apparent whole).6 Lacan’s point 
about the signifying chain is that first, it has memory; second, it has its own order 
(“law,” in Lacan’s phrasing); and third, that these things emerge out of nothing.  
 
Lacanian Seriality Part II: The Serial Real 
Lacan’s post-script to his lecture on “The Purloined Letter” is his most 




repetition—such as repeated coin flips. That lecture has given us a way to articulate 
Lacan’s initial insights into seriality. Still, “The Purloined Letter” lecture is not the 
only reference he makes to seriality throughout his public seminars, which means we 
have to push a little further to fully examine seriality in the Lacanian sense. This gives 
us one final—and complicated—move to make to establish a notion of the “serial 
real.” I put the phrase in quotation marks because Lacan himself comes close to 
employing this exact phrasing but, what’s more, I think the phrase “serial real” helps 
to manifest Lacan’s theory of seriality more coherently than it actually is in the text of 
Lacan.  
Remembering from the introduction that Lacan’s theory of seriality is opposed 
to Sartre’s is important here. Sartre sees seriality as a superficial grouping. There is no 
meaningful connection between the parts in a series. Further, it is an outside force that 
determines the relation between parts in a series. Capitalism groups a number of 
people waiting for a bus in a city center, in his most famous example. It keeps people 
disconnected. Lacan, on the other hand, formulates his notion of seriality as radical 
coherence. He is here against the notion of the discontinuity favored by Sartre in his 
idea of seriality.  
It is this sense that I am going to refer to Lacan as a structuralist. I do not mean 
this in a provocative way nor am I attempting to stage a debate between structuralism 
and post-structuralism. It is true that, in the beginning of his career, Lacan is, of 
course, influenced by noted structuralist Claude Levi-Strauss. Above I mentioned the 
initial influence that structural linguist Ferdinand de Saussure had on his thinking. 




how the appearance of things is ordered might be one way to conceive of a leading 
question. Specific to our concerns here, though, is how he considers seriality as 
structure or how does he determine the structure of a series. Remember, for Sartre 
seriality is defined by an outside agent. For Lacan, seriality is defined by the gaps 
between parts and the gaps within parts. To understand this logic, we must establish 
what the serial real means. We are going to work with one of Lacan’s clearest and 
most challenging definitions of the real; a definition not coincidentally appearing in 
the second seminar where Lacan explicitly references seriality. We are going to push 
the consequences of this definition to show how it substantiate a concept like a serial 
real. Grasping the serial real will confront us with the following question: how can 
something be impossible and inaccessible and the site of the new all at the same time? 
In Seminar XX, Lacan says that, “The real can only be inscribed on the basis of 
an impasse of formalization” (93). The real is an impasse of formalization but can be 
inscribed because of this very same impasse. We will need to ask an important 
question to get the most out of this statement. It will frame how we proceed. If the real 
is an inaccessible void how can something observable like rules and order spring from 
it? This would seem to imply that the real is either not inaccessible or that rules and 
order cannot spring from it. My claim is that the real is inaccessible and rules and 
order spring from it. Importantly it is not the same rules every time. Lacan is quite 
clear about this when discusses the “chance” relations of coin flips. A different series 
of flips will occasion different rules, but all series of flips adhere to rules that emerge 
as the series forms. Molly Anne Rothenberg, in The Excessive Subject, seems to have 




new enters thought by way of the Real” (The Excessive Subject 183). This brings us 
back to our leading question: How is this possible—how can the new emerge—if the 
real is an impasse of formalization? Slavoj Žižek is helpful on this point: 
The real is, of course, in a first approach, that which cannot be inscribed, 
which ‘doesn’t cease not to inscribe itself’—the rock upon which every 
formalization stumbles. But it is precisely through this failure that we can in a 
way encircle, locate the empty place of the real. In other words, the real cannot 
be inscribed, but we can inscribe this impossibility itself. We can locate its 
place: a traumatic place which causes a series of failures. And the whole point 
of Lacan is that the real is nothing but this impossibility of its inscribing. The 
real is not a transcendent positive entity, persisting somewhere beyond the 
symbolic order like a hard kernel inaccessible to it, some kind of Kantian 
“Thing-in-itself.” [In] itself, it is nothing at all, just a void, an emptiness in a 
symbolic structure, marking some central impossibility. It is in this sense that 
the enigmatic Lacanian phrase defining the subject as an ‘answer of the real’ is 
to be understood: we can inscribe, encircle the void place of the subject 
through the failure of its symbolization, because the subject is nothing but the 
point of failure of the process of its symbolic representation. (“The Lacanian 
Real: Television”) 
The real is impossible. The real is a site which causes a series of failures. Through the 
failure of the real to be formalized or symbolized, it can be inscribed (or “encircled” to 
use Žižek’s word choice). The real curves symbolization around it in the same way 




combinations or repetitions. We cannot see the real itself, but we can see how it allows 
for the new to burst forth: by inscribing an impossibility that did not previously exist. 
The real makes its absence felt.  
Alenka Zupančič takes up this very point in The Ethics of the Real. As she 
writes, “[The Real] concern[s] something which appears only in the guise of the 
encounter, as something that ‘happens to us,’ surprises us, throws us ‘out of joint,’ 
because it always inscribes itself in a given continuity as a rupture, a break or an 
interruption” (235). The real is a site of rupture. This is what it means for conditions of 
possibility and impossibility to emerge at once. She continues, “According to Lacan, 
the Real is impossible, and the fact that ‘it happens (to us)’ does not refute its basic 
‘impossibility’: the Real happens to us (we encounter it) as impossible, as ‘the 
impossible thing’ that turns our symbolic universe upside down and leads to the 
reconfiguration of this universe. Hence the impossibility of the Real does not prevent 
it from having effect in the realm of the possible” (ibid). Intriguingly, Žižek’s and 
Zupančič’s word choices recall the language of seriality: Žižek speaks of a “series of 
failures” and Zupančič describes the real as a site of rupture, break, or interruption—
all word choices friendly to a discourse of the serial gap. A blend of Lacan’s concerns 
in “The Purloined Letter” post-script and this late career articulation of the real helps 
us to formalize Lacan’s inquiry into seriality: rules emerging impossibly from the gap 
between so-called chance relations to order them. “The Purloined Letter” lecture lays 





In Seminar XX, Lacan offers an intriguing window into how the serial 
underpins his thought generally:  
Don’t forget that, at the outset, the relationship between signifier and signified 
was incorrectly qualified as arbitrary . . .  Now what passes for arbitrary is the 
fact that meaning effects seem not to bear any relation to what causes them. 
But if they seem to bear no relation to what causes them, that is because we 
expect what causes them to bear a certain relation to the real. I'm talking about 
the serious real. The serious . . . can only be the serial” (19 emphasis mine).7  
The real allows for the emergence of the new, as Molly Anne Rothenberg writes. It is 
an impasse of formalization that curves the symbolic around it, as Žižek and Zupančič 
have argued. To bring into conversation the early Lacan of Seminar II and the late 
Lacan of Seminar XX is to see fully how his theory of seriality is central to his 
thinking in general.  
Lacanian seriality links the real with relation (curving the symbolic, 
determining how signifiers relate to one another, to put it in simple terms). As he says, 
the relation between signifier and signified is not arbitrary (say, as the signifier 
“smoke” is to actual smoke), nor is it indexical (as “smoke” is to fire). These examples 
have nothing to do with a series. This is the important point. Just as trauma arises in a 
series in psychoanalysis—as Freud explicitly shows in the previous chapter—so too 
does signification. To use Lacan’s terms, “smoke” to actual smoke and “smoke” to fire 
do not form a series and, thus, are not “serious.” What is serious—what involves the 
real—would be a relation like this: as smoke is to a smoker. In smoke and smoker, we 




disjunction creates the coherence. The only way that smoke and smoker are related as 
signifier and signified is through a repetition that creates a new rule for language.  
For Lacan, seriality is an idea of radical connectedness. Whereas for a thinker 
of seriality such as Jean-Paul Sartre, seriality is about disconnecting or disorienting 
people, seriality for Lacan is a chance to glimpse the radically contingent way 
symbolic relations are cohered. Studies of television seriality like John Ellis’s Visible 
Fictions and the multi-author compendium High Theory/ Low Culture, tend to view 
seriality in the way Sartre does: as discontinuous and fragmentary. With reference to 
John Ellis, Jane Feuer writes: 
…television narrative operates through the segment, i.e. a relatively self-
contained scene that is discontinuous with other segments. Ellis goes on to 
argue that ‘movement from one segment to the next is a matter of succession 
rather than consequence.’ Thus, for Ellis, all television narrative is serial rather 
than linear, in the sense that ‘the series implies the form of the dilemma rather 
than that of resolution and closure.’ (Ellis qtd. in Feuer 102).  
Seriality, in the terms I have been developing through Lacan, is a theory of radical 
coherence. It is not about succession. It holds that even something as random as coin 
flips have rules that order their appearance. Repetition sets up the rules of the game, so 
to speak. This is clear in the television episode, contra Ellis. While a largely 
conventional laugh track sitcom like All in the Family will rely on similar storylines 
(e.g. Archie Bunker is a racist who feels increasingly victimized by his oversensitive 
daughter and son-in-law), it does not allow for the exact same joke to appear 




about what an All in the Family episode should be and create within those limitations. 
While segments, in Ellis’s terms, may bounce from storyline to storyline, there are still 
overarching internal rules that govern the episode. Repeating the exact same joke, for 
example, and expecting big laughs would be a betrayal of audience investment and be 
tantamount to a contempt of character.8  
This is the same point Lacan makes in “The Purloined Letter” seminar. As he 
writes, “…I do not claim to extract from the real more than I have presupposed in its 
given—in other words, nothing here—but simply to demonstrate that they already 
bring with them a syntax by simply turning this real into chance. . . the effects of 
repetition that Freud calls ‘automatism’ come from nowhere else [but the real]” (32). 
The real is the deadlock of symbolization, that which cannot be articulated in a 
symbolic register, but which persists in that very field and, paradoxically, holds it 
together. The site of trauma is an oft repeated example, but we might also think of 
Alain Badiou’s example of how infinity completes the field of numbers—even though 
infinity as a number is impossible to conceptualize. The real is this gap, this 
impossibility of articulation and synthetization. It is also, as Lacan points out, serial, 
dependent upon repetition. What gets repeated in repetition automatism, according to 
Lacan, “is a product, not of nothing from the real . . . but precisely of what was not. 
Note that it then becomes less astonishing that what is repeated insists so much in 
order to get itself noticed” (32). Or, in other words, it is not the content of what is 
repeated that is interesting but the fact of repetition itself—the insistence—as serial 
form. The serial form depends on absence, or an interruptive gap, rather than 




Seriality is also where Lacan offers a theory of repetition that builds off of 
Freud. For Lacan, repetition provides the structure to symbolic relations. Seriality is 
the grouping of random events. On the level of things as they appear (in the symbolic) 
there has to be causality. Apprehending the causality of the seemingly random is 
central to Lacan’s entire invention in the “Purloined Letter” seminar. Remember, as 
above, rules and order emerge out of nothing to order a series. This series has a 
symbolic appearance—heads following a tails following a tails, etc.—that seems to be 
chance succession. Lacan’s point is to see how the real curves this symbolic 
appearance. We see the impossible holes in the whole that act as its vital support. We 
see here that Lacan is, in a way, a structuralist—but a structuralist of the real. 
Thinking through the idea of the serial real pushes past the deterministic problems of 
rigidly structuralist thinking, as in our way of thinking through serial structure allows 
for the real, an order of impossibility that nonetheless orders symbolic relations (again, 
the hole in the whole).  
 
Lacan avec Twitter, Part I: Black Box, Odd Poetry, and Serial Rules for 
Language9 
On May 25, 2012, Jennifer Egan published a sci-fi spy thriller for The New 
Yorker.10 The novelty of Egan’s story is that it was told in series of tweets on The New 
Yorker’s Twitter account over a period of nine days. Black Box tells the story of Lulu 
(who goes unnamed in the text), a character from Egan’s A Visit from the Goon Squad. 
Lulu infiltrates the “residences of the violent rich” and acquires closely guarded data 




itself (Section 39). As Egan recalled in an interview about constructing her serial 
novel experiment via social media, “I’d . . . been wondering about how to write fiction 
whose structure would lend itself to serialization on Twitter. This is not a new idea, of 
course, but it’s a rich one—because of the intimacy of reaching people through their 
phones and because of the odd poetry that can happen in 140 characters” (qtd. in 
Clark). When Egan describes part of her interest in Twitter serialization is seeing what 
kind of “odd poetry” can occur in 140 characters, we see that she is interested in how 
material constraints affect creative work. But it is not just the character constraints of 
the tweet that creates the “odd poetry” of Black Box. It is the gap between tweets 
where we see rules emerge outside the character limit. These rules “quilt” the meaning 
of Black Box.11 By moving Egan’s metaphor of “odd poetry” from Twitter’s character 
limit to the serial gap, we can understand Black Box as a text that illustrates and 
reinforces Lacan’s approach to seriality. 
Much of the Black Box is told through “Field Instructions,” or helpful tips for 
agents in the field. These instructions are given in second person perspective, as 
though they could be given to any person, any “you”—which invites the reader to 
imagine themselves in the world of Black Box. Egan gradually makes it clear that 
these instructions are not being given to any protagonist in general but to one 
protagonist specifically. Egan’s storytelling appears to operate according to 
contradictory rules. Egan often uses “if” and “may” to suggest that Lulu’s experience 
is more universal, that what’s happening “may” happen to others, but this is her way 




Importantly, these rules are not able to be apprehended clearly in single tweets alone 
but become understandable only as the series of tweets that comprise Black Box form: 
In the aftermath of [temporary] blindness, the accretion of objects around you 
may have an almost sensual quality. (section 28, emphasis mine)  
 
Your abrupt awakening may feel like a reaction to a sound. / In moments of 
extreme solitude, you may believe you’ve heard your name. (section 33, 
emphasis mine) 
We learn about what happens to Lulu through passive voice narration. The effect this 
passive narrative has is that it puts a layer of distance between what is being described 
and what happens. Since this “may” be happening, it also might not be happening. 
And—just as college professors tell students in first year writing courses—the passive 
voice obscures who is doing what to whom (e.g. Tea was made. Where? How? By 
what magic?). In Egan’s adroit hands, however, the passive voice is employed 
stylistically—part of her odd poetry—and, what’s more, its usage creates a rule for 
narrative meaning in Black Box.  
If Lacan can prove that rules and order emerge in the flipping of a coin, surely 
we can prove that rules beyond Twitter’s character limit emerge in Black Box and help 
to convey its meaning. As we read Black Box we are confronted by—and then 
internalize—a serial structure around which the narrative forms. The passive voice 
introduces a temporal gap into Lulu’s actions. Since we almost have to mentally 
convert the passive narration to active and present tense while reading, the passive 




any of the story may or may not have happened. To understand the rules that emerge 
as the tweets of Black Box form a series, we see that the passive voice is actually 
active and it describes not possibilities but actualities. This is a new rule for language 
that did not exist before.  
For example, readers are not told that Lulu has taken secret photos through a 
camera implanted in her eye but, in so doing, has accidentally blinded herself and 
must attempt to cover it up. We are told instead, “The camera implanted in your left 
eye is operated by pressing your left tear duct” (section 25). Later we are told:  
A flash is far more dramatic in total darkness. / An epithet in another language, 
followed by ‘What the fuck was that?,’ means you overestimated your 
Designated Mate’s handset absorption. / A bright, throbbing total blindness 
means you neglected to cover your non-camera eye. / Distance yourself from 
agency in the flash by crying out, truthfully, ‘I can’t see!’ (section 27) 
Again, as a reader, we have to mentally convert this passive voice to active and 
present tense in order to make sense of the narrative as a description of an ongoing and 
active event. Likewise, we have to imagine that we are not reading a possible version 
of events that could occur for any spy, but actual description of one spy’s mission. 
This gap in narrative content reflects and reinforces the gapped form of “Black Box.” 
Rather than making the world of the text vague and directionless, Egan’s passive voice 
is able to make this world feel full of danger and intrigue. We are obliged to grasp the 
contradictory logic of Lacan’s seriality here. Gaps—temporal gaps introduced by 




whole (cohere it, in other words). This apparent wholeness, of course, is riddled with 
gaps that guarantee its apparent consistency.  
It is not simply the character limit that creates Egan’s “odd poetry,” as she 
suggests in her interview with The New Yorker, but it is the relation to the gaps within 
tweets (the temporal gaps described above) and between them (how subtle and 
unstated rules for language carry across tweets) that are responsible for the “odd 
poetry” of Black Box. The formation of a series allows for unique rules to emerge, 
such as “if” not being a conditional and “may” actually meaning “is.” These rules 
constitute Egan’s “odd poetry” and they emerge naturally through negotiating 
Twitter’s restrictions (in the way the coin tosses above form their own internal rules 
amid the restrictions of the outcome of one flip being either heads or tails). These rules 
ground her Twitter novel and determine its meaning. It is not the character limit itself 
that does that but what Egan develops as a result of that restriction. The repetition of 
the second person, the violation of the conditional, and a passive voice that is actually 
active and present, are all unique rules that emerge to order meaning in Black Box’s 
serially constructed world. But, importantly, these rules also rule Egan’s prose. Having 
established “if” and “may” clearly meaning “is,” Egan cannot use “if” and “may” in 
any normative sense. As in Lacan: the conditions of possibility and impossibility arise 
simultaneously as a series forms.  
 
Lacan avec Twitter, Part II: Joshua Clover and “Live” Seriality 
If Jennifer Egan’s Black Box is a testament to what can be achieved by 




Clover’s “How I Quit Spin” is an example par excellence of Twitter’s ability to serve 
as a platform for the unexpected and the “live.” Clover’s story, which would 
eventually become a Twitter “hit” and receive reaction coverage in online publications 
like Salon and Slate, began as something he believed would have the audience of two 
people. Recounting the background of the story in an interview for Salon, Clover says: 
I saw that a Twitter acquaintance of mine was at a U2 concert in New York, 
and he was bored and regretted it. I tweeted back saying I’d like to say I’d 
never had the same experience, but I had…I said it was a very complicated 
story, but one of the better stories of my life. He encouraged me to tell it . . . 





Asked why Twitter seemed like the right medium to tell the story of how he quit Spin 
magazine, Clover replies, “It didn’t. There was never a moment where I thought: this 
would be a good story for Twitter. It was the way I had to communicate with someone 
trapped at a concert. That’s the magic of the medium, isn’t it—that someone can be 
trapped, but amused or diverted by someone narrating a series of events from 3,000 
miles away.” Clover, a poet and scholar of critical theory, told Salon that he had “no 
experience of making narrative—[but] I got a sense of it as I went along. It was a bit 




Clover’s “How I Quit Spin” gives us another clear example of how the rules for a 
series arise as the series forms.  
More so than perhaps any other medium, Twitter is a “live medium.” 
Following trending hashtags gives users access to “real time” news, reactions, hot 
takes and counter hot takes all centered around a single evolving issue or event. For 
this reason, Twitter is the go-to medium for following celebrities, political news, or 
sports in large part because of its capacity to “air” many different voices all reacting to 
an unfolding event at once.  Clover’s “How I Quit Spin” was just such a live event. 
Our big question is the following: Do rules and order emerge in a live event just the 
same as they do for a pre-planned serial novel experiment on social media like Black 
Box? The answer would have to be “yes” if the theory of seriality I am rooting in 
Lacan is sound.  
An important note before proceeding: When referring to Clover’s story as he 
wrote it, I will be using the hashtag title of #HowIQuitSpin. When referring to the 
finished document as a whole, I will, at times, use quotation marks and refer to it as 
“How I Quit Spin.” Removing the hashtag, however, does have the effect of 
smoothing over the gaps constitutive of “How I Quit Spin’s” construction. From a 
Lacanian perspective, removing the hashtag gives an illusory sense of wholeness to 
Clover’s story. This discussion will be picked up later in the chapter. 
 #HowIQuitSpin centers around Joshua Clover’s attempt to get fired from Spin 
magazine. Clover was living in Paris at the time, getting paid monthly by Spin to write 
music reviews, features, and columns. It was “the life,” he says, but he began “to feel 




solution was to get himself fired “bc quitting seems onerous and dull” by writing an 
incendiary review of Party Music, an album by the political hip-hop group The Coup 
(8). Clover tweets: 
For 200 words I describe the album very conventional[ly]. But the second half 
of the review shifts gears. / The 2nd half says, if u just listen to this album, yr a 
poseur. It’s a 5. There’s only one way to take the album seriously / that’s to go 
down to the Spin offices & throw a brick thru the window. I give the address. 
If u do this, I write, its [sic] a 10 (11-12).  
Clover assumes he will be fired immediately but, as it turns out, Spin love the review. 
“They want to tweak a word or 2” but otherwise are completely behind the review 
(17).  This sequence of tweets show a more traditionally serial aspect to Clover’s 
storytelling. When Clover writes that there is “only way to take the album seriously” 
he ends the tweet there—on a cliffhanger of sorts. As readers we are waiting to 
discover what is “the only way” to take The Coup’s Party Music seriously. When 
Clover writes that “the second half of the review shifts gears” that thread of thought 
“shifts gears” and announces a change in tone we will read in the next tweet. As he 
admitted in the interview quoted above, he got a “sense” of the story as he wrote it, 
apprehending the rules of his own storytelling form organically.  
As in Egan’s pre-planned Black Box, Clover writes his story in chapters. 
Unlike Egan’s story which has numbered section breaks, these chapter ends seem 
intended to emphasize the information contained in the previous tweet. The end of the 
first chapter provides an excellent example: “My weird feeling is this: that we have 




there’s a problem: I don’t really have the spare cash for a transatlantic flight. This is 
where U2 comes in. / END OF CHAPTER 2” (22-24). Clover, who has told his friend 
stuck at a U2 concert that he has a similar story, is bringing #HowIQuitSpin back to its 
initial purpose. The end of each chapter is accompanied by a temporal break. Between 
the “END OF CHAPTER ONE” tweet and the beginning of chapter two nearly an 
hour and a half elapse. Between two and three, it’s a twelve-minute gap. Chapter three 
ends at 1:01 am and Clover doesn’t take the story up again until 9:31 the next 
morning, the story being far too long already to tweet to his friend stuck at a boring 
U2 concert. In fact, the U2 aspect of the story turns out to be a MacGuffin, though not 
an intentional one. The initial purpose of the story—talk about a boring U2 concert to 
a friend stuck at a boring U2 concert—gives way to what emerges as the story’s actual 
purpose: a snapshot of immediately post-9/11 life, art, and political critique, wrapped 
in a story about quitting Spin magazine. 12  
We see the story’s eventual purpose and intrigue beginning to emerge out of its 
initial premise toward the end of chapter two. This might be the first moment that we 
see new rules emerge to order #HowIQuitSpin. (Granted we need to perceive Clover’s 
story as a whole—as “How I Quit Spin”—to retroactively make this connection.) 
Clover arranges to get passes to a U2 show in Paris and trades one pass to a U2 super-
fan from Dublin in exchange for travel vouchers. He uses the vouchers to arrange for a 
flight to New York. The beginning of chapter three reminds us of the stakes: “so the 
day comes to fly off to NYC; haven’t been back since GWB took office. 2 months 
since Coup review, 3 weeks since U2” (41). The beginning of chapter five gives us an 




recall this keenly. I recall sleeping on the banks of the Charles River. It is unclear to 
me I will get another job. / I remind myself the world doesn’t let mid-class white guys 
starve, that this tightrope always has a net if yr in my shoes. / bc this is the terrible 
thing I have come to know. I try to let the terrible knowledge calm me down [as I go 
to the meeting where I will quit Spin]” (52-54). Clover uses these temporal gaps to 
reset and focus the story in an analogous way to how a television series like Lost used 
season finales and season premieres—simply, to close a season long story line and 
then suggest a way forward with a teasing bit of new information. He uses end of 
chapter and beginning of chapter tweets to set the scene for his reader. With 
devastating effect Clover gives us this three-tweet sequence:  
“[walking] under the bridge & out into the sun, blue sky, pretty far dwntwn, 
running along. A plane hits the WTC. Then another one. / END OF CHAPTER 
FIVE / there’s nowhere to go from there but that’s the thing, stories keep going 
when there is no place to go. A demoralizing fact” (60-61).  
What Clover shows us, as does Lacan, is how repetition—literally tweeting and then 
tweeting again—creates a series, and a series allows for retroactive discovery of its 
own internal rules. Seriality generates its own context. While many of Clover’s tweets 
that explicitly reference 9/11 in #HowIQuitSpin could be excised as quasi-aphorisms 
without context, for example, “11:00 comes an hour after 10:00 no matter what. Even 
when such things seem impossible,” these tweets form a chain of signification that, 
while needing to be read forwards (linearly) can only be made sense of retroactively 
(63). This idea is woven even into the logic of Twitter’s feed, where new tweets 




serial story on Twitter, this temporal mechanism reinforces the idea that it is the next 
tweet that makes sense of the previous tweet. We need the next tweet to make 
retroactive sense of what came before (following the rules of Freud’s 
Nachträglichkeit). The tweets do not necessarily make complete sense on their own. In 
less esoteric terms, word order, or sequence, is what matters. Not a single one of 
Clover’s tweets received over 58 likes which, considering the pop culture coverage of 
this story, shows that it is the sequence and the ongoing experiment of #HowIQuitSpin 
as it developed that transfixed readers, rather than any individual pieces of insight. The 
final tweet in the sequence is the most liked, almost as though the Twitter community 
is collectively patting Joshua Clover on the back for a job well-done. 
When Clover later tells Salon (quoted above) that he had “no experience 
making narrative” but “got a sense of it” as he went along, we can see the evidence for 
that claim in these organic rules that emerged in the course of his writing “How I Quit 
Spin.” Again, the sequence of the tweets helps to generate #HowIQuitSpin’s rules and 
rhythm. Where chapter six begins with the shock and devastation of the World Trade 
Center attacks, it ends with a wry bit of gallows humor: “My friend says to his dad, 
what do you think? / This will literally be the first opinion we have heard not fed to us 
by the television. We have been utterly bewildered. / Tony hesitates, smiles, a warm 
smile, a calming and infectious smile, says Well they had to come down sooner or 
later / END OF CHAPTER SIX” (85 - 87). Chapter seven, then, must change the 





As Clover later writes, “It is time for me to go into the offices I have suggested 
get bricked & walk into the managing editor’s office and quit / END OF CHAPTER 
SEVEN” (103). The bulk of the rest of #HowIQuitSpin consists of Clover explaining 
how his attempt to quit the magazine did not go as planned. Contrary to what he 
believed, he could not simply quit. He was embroiled in a contract dispute—chapter 
eight ends with Clover telling us that, upon returning to Paris, he receives an email 
from Spin that says he owes them sixteen thousand dollars—that brings us back to 
#HowIQuitSpin’s initial tweets. 
Clover’s first two tweets in #HowIQuitSpin are, “I moved to France on the day 
GWB was inaugurated. Email was a little squiggly in 2001 but good enough. / So I 
kept my Spin gig. The contract details matter” (1-2). Clover finally gets to the part of 
his story, over 100 tweets later, where the contract details come into play. Not only do 
we see the payoff and importance of a tweet that, one hundred some odd tweets ago 
has drifted somewhat in the memory, but the sequence of Clover’s storytelling is 
interrupted. Setting up who was working in the Spin offices and when, Clover 
mentions the managing editor, Craig, who hired him four years previously, had been 
recently deposed. A friend tweets at Clover looking for clarification on who the 
managing editor is and when they would have been hired—a meaningless detail for 
most people reading “How I Quit Spin” after its completion and entrance into what 
Slate called a “piece of popculture art.”  While the request for clarification is 
undoubtedly calling attention to a minor point of bureaucratic information, it does 





Figure 1. Joshua Clover, #HowIQuitSpin Tweet sequence, July 19-20, 2015. 
 
In the midst of Clover resetting the stakes and situation for his readers—as one can see 
clearly in tweet 119 when Clover gives his readers a series of “afters” establishing 
where we are in space and time in his story—we have this interruptive tweet of 
clarification. Going through “How I Quit Spin” in Storify (a now defunct web service 
that flips the temporality of tweet order while maintaining its medium specific look) is 
that we only have Clover’s reply to @mehpatrol, not the tweet he is replying to. 




seeing how one tweet that is not a part of #HowIQuitSpin can disturb the rhythm and 
story flow when reading it as “How I Quit Spin.”  
This reply irrupts the idea that “How I Quit Spin” is a timeless whole—
something that The New Yorker’s reproduction of Egan’s Black Box gives us. The 
interruption of Clover’s reply reminds us that we are reading gapped narrative. Here 
the real of seriality emerges and it’s a little unpleasant. We want to navigate away to 
continue to be absorbed in Clover’s story, entranced by the idea that #HowIQuitSpin 
is itself a narrative totality, in other words, that it is not a part of Twitter, that it is 
“something else” (a “piece of popculture art,” perhaps). Lacan’s real, as above, is best 
described as an impasse of formalization, that which cannot be incorporated in 
symbolic reality without contradiction but is, nonetheless, there. The presence of the 
above reply tweet breaks the imaginary totality of “How I Quit Spin.” This is the 
difference between #HowIQuitSpin and “How I Quit Spin.” “How I Quit Spin,” is the 
way the story is referred to in articles by Slate and Salon (it is even the way this serial 
story is cited in this dissertation). While, as above, Joshua Clover tries to distance his 
story from the medium in which it appeared, the rhythm and rules that dictate the 
structure and internal functioning of “How I Quit Spin” arise from gaps in disclosure. 
Twitter’s hard restrictions at the time “How I Quit Spin” was published—a 140 
character limit and a limit on the number of tweets one could publish in a given time-
frame (aka “Twitter jail”)—while noteworthy are less determinative of the story’s 
form than the internal rules we observed above. Removing the hashtag and putting the 
title between quotation marks is the work of Lacan’s imaginary—making something 




how the story resists totality. While there are literal spaces and gaps in the title “How I 
Quit Spin,” the stylistic convention of naming a literary story obscures them. Instead 
of imagining the gaps—the serial real—we imagine a totality. The way the quotation 
marks hide the gaps in plain sight and give to us a sense of totality is a perfect 
example of the function of Lacan’s order of the imaginary. #HowIQuitSpin, by 
leaving no spaces, forces a recognition of the story’s form and, paradoxically, its gaps.  
 
The Serial Real is Serious 
Scholars of narrative seriality such as Jason Mittell and Frank Kelleter tend to 
focus on the symbolic interplay between author, text, and audience, often noting the 
observable documents of fan engagement such as “theory crafting” on subreddits or 
message boards, fan fiction, and participation in Alternate Reality Games (ARG) that 
offer fans the chance to experience a TV series’ world during the gap between 
seasons.13 Similarly, Ruth Page, in “Seriality and Storytelling in Social Media,” argues 
that seriality should be approached in a contextual rather than formal way. She writes:  
…seriality is best understood as a relative rather than an absolute quality and 
should be approached from a contextual rather than a text-immanent 
perspective. From a contextualist stance, perceptions of seriality will depend in 
part on an interpreter’s perspective rather than being determined by the 
properties of the text taken alone. Sometimes both producer and audience will 
experience the story in a serial form, but this need not always be the case: 
seriality might be perceived only by the narrative’s producer or only by readers 




Page’s essay highlights a few aspects of Twitter seriality that I have called attention to 
above (e.g. the sequence of tweets, word choice, character restriction).14 Where we 
diverge is on this fundamental question: is seriality best approached on the grounds of 
the particular or on the grounds of the universal? Or, in Page’s terms, is seriality best 
apprehended along its relative or absolute qualities? This binary is missing a term that 
changes the question altogether: the real. This dissertation is interested in positioning 
the serial gap as the immanent quality of seriality—hole in the whole that determines 
structure and meaning—so is important to clarify what this means exactly. What Ruth 
Page seems to be guarding against is any model of seriality that predetermines what a 
given serial object is. What’s more, she is emphasizing the different experiential levels 
of seriality to show that seriality is not a monolith. On this point, I completely agree 
with her—but with a Lacanian twist.  
Understanding the serial gap as that which orders seriality—as an immanent 
quality to seriality regardless of text or context—does not mean that the gap flattens 
all serial objects to mean the same thing, as Ruth Page pushes against. It is in this way 
that the serial gap is universal: it is a particular that changes all particulars. As we have 
seen in the examples of Egan and Clover, there are rules beyond the tweet character-
limit that introduce the unique character (no pun) to their stories. Egan’s “if” and 
“may” and the rhythm of Clover’s chapters are rules that emerge from the gap to 
dictate the shape of future tweets. These Twitter case studies show us that seriality is 
not a pre-existing structure encrusted on a group that orders its units—as Sartre has 






                                                 
1 http://www.victorianweb.org/authors/dickens/turkey/turlit09.html 
Coincidentally for the larger argument of this chapter, Smith writes, “An example [of the carnivalesque] 
from a later novel might be the Freudian, and Biblical shearing of the grotesque head of Casby by 
Pancks in Little Dorrit, to the accompaniment of that carnivalesque laughter of those who have been 
oppressed by Casby in his role as their hypocritical landlord.” Smith intriguingly calls the shearing of 
Casby “Freudian” rather than noting that the concept in Freud might itself be Dickensian.  
 
2 While O’Sullivan acknowledges that the serial is the “art of the between,” thinking of the serial gap as 
not always already a fraught site means missing the real (“Six Elements of Serial Narrative” 63). 
 
3 Though not a widely used nomenclature, the term brings together the planned fiction of Egan and the 
spontaneous non-fiction of Clover for our purposes. Twitterature seems to have been coined by Michael 
Rudin in “From Hemingway to Twitterature: The Short and Shorter of It” The Journal of Electronic 
Publishing, 2011. 
 
4 Saussure’s Course in General Linguistics was given during Freud’s lifetime but not available until 
1916. Freud never makes mention of having read it. The point is simply that Freud couldn’t have 
integrated linguistics to psychoanalysis, so Lacan’s move is something that Freud did not have the 
background to make. 
 
5 Here Lacan universalizes Nachträglichkeit and elevates Freud’s structure for trauma to a place pivotal 
for understanding symbolic relations. 
 
6 In a crucial paragraph of the Appendix Lacan writes: 
Indeed, it suffices to symbolize, in the diachrony of such a series, groups of three which 
conclude with each toss by defining them synchronically—for example, through the symmetry 
of constancy (+ + + and ), noted as 1, or of alternation (+ - + and - + - ) , noted as 3, the 
notation 2 being reserved for the dissymmetry revealed by the odd in the form of a group of 
two similar signs either preceded or followed by the opposite sign (+ —, - + +, + + -, and )—
for possibilities and impossibilities of succession to appear in the new series constituted by 
these notations that the following network summarizes. This network at the same time 
manifests the concentric symmetry implicit in the triad—which is, let it be noted, the very 
structure of concern in the question continually raised anew by anthropologists whether the 
dualism found in symbolic organizations is of a fundamental or apparent character. (35) 
 
7 In the French, le sériel, or, as Bruce Fink clarifies, “what forms a series.” I have, of course, seized on 
both the English translation and the French meaning in my analysis above. 
 
8 To put it another way, the reason why Seinfeld’s many catchphrases work is because they are not 
overused. The “Soup Nazi” says “no soup for you” three times. George’s girlfriend who coins “yadda 
yadda yadda,” utters the phrase three separate times before she explains that she “yadda yadda’d” 
shoplifting. 
 
9 An important note: when quoting two tweets or more from Egan’s and Clover’s stories I make use of a 
slash to separate one tweet from another. This is, of course, a convention for citing lines of poetry that I 
am intentionally trying to echo. In Old English poetry, a caesura—denoted by a double vertical line like 
this || —emphasizes a pause in the verse. In standard musical notation a double slash— // —indicates a 
breath. Typical quotation of poetry uses the single slash to denote a line break. These notations do not 
denote “nothing,” or a suspension of the thing itself (be it a musical composition or an epic poem), but 
rather make manifest a break or a gap. In what follows, the slash between tweets separates them as units 
of meaning, evidencing the temporal gap between them, while also indicating “the narrative cut” that is 
already there. Segmenting a whole into a series introduces these invisible wounds to the text. The slash 
here acts as a kind of scar allowing us to see the formal work that serial storytelling does. It is from that 
textual encounter that the legibility of the wound emerges—the interruptive gap that curves and 




                                                                                                                                            
 
10 This chapter will be quoting from the version of Black Box published on The New Yorker post its 
initial Twitter run. The reasons will become clear in the “How I Quit Spin” section of the chapter.  
 
11 In Seminar III: The Psychoses, Lacan conceives of le point de capiton (“the quilting point”) as the 
moment of punctuation that allows the symbolic order to make sense. As Lacan says, “It’s the point of 
convergence [the quilting point] that enables everything that happens in this discourse to be situated 
retroactively and prospectively” (Seminar III 268). The quilting point affects meaning forwards and 
backwards. Understanding the quilting point allows us to see that, for Lacan, punctuation is that which 
ensures retroactive meaning. One of the more interesting employments of this logic in Seminar III 
occurs here when Lacan says, “This famous fear of God completes the sleight of hand that transforms, 
from one minute to the next, all fears into perfect courage.  All fears—I have no other fear—are 
exchanged for what is called the fear of God, which, however constraining it may be, is the opposite of 
a fear” (Seminar III 267). What Lacan is saying is that the point de capiton simplifies our problems and 
fixes the solution to them at a single place or with a single entity (i.e. the fear of God above). 
Ideologically, we can see this today in the conservative fear of the “illegal immigrant,” which fixes 
fears of Global Capitalism, or looming environmental catastrophe, all fears can be wrapped up in the 
figure of the illegal immigrant. 
 
12 There is a link that bridges 9/11 and Clover quitting Spin, apart from these two events accidentally 
coinciding around the same time. The original album cover to The Coup’s Party Music depicted MC 
Boots Riley holding a detonator in front of two buildings that look suspiciously like the World Trade 
Center, exploding in a way that looked suspiciously similar to what happened on 9/11. This original 
cover concept was “supposed to be more of a metaphor for destroying capitalism,” according to MC 
Boots Riley, lead member of The Coup. But the problem for the band is it doesn’t look like a metaphor. 
It looks like reality and recalls Slavoj Žižek’s observation in Welcome to the Desert of the Real that 
9/11 was imagined popularly in films like The Towering Inferno, meaning the trauma of 9/11 came 
from a popular fantasy becoming lived reality. This is another way of understanding the retroactivity of 
trauma central to psychoanalysis and to Freud’s idea of nachträglichkeit explored earlier in Chapter 
Two. 
 
13 Mittell has written somewhat extensively on this point, especially as it regards The Lost Experience 
ARG that ABC studios provided fans in 2007, (Complex TV). 
 
14 Page also calls attention to what she refers to as “non-narrative” seriality, such as the process of 
writing and editing Wikipedia entries (46). I’m unsure if she would disagree with me on the following 
point, but I think she actually shows that there is no non-narrative seriality. Any series—be they iPhone 
updates or patches to a video game—could be considered non-narrative at the level of denotation but at 
the level of connotation these “non-narrative” installments tell a story of bugs, errors, user demand, and 
content creation in a way different from but similar to her example of the editing history of Wikipedia 
entries. The narrative content is found attendant to the installments here—in their surrounding 







THE IMPOSSIBLE DESIRE OF SERIAL 
 
Starting October 3, 2014, a podcast from WEBZ-Chicago and This American 
Life called Serial aired over the span of three months. Hosted by investigative 
journalist Sarah Koenig, and assisted by producer Julie Snyder, the podcast revisited a 
murder case in Baltimore from 1999: the murder of high school student Hae Min Lee. 
The podcast’s title seemed cheeky. It pointed vaguely toward the genre of the show as 
true crime investigation, bringing to mind the sensational figure of the “serial killer.” 
But more importantly, it named the form of the podcast—a work of nonfiction 
unfolding as its hosts performed week-to-week research on the podcast’s subject. 
The first season of Serial shows the inextricable relationship desire has with 
seriality. The second and third seasons of Serial eschew critical features of the first 
season. Gone, in season two’s look at the military desertion case of Bowe Berghdal, is 
the reporter interviewing the subject of reporting model from season one. In season 
three, the live investigation model that unfurls a greater mystery (not unlike the 
literary fiction of Charles Dickens) is exchanged for episodes that deal with discrete 
court cases taking place in Cleveland, Ohio. Through these self-contained stories, 
Serial season three accomplishes a look at the United States’ justice system writ large. 
The way Sarah Koenig and Serial innovate their investigative techniques is not the 
point of this chapter. What Serial season one—and only Serial season one does—is 




manifest in seriality. Therefore, this chapter will show how desire moves Sarah 
Koenig from a reporter looking for an alibi in a suspiciously litigated court case to a 
reporter who desires to be the alibi.  
Starting with the discussion of journalistic ethics that the first season of Serial 
elicited from scholars and listeners, this chapters moves to explore the ethical 
dimension of psychoanalysis; territory that, for Lacan, demands a theoretical 
consideration of desire. I argue that the actual ethics Serial suggests has its basis in 
just this ethics of desire that Lacan put at the center of his seventh seminar. Serial, 
however, shows us that desire is inextricably bound to the serial form. Serial’s 
landmark first season generated both massive listener interest and critical 
condemnation. Experts in the field of journalism lauded the series as a revelation, 
while others questioned just how “ethical” it was for Sarah Koenig to be reporting a 
story that she had not finished, thus allowing the fissures, inconsistencies, 
speculations, and tensions of the investigative process into her storytelling as Serial 
episodes began to air.  
After showing how the journalistic conversation on Serial’s ethics is premised 
on the series’ relation to truth, I turn to Michel Foucault and his ethics of truth-telling 
known as parrhesia. Foucault’s notion of parrhesia is dependent upon one’s 
relationship with an interlocutor, just as Sarah Koenig’s reporting in Serial’s first 
season relies on her relationship with the incarcerated Adnan Syed (and vice versa) 
and the listener’s relationship with Koenig. But Foucault alone does not take us far 
enough into the ethics of desire, specifically, which is the crux of the serial form. To 




Through a careful negotiation of what each thinker brings to bear on Serial, I claim 
that seriality opens the space for relationships to form (journalist to investigation, 
journalist to subject) and for desire to emerge. This relies on my assertion that the 
ethical questions posed by Serial are opened up by its form, not its content, and that 
the theoretical investigation of seriality done here reveals the process by which a 
journalist assumes a role in a story. By engaging with the ethical projects that Foucault 
and Lacan proffer, we can see that Serial uses the problems of seriality to advance a 
different ethics of journalism, an ethics more concerned with uncovering truth through 
the embrace of desire, speculation, and the vicissitudes of interlocutorship than in any 
previously validated "journalistically responsible" method of investigation. 
 
Journalistic Ethics 
 Many experts and commentators have weighed in on just how ethical it was for 
Sarah Koenig to be reporting a story that she had not finished, thus allowing the 
fissures, inconsistencies, speculations, and tensions of the investigative process into 
her storytelling as Serial episodes began to air. Serial's uniqueness as a cultural object 
comes from its revival of the serial format for radio storytelling, commonly thought of 
as more a mid-20th century media phenomenon. The podcast’s employment of the 
serial form has generated both massive interest and critical condemnation. My 
argument is that the ethics that Serial suggests (but doesn’t fully embrace) has its basis 
in an ethics of desire inextricably bound to its serial form.  
Koenig’s reporting, if we are to understand Joyce Barnathan, President of the 




rupture to the form of traditional journalism (“Why Serial is Important for 
Journalism”). This act, this break from tradition is fundamental to Serial’s appeal. 
Koenig’s use of seriality imbues her reporting with the “anxiety” and “soul searching” 
that, Barnathan notes, is present in the process of traditional journalism but absent in 
the final product. Barnathan sees Koenig introducing a new “transparency” to 
journalism, instilling it with a different kind of credibility.  
Yet, what Barnathan sees as “transparency,” others see as a breach of 
fundamental journalistic ethics. For all its formal innovation, the bulk of the ethical 
criticism levied against Serial takes issue with the form. Focusing her concerns on the 
issue of form, Jessica Goldstein of Think Progress interviewed three experts in media 
ethics: Jane Kirtley, Donna Leff, and Edward Wasserman. Leff thought that the 
“foremost” obligation journalists have is to “tell the truth,” and conceded that the rest 
is “art” or “storytelling” (“The Complicated Ethics of Serial, the Most Popular Podcast 
of All Time”). As she says, “those are questions of taste and art and narrative arc, but I 
don’t think they’re about ethics” (ibid). Leff did worry, however, about potential 
problems with Serial’s end. What if Sarah Koenig had discovered Hae Min Lee’s 
actual killer? Would she misdirect and tease the narrative to skirt around information 
she was knowingly withholding from the audience? As Kirtley says, “I don’t think 
there’s any problem with continuing your investigation [after finding key 
information], but I don’t like the idea of keeping core information away from the 
listener” (ibid). Would she pretend to have just stumbled upon it? These questions 




to note that for these journalism and ethics scholars, Koenig’s approach encouraged 
distrust, not belief as it did for Barnathan.   
Edward Wasserman was perhaps the most skeptical of Serial’s radical 
deployment of seriality (though he did note that it was “riveting”). He writes, “the 
downside [of releasing information as it is uncovered is if] there are speculations that 
are being raised that are defamatory, and turn out to be false. That’s a concern” (ibid). 
So much of Koenig’s reporting is informed by what Barnathan calls “transparency”—
the exact thing that makes Wasserman uncomfortable. Goldstein goes on to ask 
Wasserman if there is a way to allay these fears without fundamentally altering 
Serial’s structure. Asked if perhaps the answer is to produce the entire series before 
airing an episode, Wasserman replies, “This may be the old school me speaking, but I 
would be more comfortable with that,” though he does admit that doing so means “you 
lose a certain amount of dramatic edge” (ibid). Despite the potential for Leff and 
Kirtley’s concern about Koenig manipulating the narrative arc around information she 
was withholding from the listener being arguably more prevalent in Wasserman’s 
model, his prescription for “solving the ethical problem of Serial” is an interesting 
one: he wants Serial without the serial.1  
The form of Serial ruptures Sarah Koenig’s reporting, separating it from 
traditional journalism or documentary filmmaking.  Even regular reporting on the 
same story (say, a presidential campaign) is not serial; there may be a sequence of 
news items written about the same topic, event, or person, but that does not constitute 
serial reporting. Serial reporting, the kind practiced by Koenig, is a punctuated and 




next installment. When we talk about seriality, we are concerned with gaps and how 
serial gaps generate their own rules and order. In this case, we can see how the gap is 
generative of desire. These concerns bring Serial into the fold of this dissertation’s 
ambition to establish a psychoanalytic theory of seriality. Serial is not simply a crime 
drama, told meticulously. It is not simply entertainment rooted in hard fact. It is not 
simply a challenge to the justice system, to notions of truth and innocence. It is all of 
these things, and because it is all of these things, I argue, it instantiates an ethics of 
desire.  
Seriality posits a gap in knowing, a delay in disclosure, an interval in 
storytelling. Its history is in the literary but that does not make it opposed to evidence 
based investigations of truth. Far from it. It is the gap that seriality introduces that 
Serial employs so adroitly in its narrative. Koenig uses this gap that the serial form 
requires to advance an ethics of reporting that is concerned with discovering “the 
truth” only. Journalists, of course, are concerned with “the truth,” but few—if any—
other journalists consider truth within a serial narrative structure. This leads Koenig to 
explore hunches, opine out loud, and to reach tentative and journalistically 
irresponsible conclusions. Contrary to critics, I do not believe this behavior needs in 
any way to be reined in; it needs to considered on its own merits and, ultimately, 
pushed to inhabit its own ethical territory. 
To see more fully the ethical territory that Serial charts, it is useful to look not 
at models in the field of journalism but models in philosophy. We will need to survey 
the critical conversation surrounding the ethicality of Serial’s first season. We will 




notion of parrhesia is dependent upon one’s relationship with an interlocutor, just as 
Sarah Koenig’s reporting in Serial’s first season relies on her relationship with the 
accused and convicted Adnan Syed (and vice versa). But Foucault alone does not take 
us far enough. To bring us further—specifically, to the territory of desire—we will 
turn to psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan. What Foucault leaves out of his analysis of 
parrhesia and the ethical position of the interlocutor is exactly the thing that 
psychoanalysis (and Serial) interrogates: the desire of the Other. I argue that it is not 
possible to consider ethical acts—be they speech acts or otherwise—without a notion 
of the unconscious desire that operates in supposedly ethical work.  
Our reading of Lacan will not strictly be a corrective of Foucault, however. 
Each thinker’s ethical project needs to borrow from crucial elements of the other for 
the purpose of articulating the ethical ground of Serial. We need to make an argument 
for the unlikely fusion of Foucault and Lacan to see the different conception of ethics 
that Serial instantiates. Then we will move to consider the following: how does that 
notion of ethics challenge Serial and how does Serial challenge that notion of ethics? 
What can Foucault and Lacan reveal about Serial and what can Serial reveal about 
Foucault and Lacan? By engaging with the ethical project each of these thinkers 
proffer, we can see that Serial uses the very form of the show itself to advance a 
different ethics of journalism, an ethics more concerned with uncovering truth than in 
being journalistically responsible. 
 




In “Serial, Seriality, and the Possibilities for the Podcast Format,” 
anthropologists Mariam Durrani, Kevin Gotkin, and Corrina Laughlin explore how 
Serial’s expert use of the podcast form might provide a road map for anthropologists 
to transmit their academic work. The authors see how Serial fits—and challenges—
anthropology’s core tenets as a discipline, particularly as it regards subjectivity and the 
representation of diverse cultures and communities of color, like, according to the 
authors, Serial’s near “public anthropology” of Muslim Americans problematically 
told from the singular perspective of a white journalist (595). The authors struggle 
with balancing the intimacy of Koenig’s radio voice and the closeness she feels to the 
subject of her investigation with her racial and class detachment from it. Commenting 
on Koenig’s analogy of the case to Shakespeare’s Othello and Adnan as being “not a 
Moor exactly but a Muslim all the same,” Durrani et al. write, “The fact that Koenig 
relies on an understanding of Muslimness here that spans from Shakespearean 
representations of the Moor to Adnan Sayed, a Pakistani American from Baltimore, 
shows that her investments in the politics and ethics of representation do not quite 
meet the rigorous standards that we, as academics, would like to think that we have for 
ourselves” (ibid). Koenig fails to be detached enough and allows her own cultural 
history to determine her account.  
Others have argued for Serial to be granted special dispensation on issues 
exactly like this. Conor Friedersdorf, writer for The Atlantic and founding editor of 
The Best of Journalism, agrees. “White reporters covering minority communities 
should proceed with great care, thoughtfulness, and sensitivity—and scrutiny of their 




shortcomings, offering: “Serial is a reflection on a murder case and the criminal-
justice system reported over ‘just’ a year, which is to say, it is researched with more 
effort and depth than 99 percent of journalism produced on any beat in America” 
(“The Backlash Against Serial—and Why It’s Wrong”). Durrani et al. do 
acknowledge this position—that for whatever criticism Sarah Koenig and Serial 
deserve for the unchecked white privilege operating in the background of the show, 
we could not even have these rich and important discussions on race, representation, 
and privilege without Serial—but it is clear that they do not support it. What the 
anthropologists shy away from is part of what made Serial such a phenomenon—it 
took risks. It is the serial form itself that is at the root of all of these ethical quandaries. 
It both produces the very narrative element that attracts Durrani, Gotkin and Laughlin 
to wonder at the potential use of the serial form for their discipline, but it also repels 
them. The serial form of both releasing information and speculating about it as it is 
released produces the ethical questions that give pause to the authors’ analysis and 
recommendation of the podcast form for anthropology. 
What ties all of these concerns together—questions about the form, the 
dispensing of information, the speculation that is tantamount to public slander, the 
unacknowledged white privilege—is Sarah Koenig herself. Barnathan defends 
Koenig’s objectivity in Serial by stating, “What makes Serial so special and so 
meaningful for journalism is reporter Sarah Koenig’s transparency . . . As she says, she 
has no skin in the game. She is simply looking into a story about a promising high 
school student of Pakistani origin accused of killing his former girlfriend, Hae Min 




Journalism,” emphasis mine). It is not accurate to say that Koenig has “no skin in the 
game.” In the first episode, “The Alibi,” Koenig makes her position in this 
investigation clear with two statements that virtually bookend the opening entry to 
Serial. Introducing the concept and approach to the series, Koenig says, “I'm not a 
detective or a private investigator. I'm not even a crime reporter. But, yes, every day 
this year, I've tried to figure out the alibi of a 17-year-old boy.” The episode closes 
with an email exchange between Koenig and famous missing witness Asia McClain 
(i.e. “the alibi” in “The Alibi”): 
All this time I thought the courts proved it was Adnan that killed her. I thought 
he was where he deserved to be. Now I'm not so sure . . . I just hope that 
Adnan isn't some sick bastard just trying to manipulate his way out of jail." I 
wrote back, "Believe me, I'm on exactly the same page." (ibid, emphasis mine) 
Koenig positions herself—from the very beginning—as the “lost witness” to the entire 
case. The first lines of Serial are “For the last year, I've spent every working day 
trying to figure out where a high school kid was for an hour after school one day in 
1999—or if you want to get technical about it, and apparently I do, where a high 
school kid was for 21 minutes after school one day in 1999” (ibid). Her relentless 
quest to find Adnan’s alibi leads to the identification with Asia McClain we see in that 
snippet from their email exchange—“Believe me, I’m on exactly the same page [with 
the lost witness].” If Serial was concerned simply with finding “the alibi”—Asia 
McClain—it could have ended after one episode. It is not, however. It becomes, 
through the gaps in its serial telling, concerned with Sarah Koenig’s attempt to become 




guilty or innocent. Koenig has a tremendous amount of “skin in the game,” contrary to 
Barnathan’s assertion, and this is precisely what makes Serial so compelling and such 
a rich site for theory and discourse. We start to see that the ethical question posed by 
Serial is opened up by its form: seriality reveals the process by which a journalist 
assumes a role in a story. Seriality opens space for relationships to form (journalist to 
investigation, journalist to subject) and for desire to emerge as a mode of inquiry. 
What Serial does is show how Foucault’s ethics of parrhesia and Lacan’s ethics of 
desire emerge through a serial narrative structure. This is the strength of Serial, not its 
ethical blind spot. 
 
Koenig and Foucault 
The turn to theory can, at times, seem a way to treat abstractly a concrete 
worldly situation—just as the serializing of a 1999 murder case can seem to turn 
people into characters and traumatic real life drama into entertainment—but that is not 
the case here. I submit that it is only with a proper grasp of what theory can bring to 
bear on this discussion of ethics that we can truly and fully understand Serial. Michel 
Foucault’s work on ethics focuses on the necessity of a relationship with another as 
the basis for truth telling. Jacques Lacan will trouble Foucault’s conception of ethics 
by introducing the unconscious and desire as fecund territories for ethical inquiry. 
Sarah Koenig serves as the chief interlocutor for two audiences vital to Serial’s 
narrative development. Both are obvious: Adnan and the listener. For a way to help us 
begin to theorize the contours of ethics, truth telling, and the necessity of the 




criminal or delinquent subject, making him a natural thinker to approach for Serial. 
However, we focus not on concepts like the Panopticon or a work like Discipline and 
Punish here, but on parrhesia. Foucault develops his notion of parrhesia—a 
“modality of truth telling”—most schematically in The Courage of Truth, a series of 
lectures conducted at the College De France from 1983-1984 (2). Foucault’s work on 
parrhesia exerts influence on the fields of politics and law to this day.2 Philosophical 
parrhesia is “frank speech,” the speech exchanged between friends, with an 
interlocutor who one risks offending with their personal truth. Political parrhesia is 
“fearless speech,” the truth-telling that risks one’s position or standing in democracy, 
as “democracy is not the privileged site of parrhesia but the place in which parrhesia 
is the most difficult to practice” (58). This is because parrhesia requires truth-telling 
without any hiding and without the rhetorical flourishes that often manifest themselves 
in the practice of democracy. One’s duty, so to speak, is to the truth; not to curate an 
image, lobby for political advancement, or to cover oneself in rhetorical glory. I want 
to focus on this basic structure for truth-telling that Foucault posits in The Courage of 
Truth, as it is germane to a discussion of Serial, a narrative premised on truth-telling 
and truth-investigation. It also, usefully, troubles the kind of ethical journalism 
practiced and implied by Sarah Koenig. It allows us to focus on her relationship—
interlocutorship, if you will—with Adnan Syed, troubling the ethicality of that utterly 
fundamental relationship for Serial.  
As Foucault sees it, truth-telling is the basis for the development of an ethics of 
the self.  Despite this focus on the individual, Foucault is adamant about the role of the 




the self in Foucault, it is only insofar as the self is connected to others. As Foucault 
says, “In ancient culture, and therefore well before Christianity, telling the truth about 
oneself was an activity involving several people, an activity with other people, and 
even more precisely an activity with one other person, a practice for two” (5). In line 
with his characteristic rejection of the institutionalization of religion, Foucault is 
against the idea that an expert or specialist (like the priest in Catholicism) needs to be 
a part of this truth-telling equation and that confession needs to be the model for truth-
telling itself. Instead, the other in truth-telling requires no special status other than 
being the interlocutor for the self.  
Koenig proves time and time again to be the perfect interlocutor for Adnan. 
They speak freely and easily. It is engaging to listen to. As a listener, I feel like these 
two have a real relationship, beyond “interviewer and interviewee,” a relationship that 
is well positioned—in our Foucauldian formulation—to explore truth. Truth, for 
Foucault, is in no way equivalent to objective fact, a similarity his ethical philosophy 
shares with the nature of Serial’s investigation. The recitation of formulae or rules, for 
example, does not count as “truth.” Parrhesia—truth telling—is a position one adopts 
in regard to the truth, to speaking it, to investigating it. Parrhesia demands that the 
individual risk their self in the act of telling the truth. This risk of offending or 
challenging the other stands as the measuring stick for the effectiveness of the act of 
parrhesia. Speaking truth by necessity incurs backlash, censure, rejection. The 
investigation of truth, as we see in Serial, must be vulnerable to the very attacks levied 
against it that we saw above. Equally true, Sarah Koenig and Adnan Syed’s 




There is, however, a significant exchange between Sarah Koenig and Adnan 
Syed, one that adheres almost exactly to what Foucault describes as “the parrhesiastic 
game” in The Courage of Truth. Koenig tells the listener that after six months of 
speaking to Adnan over the phone, he asked her what her interest was in the case. 
Koenig, as she recounts, rifles through a list of things she thought were interesting 
about the case and finally says, “[W]hat really hooked me most, was him. Just trying 
to figure out, who is this person who says he didn’t kill this girl but is serving a life 
sentence for killing this girl” (“The Case Against Adnan Syed”). Koenig’s answer 
results in, as she says, the closest thing to a “hostile” interaction they had while 
working on Serial—it is also the moment where we see that Adnan is the perfect 
interlocutor for Koenig herself.  
She tells Adnan that she thinks he’s “a really nice guy” and that she likes 
talking to him, that driving her interest in the case is figuring out “what does that 
mean?” Sarah is attempting to understand how much she enjoys Adnan’s conversation 
and company with the idea that he is also a violent killer. Adnan pauses a while before 
responding; a silence that is remarkable for Sarah and Adnan’s communication simply 
for its exceptional status. Adnan is flustered and stutters his way toward eventually 
saying “it’s weird to hear you say that because, I don’t even really know you” (ibid). 
Sarah is immediately taken aback and she asks, “are you saying I don’t know you at 
all?” (ibid). Adnan is still incredulous that Sarah can make the judgment that he is “a 
nice person” given that they have only talked on the phone “a few times” (more than 
thirty hours of phone call by this point, which Koenig points out is “way more than 




We can see a lot in this interaction. We see further affirmation that, yes, Sarah 
Koenig does have quite a lot of “skin in the game,” as she more or less tells Adnan—
and the listener—that she considers him a friend. We see Adnan engaging in 
parrhesia—frank speech—risking his good standing with Sarah Koenig, his 
interlocutor who really could be his savior or executioner (as Adnan refers to Koenig 
in another episode). The stated point of Serial’s investigation is to find “missing 
evidence” or question the evidence that exists. If the convicted murderer outright tells 
the person taking new interest in his decades-old conviction that “you don’t really 
know me,” that’s as convincing an argument for “maybe he did do it” as Adnan could 
have offered. Simply put, it makes it easier to believe this “nice guy” could have killed 
somebody if he brazenly tells the person investigating his conviction “I know you 
think you know me, but you do not.” 
We do, however, encounter a problem with Foucault here. The skeptical reader 
will ask, but does Adnan know he’s speaking parrhesiastically? Wouldn’t one have to 
have knowledge of their ethical act before doing it? Or is it that the ethical act is a 
matter of retroactive interpretation? Foucault’s entire system of truth-telling and 
ethical speech/ action is premised on an unstated and untenable notion of intention. In 
Foucault, we can read intention directly from actions. That is, if one practices 
parrhesia as Foucault describes, one is ethical. We do not question the motivations 
and machinations of the interlocutor if their actions fit the system that Foucault details. 
Foucault famously rejects the insights of psychoanalysis—particularly its call for, as 
he might term it, a “hermeneutics of the subject.” If the entire psychoanalytic project 




the reasons they think they do them. One need not be an ardent reader of Freud or 
Lacan to accept this idea; one need not even believe in an unconscious, merely a 
subconscious.  
Foucault utterly rejects this. There is no unconscious lurking in the background 
of Foucault’s work and thought. It matters not the reason behind Sarah Koenig openly 
questioning Adnan Syed’s character while on the phone with him, the only thing that 
matters is that she did it. By affixing the locus of logic on one’s relation to others, in 
the way Foucault explores, Foucault might say that the intention doesn't matter, all 
that matters is the willingness to begin acting parrhesiastically, that it is a process. 
Whether one begins with earnest intent or otherwise, the "intention" arises as a result 
of practice or askesis, in Foucault’s terminology. This seems like a perfectly 
Foucauldian answer to the problem that he, sadly, did not live long enough to 
confront. It is, however, an answer that is open to psychoanalytic appraisal, which is to 
say that if intent can only be apprehended through a process that reveals in the 
rearview, then parrhesiastic acts and utterances acquire meaning through the very 
same process that speech does during a psychoanalytic session—retroactively. And if 
meaning only emerges retroactively, this implies that the gap within utterances—
precisely what the serial form privileges—marks an interruption in truth-telling as 
practice. In this moment of interruption, the subject’s unconscious intention or desire 
manifests itself. The interruption trumps the truth of our practice with the truth of the 
subject’s desire. In this way, the serial (and Serial) takes us beyond Foucault, who 





Koenig avec Lacan 
As I have shown above, while Foucault appears a natural resource for a 
discussion of the ethical speech that can arise between interlocutors—and theorizing 
the interlocutor is necessary for considering Serial season one—his ideas stumble 
when we consider the desire that might be at work in that relationship. This is a critical 
factor in Serial and the ethical project I’m locating in its first season. While the issue 
of intention is an impediment in Foucault, it is a site for theorization in French 
psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan, to whose works we now turn. In The Courage of Truth, 
Foucault thinks alongside Ancient Greek philosophy, culture, and the “practices” at 
work in everyday life in an attempt to develop his notion of parrhesia. Lacan, starting 
with his seventh seminar, The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, takes aim at what he calls 
“traditional ethics” emanating from the Ancient world, specifically in the work of 
Aristotle. Traditional ethics aim at “the service of goods” or attend to the good at the 
expense of desire, according to Lacan (314). Lacan’s work, then, stands in opposition 
to Foucault’s project, which has a theory of the ethical act but no theory of intention, a 
theory of pleasure with no theory of desire.  
Lacan famously asks and examines, Che voui? or What do you want? This is 
the question posed to the Other that inaugurates the subject’s desire. Lacanian 
psychoanalysis is premised on the idea that our desire is not our own, our desire is 
always aimed at the Other. Lacan begins this thread of thought simply: when you’re a 
kid and you make your parents laugh, you don’t know why they’re laughing but it 
makes them happy, so you keep doing whatever it is that makes them happy, even 




“secret” codes of symbolic interaction (e.g. not actually answering “How are you?” 
when one says that to you on the street) so one’s whole way of relating to the world 
occurs in this very matrix: yes, I know exactly what to do to appear normal in public 
but I don’t know why I need to or want to. What we are looking for, according to 
psychoanalysis, is the Other’s approval. In Serial, this question is implicit and 
undergirds much of Sarah Koenig and her team’s investigation in the first season. 
Why didn’t Christina Gutierrez contact Asia McClain? Why didn’t Adnan mention 
speaking to her at the library? Why does Jay change his account of the crime to the 
police over and over and over again? What do these people want? (What does the 
Other want?) The audience asks this question of Sarah Koenig, and Sarah Koenig asks 
this question of everyone and everything she encounters. The issue of desire is here 
woven into the very fabric of Serial’s narrative.  
Which brings us to how desire offers Lacan a “way out” of Lacan’s reading of 
traditional ethics (and how the immanent presence of desire separates Serial from 
traditional journalism). Lacan identifies the philosophy of Immanuel Kant as the 
introduction of desire to ethical philosophy. He deals with this notion in three separate 
works: The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, “Kant avec Sade,” and Encore, a seminar that 
works through a revision to some of what he put forth in the previous ethics seminar. 
Lacan begins, in The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, by claiming that “a radical repudiation 
of a certain ideal of the good is necessary” (230). This ideal of “the good” comes 
straight from Aristotle and traditional ethics, an ethics preoccupied with, according to 
Lacan, “The cleaning up of desire, modesty, temperateness, that is to say, the middle 




develop in his own ethical project is something that breaks with this notion of the 
ethical being tied to the advancement of the good.  
For Lacan, Kant marks the breaking point from the ancient morality of the 
good. Kant enables us to consider ethical acts regardless of the contribution that they 
might make to what people today refer to as “flourishing.” As he turns ethics away 
from the good, Kant also turns it away from the merely possible. As Alenka Zupancic 
neatly unpacks: 
By insisting on the fact that the moral imperative is not concerned with what 
might or might not be done, Kant discovered the essential dimension of ethics: 
the dimension of desire, which circles around the real qua impossible. This 
dimension was excluded from the purview of traditional ethics, and could 
therefore appear to it only as an excess. So Kant’s crucial first step involves 
taking the very thing excluded from the traditional field of ethics, and turning 
it into the only legitimate territory for ethics (3).  
It is in this very territory that Sarah Koenig and Serial operate. Through his reading of 
Kant, Lacan allows us to see that the criticism levied at Sarah Koenig for breaching 
objective journalistic standards is not viable, or if it is, it relies on separating desire 
from the ethical (as in traditional and Foucauldian ethics). Since desire is at the core of 
the subject, “not giving ground relative to one’s desire”—Lacan’s ethical maxim—is 
perfectly sensible. This does not fit exactly with the ethical territory I have been 
crafting for Serial and Sarah Koenig. I am adamant that her desire needs to be present 
in her investigation. Rather than “compromising” her ethical position, this enables and 




The Adnan Syed-Sarah Koenig relationship enables truth-telling, as we learn 
from Foucault. It does not enable “verification bias,” as some detractors have argued, 
nor does it compromise Sarah Koenig’s objectivity.3 A belief in some objectivity, 
here, is the lie. Jesse Owen Hearns-Branaman, in the recent Journalism and the 
Philosophy of Truth: Beyond Objectivity and Balance, calls for new theories on 
journalism’s epistemology. The heart of his project is finding a way to theorize 
objectivity, rather than simply name it. He rejects any approach that resembles a 
taxonomy, arguing that most of the journalism scholarship from the 1970s to today 
shows a stagnation in approach, a circularity in debate (15).  Significantly, his route to 
new thinking on objectivity and truth in journalism passes through Lacan. It is not 
hard to understand why. Yes, there must be some notion of objectivity that supports 
journalistic inquiry, but there is not a supposedly pure form of “objective journalism” 
on the one hand and then there is Serial on the other. Serial season one gives us an 
opportunity to see how desire complicates a notion of “bias free” reporting. Serial 
simply invites this complication to drive its investigative narrative.  
What we come to, finally, is a consideration of the ethical dimension of 
seriality observable in the form, backlash, and innovation in Koenig’s reporting. In 
Encore, Lacan’s revision of his first ethics seminar, Lacan has made a subtle shift. As 
Joan Copjec glosses in Imagine There’s No Woman, “[Lacan’s] ethics takes off from 
the proposal that being is not-all or there is no whole of being” (6). In a sense, this is 
what Serial offers us. What inheres seriality is the gap. This gap in knowing, the gap 
in meaning, of possibility. This gap raises expectations and, of course, disappointment. 




detractors do not reckon with: the way its form shapes the investigation and its ethical 
dimension is the podcast’s most intriguing feature from a theoretical perspective. As 
Foucault says, “parrhesia . . . is only [parrhesia] after it has opened up an essential, 
fundamental, and structurally necessary moment of the possibility of hatred and 
rupture” (25). Foucault and Lacan both acknowledge the structural necessity for a gap 
to be present for the ethical to emerge.4 For Lacan this gap occurs between the demand 
of the other and the act of the subject (Antigone’s refusal of Creon’s injunction against 
burying her brother is Lacan’s example). This gap is utterly constitutive of the serial 
and it is what has made Serial so fascinating for those who extol it (like Joyce 
Barnathan) and those who take issue with it (like Edward Wasserman).  
What Serial does is return us, in a way, to Dickens and how he wrote alongside 
his readers reading. This is a formal echo of this aspect of seriality that attracted 
listeners. When people listened, they felt that they were part of an ongoing criminal 
investigation—which they were (especially when listeners connected with the 1999 
murder contacted the show willing to offer testimony and information). This was the 
first thing that drew listeners in and is the first thing that anyone who critiqued the 
show brings up; that it went about its investigation poorly because of this unfolding. 
What Serial shows is how people get bound up in form (something we will see further 
in the next chapter). We can look at the serial form as the object cause of desire, as 
Lacan’s objet a is often translated in English. The problem with this formula though is 
that it blurs how desire is prior to the object and that desire causes the object. Through 
looking at Lacan’s formulation of the ethics of psychoanalysis— the working through 




objet a—Lacan gives us a framework for seeing how desire and seriality are 
inextricably linked. In the previous two chapters, I show seriality as a function of the 
psyche. If seriality grounds the subject, then in a way different from how Sartre means 
it, seriality is also a form through which subjects relate to one another. Serial as a 
podcast is literally two subjects relating to each other through the serial form, and how 
that form is related to audiences, and how that relation ended up determining the form 
of Serial. Desire is not simply want or that people wanted new episodes of the podcast 
or wanted to know who had killed Hae Min Lee. Desire is disturbing and cannot be 
consciously avowed. 
This is the encounter with form and desire found in Serial’s first season that 
the show would never revisit. This may be because of the criticism they received or, 
perhaps, it is due to recognizing the grim underside of how the serial form, the 
interlocutor, and desire intersect. Julie Snyder said in a 2016 roundtable discussion on 
popular seriality at Columbia University that the way that people reacted to the show 
as though it were a fictional narrative disturbed her:  
There was one point, while we were in the middle of the first season of 
Serial—it was some coffee shop right up here by Columbia—and Sarah 
Koenig told me, she had gone in, and there was a tip jar next to the cash 
register, and one said, “Adnan did it” and one said, “Jay did it”—who are the 
two characters, two of the people in the story—and you were supposed to tip 
on it. And it makes you want to puke . . . It just felt like—“This isn’t what we 




At the same time that Snyder expresses disgust at the “fan” reaction to their 
journalistic investigation, she offers a fascinating slip of the tongue: characters. Jay 
and Adnan are “the two characters,” she says, before correcting “the two people in the 
story” (ibid). Snyder here speaks exactly as a “fan” would of any fictional series. At 
the same time that she decries some of the engagement with Serial’s first language, 
she adopts the very language she attempts to disavow. This, we might be tempted to 
underline, is desire itself irrupting.  
The first season shows clearly the relation that seriality has with the 
psychoanalytic notion of desire. Crucially, this comes from the form first and the 
content second. This is one of the points of my work here, and one of the subtle points 
of psychoanalysis I am trying to draw out—that psychoanalysis is concerned with how 
form affects the psyche and how we should understand the psyche as form. Conscious 
experience is riddled with gaps from which the unconscious emerges. It is analogous, 
in this way, to the gapped form of Serial (and the serial, in general). It is through these 
gaps that relation can take place and subjectivity can emerge. Gaps are not 
imperfections or holes that denote incompletion. They are the very thing that allows 
for Julie Snyder’s unconscious desire to see Jay and Adnan as characters to emerge. 
 
Conclusion 
Serial intervenes in culture at the unexpected intersections of narrative and the 
law, journalism and desire, ethics and seriality. It has been hailed for pioneering a new 
journalistic format (the podcast), and saving an old one (radio). It has been criticized 




actual murder, its flouting of established journalistic convention, and its potential bias 
toward the convicted felon at the heart of it all. The question of Serial’s ethics 
pervades all of these questions.  
What cannot be debated regarding Sarah Koenig and Serial, however, is that 
what the show does is new. It is. As such, I have argued that Serial requires a different 
framework to evaluate its ethical content, since it is outside the bounds of established 
critique. In a standard documentary series (like Netflix’s Making a Murderer) or 
published works of journalism, the journalist is not the active interlocutor of the 
subject of the story (here, Adnan Syed). For this reason, we need a model for 
evaluating the ethical status of the relationship between Sarah Koenig and Adnan Syed 
that drives Serial’s investigation. For insight into this new framework, I have turned to 
Foucault and Lacan, whose ostensibly incompatible thought are indispensable. Despite 
the problem of intention at the heart of Foucault’s ethics of parrhesia that Serial 
allows us to see, his model is exemplary for showing how the interlocutor makes 
ethical speech possible.  
Critics have opined that Sarah Koenig becomes too close to Adnan Syed, 
clouding her ability to evaluate his case objectively. Foucault would say that such 
objectivity risks nothing. Were Koenig to be removed from Syed partially or 
completely there would be much less to pull her toward the opinion that Syed is 
innocent. A dispassionate investigation into the physical material of a possible 
wrongful conviction is certainly a valuable practice but it can by no means be 
considered the only way to investigate truth. There must be alternatives available. 




this: what does it mean if "responsible journalism" is opposed to the investigation of 
truth? Koenig and former consulting homicide detective Jim Trainum say that the 
detectives on Syed’s case “probably settled for what was good enough to be the truth” 
(“To Be Suspected”). But Serial does not settle for this. If “responsible journalism” 
would separate Koenig from Syed, prevent her from interviewing certain people, 
prevent her from airing her speculations and accusations as they occur in her 
investigation—distance her from the truth, in other words—then what is the ethical 
status of this supposed “responsible journalism”? The issue of Serial’s ethics cannot 
be so black and white as to rely on conventional models that fail to meet Serial on its 
own ground (i.e., confront what it is actually doing).  
These questions are fortified by Lacan, with whom we are able to look at the 
ethical status of desire. Listening to Serial it is clear that Koenig desires—if not to 
clear Adnan Syed of wrongdoing entirely—to be the person who can know 
definitively what happened in this murder case. It is doubtless that Sarah Koenig 
realized her desire to find the exculpatory evidence that would prove Adnan’s 
innocence compromised her journalistic voice—a desire that, as I have argued, leads 
her to position herself as this “lost” expert witness. But even as this compromises 
traditional notions of “journalistic integrity” it increases narrative tension and listener 
interest in the show. Crucially, it pushes Koenig toward a different territory of ethics, 
one that sheds traditional notions of objectivity. 
Perhaps the most enticing and disquieting element for some listeners has been 
the narrative aspect of the series. Even Sarah Koenig, quoted by Ellen Gamerman of 




law that subtends Serial. Gamerman writes: 
As they do with addictive TV, fans are already fretting that the last episode 
will be a letdown. “I feel like we’re pretty good at making sure it won’t be a 
giant disappointment,” Ms. Koenig said in an interview. “I’ll present what my 
reporting bears out, and that’s my responsibility. It’s not my responsibility to 
entertain you with some wonderful, perfect ending. I don’t mean that in a 
holier-than-thou way at all—it’s just—I’m a reporter. (“Serial Podcast Catches 
Fire”) 
Here Koenig struggles with the ethics of seriality and desire that her podcast 
develops—we even see seriality displacing Koenig’s reporting from herself. Koenig’s 
statement fails to grapple with the space her podcast created for her: this impossible 
hybridity of reporter and storyteller, interlocutor and subject of desire, distanced from 
traditional journalism. In other words, if the principal author does not fully embrace 
the narrative aspect of Serial, how can Edward Wasserman? By insisting ‘I’m just a 
reporter’ Koenig refuses the radicality of her own project. That Koenig is even being 
asked about her “series finale” alerts us to the uniqueness of her journalism. Further, 
by recoiling from the full narrative import of Serial, Koenig misses a crucial insight 
graspable in her listeners’ worry: the potential for disappointment is increased with 
serial endings over episodic endings. I contend that disappointment is the virtue of 
serial storytelling. Serial storytelling is so enriching, so engrossing, because it raises 
ever higher our expectations for it. Fans ‘fretting that the last episode will be a 
letdown’ is the point. One can only be disappointed because of the form. It raises 




dynamic than one that meets requirements without ever raising them. This, perhaps 
more than any other element of the podcast, is what definitively separates Serial from 
traditional and everyday news reporting. 
Consider Koenig’s final take on the story in Serial’s final installment:  
As a juror I vote to acquit Adnan Syed. I have to acquit. Even if in my heart of 
hearts I think Adnan killed Hae, I still have to acquit. That’s what the law 
requires of jurors. But I’m not a juror, so just as a human being walking down 
the street next week, what do I think? If you ask me to swear that Adnan Syed 
is innocent, I couldn’t do it. I nurse doubt. I don’t like that I do, but I do. I 
mean most of the time I think he didn’t do it. For big reasons, like the utter 
lack of evidence but also small reasons, things he said to me just off the cuff or 
moments when he’s cried on the phone and tried to stifle it so I wouldn’t hear. 
Just the bare fact of why on earth would a guilty man agree to let me do this 
story [makes me think he must be innocent]. (“What We Know”) 
Indeed, what keeps Koenig’s “I think the case is weak but I don’t know if Adnan is 
guilty or not” final statement from being disappointing is that the case (as of this 
writing) is still active. Adnan will now face another day in court. There may be more 
Serial Season 1. The possibility of more, the deferment of the ending, the possibility 
of more possibilities is the only thing that keeps the serial from disappointing. As 
psychoanalysis has it, complete satisfaction is an impossibility; were one to be 
completely satisfied one would stop desiring. And who would want to stop desiring a 
narrative whose form asks us, problematically, to continually reencounter it? 
                                                 
1 While, yes, a pre-recorded investigation of twelve episodes aired week by week is still serialized, such 




                                                                                                                                            
“live” aspect to Serial opened a gap in the narrative that most serialized-after-production stories close 
down. Removing it would not simply cause Serial to “lose dramatic edge,” it would cleave from Serial 
the very thing that made every listener feel like they were thinking, feeling, speculating, conjecturing, 
wondering right along with Koenig. In short, the series would lack the very reason Wasserman was 
contacted to comment on it in the first place. 
2 See Jonathan Simon’s “Fearless Speech in the Killing State: The Power of Capital Crime Victim 
Speech.” North Carolina Law Review. Vol. 82. (2003): 1377-1414. Print. 
3 See Conor Friedersdorf, Adrienne Lafrance, Tanya Basu, and Katie Kilkenny, "Serial Episode 8: A 
Study in Bias?" The Atlantic. Atlantic Media Company, 13 Nov. 2014. Web. 15 May 2016. 
 
4 If the psychoanalytic subject is the subject of desire, the Foucauldian subject (he would prefer 
“individual”) comes into being through “the historical analysis of the limits imposed upon us and an 
experiment with the possibility of going beyond them” (“What is Enlightenment,” Ethics, Subjectivity 
and Truth 319). The subject who exceeds her historical limits is the ethical subject, the parrhesiast, but 
it is not the case that this is an excessive subject as it would be in Lacan and in psychoanalysis. The 
desire that exceeds biological or even situational necessity is not present in Foucault. We still have this 
flattening of speech and act—result—with intention. For us, Lacan offers a way out of this problem in 
Foucault. Indeed, with Lacan—in working with excess, enjoyment, and desire—we see a better fit for 






FILLING THE GAP 
 
Academic inquiry into Netflix and streaming television has focused on the 
employment of algorithms (Hallinan & Striphas, 2016; Gomez-Uribe & Hunt, 2016; 
Amatriain, 2013), binge watching as the mainstreaming of “Cult TV” fandom (Jenner, 
2015, 2016; Pittman, & Sheehan, 2015), viewer engagement/ digital reception 
(Groshek, & Krongard, 2016; Matrix, 2014), and streaming as the next step in the 
evolution of television form and content (Auletta, 2014). This work has attempted to 
account for Netflix’s meteoric rise as producer of television content, while evaluating 
its industry wide effects.  
There is another thread of commentary on Netflix and streaming, however, that 
cuts across both popular and scholarly writing. That is, pathologizing binge watching. 
The issue of binge watching cuts to the very core of the psychoanalytic project and 
this dissertation’s position that psychoanalysis is the serial media theory, as in a theory 
of psychic life and social engagement that is primarily concerned with seriality. 
Psychoanalysis begins in the clinic with an interest in not pathologizing behavior (e.g. 
the complaints of women branded hysterics). The point of psychoanalysis is to 
understand behavior rather than pathologize it. Binge watching is pathologized by 
media critics both socially and academically. Scholars such as Jason Mittell do not 
consider Netflix shows to be serial since they forgo a traditional distribution model 




addiction that needs to be checked or perhaps regulated. Here we have a unique test 
case for psychoanalysis as a media theory. We can move toward not pathologizing 
binge watching, since this tells us very little about media released in the binge format 
and we have an opportunity to see the work of the serial gap in media that purports to 
be gapless. In this way we see the shape of seriality and the presence of the gap in the 
relief of its apparent absence. Further, we will be able to explore the enjoyment 
constitutive of binge watching television.1 What emerges here is a consideration of the 
body in binge watching, a key aspect to thinking about binge watching theoretically.  
 
Setting the Stakes 
The first prong of this chapter’s argument is this: media theorists and pop 
culture commentators tend to pathologize binge witching instead of theorizing it. We 
see this in the following popular news media sources. The Associated Press, in “Binge 
Watching: Where Immersion, Indulgence, and Escapism Meet,” regard binge 
watching as a kind of opting out of everyday life, a choice to remove oneself from 
reality. The Guardian, writing on Netflix’s Narcos, asks “Full Immersion TV: is 
Narcos too intense to binge watch?” Here the binge model is something that makes a 
television viewer more vulnerable to televisual content, a point which Jan Van den 
Bulck, co-author of a University of Michigan study on the negative effects binge-
watching has on sleep patterns, agrees. In an interview on the findings of his sleep 
study, Van den Bulck says, “[Binge watching is] a different kind of immersion—the 
idea that you almost feel as if you’re in that world of science fiction or fantasy or 




the study itself, Van den Bulck writes “the narrative complexity of these shows” 
causes bingeing, as it “leaves viewers thinking about episodes and their sequel after 
viewing them. This prolongs sleep onset or, in other words, requires a longer period to 
‘cool down’ before going to sleep, thus affecting sleep overall” (1004).2 It is difficult 
to ignore that, at a cultural moment when television has been validated as an art form 
in a way not seen previously, a strain of one of the oldest criticisms of TV reemerges: 
that TV is bad for you and it will ‘rot your brain.’ Or, as an NPR article clumsily puts 
it: “Too Much TV And Chill Could Reduce Brain Power Over Time.” 
Perhaps there is no better scholarly example of the above skepticism of the 
efficacy of binge watching than Dennis Broe’s recent Birth of the Binge: Serial TV 
and the End of Leisure. Broe echoes the Sartrean approach to seriality we saw 
described in the Introduction. Referring to the binge model as a kind of “heightened” 
seriality, Broe establishes the stakes of his analysis: 
The sociopolitical background against which this heightened seriality emerges, 
with its much more intense luring of an audience into a more complicated and 
extended fictional world, is one of a seemingly ever more powerful capitalist 
system centered in the Anglo (American and British) world . . .  as are the 
television series that circulate out from it. This system has, on the one hand, no 
limits, no recognizable opponents, as it continues to expand and commodify all 
aspects of everyday life. But in the real world, capital is all the time surging 
against boundaries and destroying them at its own peril. The earth itself is in 




technological revolution (oil, fracked natural gas, radioactive minerals strip-
mined for communication devices) are rapidly destroying the planet. (14) 
Broe offers a critique of seriality—the binge model specifically—as a way of 
critiquing capitalism. Interestingly, Broe’s logic actually buys in to capitalism as he 
decries it: if only seriality had an opponent (i.e. a competitor) then the competition 
would regulate itself. We saw this earlier with James H. Wittebols’s approach to “the 
Soap Opera paradigm”: there is simply no opposing force to seriality. It spreads and 
spreads. Broe’s stance fits comfortably with Wittebols and Crary, a philosophical 
position we can recast thusly: seriality is the motor of ceaseless repetitive production. 
To mount a successful critique of capitalism, we must see its logic. For those adhering 
to the Sartrean school of capitalist critique, it is seriality that underpins capitalism and 
it is at the level of seriality that capitalism must be critiqued.  
I will, again, stress that the above scholars see correctly, to my mind, that 
seriality is not a neutral form. It is not a structure empty of content until filled. It is 
not, say, meter without a line of poetry. There is something inherent, active, and 
structuring beyond conscious control in its constitutive gaps. Where the above 
scholars see an inherent insidiousness to seriality, however, I am arguing for us to see 
the serial suffering of the analytic session articulated by Freud and the real of Lacan.   
Chapter Three showed how desire is intrinsic to the serial form. This is another 
point at which it is important to observe a psychoanalytic approach rather than a 
paranoid approach. Again, Dennis Broe’s book is instructive on this point. He sees the 
situation with seriality beyond its close relationship to the form of capitalism: the 




Desire itself in this market model is manufactured along the model of 
Hollywood genre production, with the spectator knowing exactly what rewards 
are promised with each genre, what specific chain of desires are activated (love 
in the rom-com, exhilaration in the action film) and the formula then 
guaranteeing a variation slight enough to seem novel but not significant 
enough to disturb the genre’s underlying routinized promises. These now-
dominant forms of grammatization, different from the earlier processes of 
writing, are the result of tertiary retentions being confiscated by [what Bernard 
Stiegler calls] the “technologies of control.” They lead to a “logics of 
dissociation” that do not bring people together but further entrench them in 
their own isolated hell (which is no longer, as with Sartre, other people but 
rather other people’s devices) all the while destroying the “desire of the 
future.” (24) 
Broe buys in to the idea that desire can be counted and accounted for and falls victim 
to what that logic entails: that viewers are being spoonfed something against their own 
interests, that “seriality is employed cleverly within a capitalist mode of production to 
create the demand, ‘the desire to find out what happens next,’ [as Jennifer Hayward 
writes,] that it then feeds” (138). Broe quotes Jennifer Hayward here as a way of 
conflating the kind of quantifiable demand of capitalism with desire. For 
psychoanalysis, desire is always unconscious. What Broe writes about here is “want,” 
not desire. Interestingly, the Netflix limited-series Maniac nods toward this paranoid 
logic in the opening minutes of its first episode. Maniac takes place in a retro-futurist 




given personification. Ad Buddies are actual advertising men who will front the cost 
for various purchases as long as they can interview and collect data on a potential 
client. When Annie (Emma Stone) attempts to use an Ad Buddy to pay for cigarettes, 
she is told by the cashier, “Those assholes record client conversations. A National 
Database of Desires. The businessmen, ever hear of it? They know you better than you 
know you.”3 To believe that corporations—or seriality—control desire is to disregard 
both conscious agency and the unconscious at the same time as corporate mastery is 
totalized. The more difficult logic to observe is exactly what we saw in the previous 
chapter: our desire is other to us. It is an intimate other, that is, the unconscious. To 
believe in the “conspiracy” of the Ad Buddy or the absolute knowledge and power of 
the corporation is to find comfort in the idea that someone really does know you. The 
more discomforting revelation is that you are other even to yourself. For Sartre and 
those following in the wake of his Critique of Dialectical Reason, seriality is the 
engine of capitalist expansion and it is seriality which others us to each other. Broe 
does move on to suggest that seriality can be used to unite rather than divide, 
emphasizing Sartre’s notion that from seriality the group-in-fusion can emerge to 
make a meaningful collective out of superficial seriality but, as we saw with Sartre, 
this means moving on from seriality rather than engaging with it (138). 
So, what does a non-pathological approach to binge seriality look like? We 
might expect to find an answer in Jason Mittell’s Complex TV. It is worth carefully 
tracking Mittell’s position on seriality here, as it will inform his later declaration about 
the serial status of Netflix’s binge model. For Mittell, the central characteristic of 




“through a strictly regimented use of screen time,” a structure mandated by “material 
reception contexts of television broadcasting” (27). These gaps are created by network 
scheduling and, as Mittell goes on to say, have an added function. These network gaps 
“allow viewers to continue their engagement with a series in between episodes, 
participating in fan communities, reading criticism, consuming paratexts, and 
theorizing about future installments” (27). Mittell’s discussion of the gap here is a 
literal one but even he seems to acknowledge that seriality takes residence in the 
psychic life of the subject through the paratextual engagement he describes. His 
conception of the serial gap is importantly different from the analysis conducted here. 
For Mittell, the serial gap is figured in terms of tabula rasa. It is an empty interval of 
time which is endowed with meaning through the activity of viewers and consumers. 
Given this definition of seriality, it is easy to see that Mittell would be skeptical about 
Netflix’s binge model.  
Mittell points to the “boxed aesthetic” as a way of consuming a television 
serial without “a forced schedule,” as it would air on broadcast television (41). The 
only way to re-create a network mandated gap would be by “self-pacing” a series (41). 
Netflix programming seems to expand this boxed aesthetic, as Mittell calls it, which 
for him complicates the serial form of Netflix shows:  
Netflix’s move into original programming has embraced the boxed aesthetic 
even without DVD boxes, publishing entire seasons of House of Cards, 
Arrested Development, and Orange is the New Black all at once to its digital 




raising the question as to whether these multiepisode narratives can be 
considered serial at all. (41) 
It is important to point out that Mittell only raises the question of Netflix seriality and 
does not take it up in the rest of his book.4 We can safely conclude, however, that 
Mittell does not think Netflix or streaming series have a claim on being considered 
serial, since he writes earlier that “The experiences of Dickens’s readers who followed 
his novels through the serialized publication process were unique and unable to be 
replicated by those who read his bound volumes; similarly, the serialized television 
viewing experience is ephemeral compared to the repeatable practice of boxed 
viewing” (40 emphasis mine). Mittell’s choice not to engage Netflix seriality on its 
own terms is curious. Early in Complex TV, Mittell distances his project of narrative 
complexity and televisual aesthetics from earlier models, such as Robert Thompson’s 
notion of “Quality” television, that borrow heavily from the language of film studies 
and literary criticism. Mittell believes that mapping a “model of storytelling tied to 
self-contained feature films onto the ongoing long-form narrative structure of . . . 
television” misses the key components of contemporary complex television, such as 
“continuity and seriality” (18). Further, he writes that praising contemporary television 
series as “novelistic” does nothing so much as “obscure rather than reveal the 
specificities of television’s storytelling form” (18). On these points I am in total and 
enthusiastic agreement with Mittell, especially when he writes, “I believe we can more 
productively develop a vocabulary for television narrative on its own medium terms” 
(18). Given Mittell’s stated focus on developing vocabulary for studying television 




qualify as a serial is down to it subverting a standard of seriality that Mittell sources 
largely from a TV production model that is itself rooted in the way literary fiction was 
distributed in the Victorian era. I do not call our attention to this discrepancy to 
pointlessly needle Mittell, rather I believe his push to define concepts for the study of 
the poetics of television narrative “on its own medium terms” needs to be 
meaningfully applied to the Netflix/ streaming model of binge seriality. So, the better 
question is not “can something like Netflix’s Stranger Things even be serial?” as 
Mittell might ask, but why is something like Netflix’s Stranger Things still serial? 
Formulating the question in this way moves us from treating seriality as though it is 
only a material quantity and moves us toward considering it as a theoretical construct 
and will be taken up in the latter half of this chapter. 
Recalling Freud’s letters to Martha discussed in an earlier chapter, we see that 
Freud seems to have dabbled in binge reading with George Eliot’s Daniel Deronda, “I 
read [Deronda] with mounting puzzlement and interest until an hour ago, discounting 
a few hours of sleep. My well-known impatience made me hurry to get to the end” 
(74). The impatience to get to the end and staying up past a reasonable time to go to 
bed are two aspects of engaging with binge seriality most commonly associated with 
streaming television. A radio and print ad from the eye drop brand Visine 
encompasses this attitude. The ad in print reads: “Just one more episode? For your 
viewing pleasure,” “Give your eyes what they need to go all night,” “If you can’t stop 
feasting your eyes on your screen buffet, VISINE TEARS DRY EYE RELIEF will 




to help viewers fully bask in the “warm glowing warming glow” (to paraphrase The 
Simpsons) unique to streaming television. 
Given this context, we can envision Freud as analogous to the kind of binge 
viewer Netflix called “the new normal” in 2013.5 We also see something vitally 
important for a discussion of the binge model as seriality. Freud did not engage with 
Victorian serials weekly or monthly, as readers contemporaneous with George Eliot’s 
serial writing and release of Daniel Deronda would have. According to Mittell, serial 
gaps are found in the live release of a serial only. Self-pacing a boxed DVD version of 
a previously “gap-filled” serial release does not adequately recreate the gaps of the 
initial release, as, in his definition of seriality. Mittell heavily emphasizes the weekly 
engagement with paratexts undertaken by viewers. The implication here is that after a 
serial narrative is bound in a boxset or a single volume it suddenly lacks the gaps 
constitutive of its initial construction. We might be moved to conclude that it is no 
longer serial.  
What Freud shows us is that the effect of the gap transcends this attempt to bind 
it. While locating the emphasis of the gap within a larger critique of capitalism, 
Dennis Broe never disputes the seriality of Netflix shows. Broe sees that seriality has a 
force to it that is not limited to a network schedule. Broe, however, pathologizes rather 
than engages with the Netflix binge model. This is where we reach the limit of Broe’s 
and Mittell’s approach to Netflix. For Broe, a la Sartre, seriality is a form social 
control and we must move beyond it (as discussed at length above). For Mittell, 
seriality occurs because of a broadcast or publishing schedule dependent upon literal 




initial publication is a great way to study fan communities. Elevating the behavior of 
fans to the decisive aspect of seriality means something we might intuit as the 
“authentically serial” is only available in its live run. I think this is a false step. It 
makes seriality out to be too elusive, too transient, too momentary to be conclusively 
or adequately studied in a forensic manner. In other words, to fully understand what it 
meant to watch ABC’s Lost, “you really had to be there.” The initial publication of 
serial narrative is not a unity of discourse, textual production, and author/ audience 
that can never be returned to. It is a gapped and interrupted experience that can only be 
properly understood or engaged retroactively. This is formally consonant with the 
distribution and creation of serial writing itself. In much the same way that one of the 
principal appeals of serial storytelling is the idea that “this will make more sense 
later,” with the arrow of meaning not pointing forward but backward, to theorize 
seriality is not to see only the gaps installed by network scheduling but see how the 
serial is always itself gapped. What studying binge seriality will show us is this 
attempt to erase gaps—as Freud attempted to do as a reader of Daniel Deronda—
makes their effects more apparent.  
 
The Serial Gap as a Problem to Be Solved, or Bingeing as Understood by Netflix 
It’s worth pausing to consider the following question: why get rid of the 
traditional temporal gaps of a publishing model that has been wildly successful—
across print, visual, and sound media—since 1836? The serial gap actually has a 
history of being seen as troublesome and Netflix’s binge model is the latest in a long 




chapter, critics of the first season of the Serial podcast wanted the serial aspects of the 
investigation without attendant ethical concerns. The history of wanting the best of the 
serial—its accessibility and ongoing complexity—without the worst of it—suffering 
through the dialectic of closure and disclosure—is articulated perfectly by Karl Marx 
in the preface to the French edition of Capital, vol. 1. The French edition of the first 
volume of Marx’s Capital appeared in installments between 1872 and 1875 (Capital 
106). Marx was convinced to publish the translation serially, as opposed to the full 
volume treatments it received in its initial publication and later English translation, as 
“In this form the book will be more accessible to the working class, which to me 
outweighs everything else” (104). When Marx writes that it “outweighs everything 
else” he is referring to one of seriality’s central obstacles and impetuses: the deferral 
of meaning. As Marx writes: 
[due to serialization] it is to be feared that the French public, always impatient 
to come to a conclusion, eager to know the connection between general 
principles and the immediate questions that have aroused their passions, may 
be disheartened because they will be unable to move on at once. (104) 
Marx realizes that, while a serialized version of Capital will increase its readership, it 
will also cut off its readers from the conclusions he is painstakingly building toward. 
The passions of French readers, the desire to get to the end (something the fiction of 
Balzac and Eugene Sue inspired to great effect), is something Marx would prefer not 
to arouse.6 Marx, evoking an instructive response to seriality wants the serial—in his 
case, widespread accessibility and distribution—without the serial—the complication 




inextricable from the serial form. What Marx doesn’t see is that desire is unconscious, 
and it is precisely the impossibility of meaning occasioned by the gap that propels the 
serial. The gap is not a problem but is, rather, a feature that cannot be erased by 
binding or bingeing. German philosopher Fichte developed a term germane for 
theorizing precisely this crucial aspect of seriality: “Anstoß” (anstoss). As Slavoj 
Žižek explains, “It is important to bear in mind the two primary meanings of Anstoss 
in German: check, obstacle, hindrance, something that resists the boundless expansion 
of our striving; and an impetus, a stimulus, something that incites our activity” (49). 
The paradox at the heart of Fichte’s anstoss—the logic that the thing that acts as an 
obstacle is the precise thing that acts as the impetus for the thing in the first place—
has a profound analogue in seriality. For Fichte, anstoss is at the center of subjectivity. 
We might take this as an opportunity to see the serial gap, the obstacle that is also an 
impetus, is at the center of subjectivity (as well as seriality). This is how we see, in a 
different way, that the gap is not just constitutive of the serial but a central antagonism 
in psychic life that cannot be foreclosed.  
Serials are premised on saying too much and not enough (a gap in meaning). It 
is this tension between the demand of episodic totality and the necessity of retroactive 
serial meaning that propels seriality. In a very meaningful sense, a trademark serial 
storytelling element—such as the cliffhanger Freud refers to in Studies on Hysteria—
radically refuses totality. It seems to be a blaring signal that there is more to the story. 
And yet, a sufficient amount of storytelling must be accomplished for a cliffhanger to 
have any meaning at all. With a serial television show, novel, or podcast, it is the 




the interest in the episodes themselves. It’s this lack, or gap, in the individual units of 
meaning that propels the audience to take an interest in the series. Despite all evidence 
in support of the gap as either a model for good narrative or good business, it is and 
has been Netflix’s stated objective to wade into the realm of television—a medium 
defined by its relationship to seriality—and solve the problems of broadcast seriality.  
Netflix embraced what it saw as a shift in viewership and turned it into a model for 
television distribution. Based on an extensive survey of users, Netflix declared binge 
watching television as the “new normal” in 2013. 73 percent of United States users, 
according to this survey, reported that they binge watched their favorite programs 
(“Netflix”). Bingeing, defined as watching 2-6 episodes of one show in a single sitting 
was also something that a full 73 percent of those “bingers” said that they “felt good” 
about bingeing on television generally (ibid).7 
The binge model championed by Netflix was offered initially as something that 
solved the problems of network television seriality. With a binge series there are no 
annoying ad breaks, no waiting for new episodes, and no being told by a TV network 
when to sit in front of your TV (or when to set a digital recording time). Control over 
the TV experience is given to the Netflix “user” rather than TV viewer, something 
cultural anthropologist Grant McCracken credited as engendering this shifting in 
viewing habits: “this TV watcher is different, the couch potato has awoken. And now 
that services like Netflix have given consumers control over their TV viewing, they 
have declared a new way to watch” (ibid). 
 In what at first seems remarkable but after reflection makes perfect sense, 




Lacan in his “punctuated sessions.” As he began to come into his own as a 
psychoanalytic practitioner, Lacan originated the idea of the short session, which no 
longer followed the standard 50-minute or 60-minute session that Freud had 
established. Lacan would end sessions at a key point for the analysand, always without 
prior warning or schedule thereby forcing the analysand to not hold back. The 
development of his “short” or “punctuated session” proved to be Lacan’s most 
controversial move as an analyst. Many saw this punctuating the session as a bald 
money grab, but it is the end, Lacan seems to be arguing, that always endows meaning 
to the beginning. The most important strategy an analyst could employ, ergo, would be 
to make the ending of a psychoanalytic session always meaningful. The imperative is 
to always end with the unconscious revelation of the patient—when someone says 
more than they mean to—and not the inevitable tick-tock of the clock.8 
Rather than leaving it up to the clock and a schedule of analytic sessions to 
determine meaning, Lacan turned to stopping sessions at the precise moment a patient 
said something worth thinking about between this and their next session. Lacan is 
attempting to endow real meaning to the end of a session and have that quicken the 
revelatory aspects of “the talking cure.” It’s also clear that he is attempting to solve the 
problem Freud first articulated about the analytic situation. Rather than having patients 
“suffer more” because they are unable to articulate the last thing they wanted to talk 
about, Lacan stops patients at the precise moment than they say more than they mean 
to. Is this not the same impulse that has encouraged Netflix’s challenge to the 
broadcast and premium cable distribution model? Rather than having viewers “suffer” 




meaning making signifier from the gap in a network schedule to a “user” decided 
punctuation. The point here is simply that Lacan’s view of the psychoanalytic session 
and Netflix’s view of the serial situation common to broadcast and premium television 
are tantalizingly aligned. Both agree that the solution of the problem is to change the 
point of punctuation. Again, seriality has quite often been approached as a problem to 
be solved, rather than a real to be engaged with. (Even someone who should have 
known better, such as Lacan, has done this.) 
Now, it must be said, that it is hardly surprising to see a company put out a 
news release touting the findings of a self-reported survey that enthusiastically crown 
its own platform as possibly the best thing that’s ever happened to television. (It is 
worth recalling, however, that Mittell partially buys in to the streaming company’s 
stated objective to undo the traditional gap-filled broadcast and premium cable model 
of television seriality.) Netflix has, by all accounts, changed the televisual landscape. 
It is useful and enlightening to read how they have interpreted their own intervention 
into the industry. Moreover, it is crucial to realize two things. The first, as Netflix 
understands, television viewing is changing. This shift in viewing habits reveals that 
the network-dominated model for television has become outmoded and is now, 
clearly, a problem. As Ted Sarandos, Chief Content Officer of Netflix, says, "Our 
viewing data shows that the majority of streamers would actually prefer to have a 
whole season of a show available to watch at their own pace" (ibid). Traditional 
network and cable television models are here positioned as a problem to what is 
emerging as a new and preferred way to watch TV. Netflix, subsequently, is the 




choice in programming and has helped free consumers from the limitations of linear 
television” (ibid). It’s difficult to ignore the language of capitalism coming through 
here (and yet another example of the close relationship seriality has with capital). 
Framing Sarandos’s comments, consumer choice—not “viewer” choice—is the 
solution to the problems of the staid and stagnant programming strategies of the past. 
Netflix “has helped free consumers” from the shackles of “linear television.” The 
network television model is here rendered as something of an oppressive force that 
limits not just creativity but (consumer) freedom itself. One would think Netflix has 
liberated “consumers” from the “prison house” of traditional network seriality. A 
laughable fantasy on the face of it but one which, we are obliged to note, has resonated 
both with viewers and TV critics (consumers, in Netflix’s parlance). Since House of 
Cards premiered to rave critical and user reviews, Amazon, Hulu, YouTube and others 
have adopted Netflix’s binge model of serial television distribution. Indeed, for 
streaming video providers, the binge model has itself become the formal distinction 
between streaming video and traditional television. The “problem” of seriality, here 
viewable in the network model, has been thoroughly and widely solved. 
 The second important thing to recognize is that binge-worthy media is 
inseparable from the serial form. Again, quoting Sarandos, “Our own original series 
are created for multi-episodic viewing, lining up the content with new norms of viewer 
control for the first time" (ibid). As Netflix understands, it is necessary to keep the 
serial in focus (“multi-episodic viewing”) while discussing bingeing because bingeing 
is itself a serial process. Netflix has not risen to the top of the television production 




through the consistent crafting of bingeable serials such as the aforementioned House 
of Cards, Orange is the New Black, Stranger Things, Glow and serial documentaries 
(“docuseries”) such as Making a Murderer and Wild Wild Country. Furthermore, with 
the binge model, content creators are allowed to write episodes free of the anticipation 
of network-mandated ad breaks and other network norms that serve advertisers over 
creators. TV series need not conform to the network 30-minute episode model (which, 
today, means a 22-24-minute episode with 6-8 minutes of ads) or a 1-hour model (44-
46 minutes of episodes with around 15 minutes of ads). Rather than composing 
individual stories around the narrative intrusion of advertising, or whole seasons 
according to a network demand of 20+ episodes, streaming television episodes can be 
written until the story is finished. In the ten episodes of the recent season of Netflix’s 
Glow, for example, episode length ranges in a way one simply would not see on 
network television: Episode 3, “Concerned Women of America” comes in at 26 
minutes; Episode 6, “Work the Leg,” is 31 minutes long; Episode 8, “The Good 
Twin,” is 34 minutes; Episode 9, “Rosalie,” is 36 minutes, with the season finale 
coming in at 46 minutes. While American television premieres and finales tend to be 
longer than other episodes, the variability of episodes on display here is a standard for 
Netflix in a way that would be exceptional for network television.  
Putting Netflix’s intervention in the context of the network model shows us 
this: viewers want to watch multiple episodes of television on their own schedule. The 
network model—forcing viewers to watch shows at prescribed times and enforcing 
mandated ad breaks—is outmoded and anti-consumer. New series, released with all 




television writers to write without the constraint of ad breaks and allowing viewers 
(consumers) to watch free of commercial breaks and episode breaks, aims at providing 
a gapless narrative experience absent any interruption. Netflix has identified that 
contemporary viewers do not want a network to tell them how and when they can 
watch their shows. The intent, then, is to eliminate gaps and to introduce a seamless 
viewing (consuming) experience. So how can interruptions be constitutive of the serial 
when there aren’t any interruptions? How do gaps “ghost write” the serial when there 
are no gaps? The notion that Netflix, or Netflix style television, offers gapless 
entertainment is a fiction. “Consumer choice” may mitigate the obvious appearance of 
interruptions in the binge serial but it does not eliminate it. Bingeing—both as viewer 
practice and method of serial narrative production—aims at overcoming seriality 
(understood here as a narrative held together by interruption). Bingeing, therefore, 
allows us to see quite clearly that the serial gap confronts us. Through the 
confrontation of seriality, bingeing emerges as a way to distance oneself from the 
interruptions and gaps constitutive of seriality. Bingeing is the repetitive failure to 
obtain an impossible object that always appears in new guises. Rather than 
overcoming the serial gap, the binge series finds a new way of expressing how the 
interruption is immanent and inviolable to the serial. We can see this clearly in the 
second season of Stranger Things, Netflix’s most popular series.  
 
Stranger Things 
It’s important to note that the above has been interpreted by Netflix users as a 




television (even premium cable television). The emphasis on “control,” however, is an 
illusory one. Users have control to the extent that content creators allow it. The season 
two episode of Stranger Things, “The Lost Sister,” is exemplary of this point. 
Stranger Things, a series released by Netflix in the “binge model,” has many of the 
traditional interruptions we come to expect from broadcast television in its episodes: 
act breaks, episode breaks, and cuts to black as though there would be a commercial 
break. With “The Lost Sister,” Stranger Things accomplishes something that a binge 
series would seem to foreclose: a gap filled with content. That phrase is surely obscure 
at the moment, but let’s proceed thinking along the lines of the function of the 
cliffhanger. Since one can simply proceed to the next episode on Netflix without even 
watching a series’ opening credits, resolving the tension installed by a cliffhanger is 
seemingly a click away. Anticipating an end and not getting it is no big deal because 
absent from the Netflix series is the temporal delay Mittell writes about as being 
constitutive of seriality. It doesn’t matter if the characters have five minutes or an hour 
or a week to rescue Timmy, as long as the viewer has enough time to watch the next 
episode the tension will resolve itself. In other words, traditional serials accomplish 
the cliffhanger by way of installing an almost mandatory wait time. An inviolable gap. 
What Stranger Things season two does is accomplish the cliffhanger while giving 
viewers a whole episode to watch. (This is what I mean by “a gap filled with 
content.”) 
The episode preceding “The Lost Sister,” “The Spy,” ends with a season 
changing event that leaves many of the series prominent characters in imminent 




binge series do not expect a cliffhanger to be a “real cliffhanger.” And so what 
actually creates the cliffhanger is not that Stranger Things interrupts a scene, nor is it 
that the episode pivots away from the previous action entirely (what Luke Terlaak 
Poot has recently called “continuous” and “discontinuous” cliffhangers).9 What 
creates the cliffhanger here is twofold: 1. “The Lost Sister” does not pick up on any of 
the previous episode’s story lines. And 2. More importantly, the Netflix viewer is 
unaware that it is even possible to introduce a cliffhanger in a streaming series. One of 
the great myths of Netflix as television producer is that it has freed itself—and 
viewers—from the shackles of the network schedule. The notion that a popular Netflix 
series would engage in a “dirty trick” typical of traditional television is almost beyond 
belief, given what we read above regarding how Netflix has positioned itself in 
contradistinction to traditional broadcast methods of storytelling. And yet, to get to the 
episode that resolves the tension introduced by “The Spy” one has to watch all of “The 
Lost Sister.” In other words, Stranger Things introduces a proxy for the week-long or 
months-long gap that viewers of traditional television serials experience. In fact, 
between episode three “The Pollywog” and episode four “Will the Wise,” Stranger 
Things cuts in half a dramatic sequence where Will Byers attempts to confront the 
demon creature that has been stalking him. “The Pollywog” ends with Will screaming 
at the creature to leave him alone. Rather than take orders from a child, the 
supernatural being dives into Will’s mouth, possibly (for all the viewer knows) killing 
him. Cut to black. “Will the Wise” begins on the other side of this cut, with Will alive 
but with the creature seemingly possessing Will’s body. This is the expected kind of 




required to move on to the next one, but the viewer can simply watch the next five 
minutes of the next episode immediately to resolve the tension. “The Lost Sister” 
refuses to allow Stranger Things viewers to evade the “To Be Continued” and the 
registration of the interruptive gap.   
Unsurprisingly, “The Lost Sister” is, by some length, the show’s worst rated 
episode by viewers on IMDb.10 Having to watch a character-based episode that not 
just interrupts the tension produced by “The Spy” but seems to rip Stranger Things 
away from every single urgent storyline has been met by widespread annoyance. The 
following is an excerpt of what is considered the “most helpful” (read: most 
representative) review of “The Lost Sister.” It is titled, “Why did this exist? Save 
yourself the trouble and skip it!!”: 
This episode was such a jumbled piece of garbage. I love this show (excluding 
this episode), and the episode was written in a vacuum probably for the sole 
purpose of one or more spin-offs. It doesn't even feel like it's on the same time 
line, nor does it feature any of the other main characters doing anything 
important.  
 
I dug my IMDb account out of the graveyard just to review this monstrosity . . 
.This is just such a train wreck that I have to speak against it, lest it become 
more common in the future. As subscription television becomes more popular 
and common it should not need to relive the historical downfalls of traditional 
TV and the reason we cut cords in the first place. 




It’d be easy to dismiss the relevance of this kind of critique for an academic argument, 
but this IMDb user’s comments are extraordinary for a number of reasons. The first is 
that tggrif, in panning this particular episode of a Netflix series, affirms the “consumer 
choice” model of television that Netflix is chiefly responsible for creating. The user 
even warns against any Netflix series from writing an episode such as “The Lost 
Sister,” associating the structure of Stranger Things season 2 with “the historical 
downfalls of traditional TV.” If the register of these comments seems unnecessarily 
high (i.e. a bad episode of television is maybe not a “monstrosity”), we should recall 
Sarandos’s comments that Netflix has “free[d] consumers.” A cliffhanger episode like 
“The Lost Sister” is a reminder that one cannot be freed from the specter of a serial 
interruption. As Freud showed us in Chapter One, the interruption causes the patient to 
suffer more than if the session—or serial story—came to a complete and self-
contained end. The binge model mitigates a number of non-narratively mandated 
interruptions, as previously discussed, but it cannot turn serial television into a gapless 
five or ten-hour movie. As Jason Mittell observed above, film is a far more radically 
self-contained medium. To think of streaming television as simply a long movie is to 
ignore the ongoing interruptive aspects that simultaneously break and bind it. It is to 
imagine the erasure of the gap. As I’ve been arguing, erasing the serial gap is formally 
impossible.   
The second insight we should take seriously from this non-academic 
assessment of Stranger Things is that the user inelegantly identifies exactly the kind of 




trick” in Experiencing Fiction: Judgments, Progressions, and the Rhetorical Theory of 
Narrative. As Phelan writes:  
Surprise endings provide strong evidence of the interrelation of ethical and 
aesthetic judgments, as a quick look at the classic example of the ineffective 
surprise will show. A story that puts the protagonist in peril and then ends with 
the sudden and unprepared-for revelation that the protagonist has been 
dreaming is ethically and aesthetically flawed. Such a story is ethically flawed 
because its implied author asks the audience to invest themselves in the 
protagonist’s actions while knowing all along that those actions are merely 
illusions even within the world of the fiction. Such a story is aesthetically 
flawed because the sudden revelation requires the audience radically to 
reconfigure their understanding of the story for no benefit other than the 
surprise itself. In short, such a story is built on the aesthetics of the cheap trick. 
(95) 
Phelan is writing about “surprise endings” here, but his thoughts deepen our 
discussion of the “The Lost Sister” and the stakes of being confronted with serial 
narrative design in a binge series.12 For the IMDb user (and many others), the 
confrontation of “The Lost Sister” is basically being forced to see “behind the 
curtain,” so to speak, and peek at the mechanism of serial narrative. As the IMDb user 
sees in “The Lost Sister,” there is no benefit in the episode other than interrupting the 
overarching narrative of Will Byers and co. dealing with a new threat from The 
Upside Down in Hawkins, Indiana. (There’s even the cynical suggestion in the 




evident basis.) In effect, there is “no benefit other than the surprise itself.” Indeed, 
even my sympathetic reading of the episode—that it gives the second season a breath, 
a necessary simmer to the boiling action of the season up to that point—agrees that the 
episode’s merits are at the level of form and structure. In other words, to tggrif’s point, 
I’m not saying that the dialogue or acting is transcendent or that the new characters 
introduced needed to be introduced. The user says that the episode was “written in a 
vacuum” and uses this to say it is fatally disconnected from the rest of the season, I am 
in general agreement here: though my evaluation of the episode is, obviously, far more 
positive, the success of the episode is how it halts the myopia that the only thing that is 
important or noteworthy in Stranger Things is what happens in Hawkins, Indiana. It 
shows us that the world is wider than the concerns of characters we have already met 
(and that the kidnapping and scientific testing of young children has been going on for 
a long time with far more affected in far more places than viewers realized). It even 
harkens back to what, in retrospect, looks like a half-hearted cliffhanger between “The 
Pollywog” and “Will the Wise.” 
What distinguishes “The Lost Sister” is that it radically reconfigures the 
viewer’s understanding of the shape of Stranger Things season two and allows for the 
show to exist outside of the snow globe of Hawkins. Here, I intentionally mimic 
Phelan’s language of negative judgment for such narrative design. Not to say that 
there are bad uses of the cliffhanger and good uses of the cliffhanger; uses of the 
cliffhanger that evince effective narrative design and those that confirm the opposite. 
Rather, the virtue of “The Lost Sister” is in its capacity to manipulate, misdirect, and 




to “suffer more” than if the story had simply played out for another five minutes.13 
Freud wrote Studies on Hysteria in 1895, but the notion that the “To be continued” 
causes suffering is just as prevalent in 2018 as it was at the end of the Victorian era.14 
Stranger Things should be commended for creating an interruptive gap within a serial 
publishing model that seems intent on eliminating them. That the interruptive gap 
comes by way of providing content is, to me, a radical gesture. Finding a way to 
introduce a serial gap into the binge structure shows the supposed “user control” (or 
mastery) over a Netflix series is illusory (this is something the above IMDb user 
recognizes but as a negative). This also shows us that significant interruptions can 
arise in narratives seemingly liberated from such interruptions. 
The Stranger Things example shows that the serial gap is not a relic of a 
bygone era of network television programming, as our intrepid IMDb user would like 
to think, but is an effective narrative tool. The serial gap evidences that the viewer is 
not just caught up in the serial fiction but is literally caught. Ensnared. When 
streaming television “falls” to the standards and tropes of traditional television, we see 
the spirit of seriality emerge: this thing that has not just “hooked” a viewer but has its 
hooks in a viewer. It is a confrontation with our inability to control or direct the 
narrative (despite what Netflix executive Peter Sarandos would like to think). 
Seriality, as Sartre, Wittebols, and Crary showed us in the Introduction, is something 
of a scandal. A threat. It needs to be overthrown (it can’t be, as we have shown in 
different ways). But it is worth continuing to hold on to the “scandal” of seriality. That 
this shows it is not simply something that can be scheduled around or eliminated with 





Bingeing as Enjoying Fatigue 
The new normal Netflix has helped to ossify has been met with immense 
critical interest, both inside and outside of the academy. As scholars come to grips 
with how to discuss bingeing as an inextricable intersection of both viewing practice 
and method of textual production, we begin to grasp a commonality between the 
critical response to bingeing and Netflix’s own internal marketing: binge television is 
something new. It is successful in its aim at being “different” from traditional 
television and therefore the task for scholars is to understand it. However, we need to 
see that the binge model is not a meta-language. It is not a position within seriality that 
is also outside seriality. Another way of putting it is that a signifier cannot signify 
itself. It depends on other signifiers for meaning. What bingeing shows us is that 
seriality is not a “prison house.” We encounter within seriality a limit—or an obstacle 
that it is also its impetus—that serves as a kind of opening. The binge model seizes 
this opening and allows us to read back on seriality as such. The binge model, as 
discussed above, is an attempt at overturning the Anstoss at the heart of seriality. In 
other words, seriality is itself an obstacle to a totality of meaning. If the obstacle to 
serial meaning can be removed—that is, episodic installments that disrupt totality—
then the problem of seriality is solved. Again, the goal seems to be attempting to get 
the best of seriality (long form storytelling, engaging characters who viewers “live 
with” over the life of the show) without the “worst” of it (having to wait for anything 




In terms of understanding bingeing as a viewership practice and phenomenon, 
Mareike Jenner writes that binge watching is best understood “as an intersection of 
discourses of fandom filtering into the ‘mainstream’” (13). Specifically, the viewing 
habits typically reserved for marathoning episodes of “cult TV favorites” (Twin Peaks, 
X-Files, Buffy the Vampire Slayer) in earlier eras has now become widespread. This 
notion that binge watching is the result of “cult TV fandom” becoming mainstream 
has its basis in the cultural etymology of the phrase in popular culture. As Ben 
Zimmer of Visual Thesaurus explains, the earliest recorded usage of the phrase “binge 
watching” appears as a plaintive request for VHS tapes of the X-Files appeared in a 
New England area usenet chat room.15 The idea that bingeing is the result of cult 
fandom becoming mainstream makes perfect sense, especially in an age where the 
highest grossing films each year are either Star Wars movies or comic book superhero 
films. While this describes the practice of binge viewing it does not delve in to the 
enjoyment constitutive of bingeing. 
The argument I have been pursuing is that bingeing needs fundamentally and 
meaningfully to be understood as an (attempted) “solution” to the Anstoss that is at the 
center of seriality. Remember, it is the obstacle (a totality of meaning) that is also the 
impetus (gesturing toward totality, “filling in the gaps”) for the serial. Bingeing is not 
only an attempted solution at the levels of viewing and content distribution, but the 
“destiny” of bingeing qua solution is sewn into the word’s very history. The word 
“binge” first appears in English dialect dictionaries, such as Anne Elizabeth Baker’s 
Glossary of Northamptonshire Words and Phrases (1854), in the mid-19th century 




scale cultural impact). The word was then used, according to Baker, as a term that 
“primarily signifies the act of soaking, and is applied substantively to persons, and 
adjectively and verbally to things. A man goes to the alehouse to get a good binge, or 
to binge himself [to drink to excess.] A heavy rain is a good bingeing shower: but the 
most general and frequent application of the term is to the soaking of tubs or wooden 
vessels to prevent leaking” (49). By saturating wood, one prevents it from absorbing 
any more water, wine, beer, etc. Here, bingeing is a “water solution” to the problem of 
leaking. The binge model of seriality, by “submerging” the viewer in a series, aims at 
eliminating the hallmark gaps and interruptions of the serial form, just as the process 
of 19th century bingeing eliminates gaps in a wooden cask. The binge series highlights 
the relationship to the gap audience members take up. Speaking of the traditional 
broadcast model of television seriality, Sean O’Sullivan writes that it is “in that 
between state [of old episodes and new episodes] that we as readers or viewers do 
most of our interpreting” of a series (“Old, New, Borrowed, Blue” 123). We are in the 
middle “bobbing on the narrative,” O’Sullivan writes (ibid). O’Sullivan does not seize 
on the drowning implications of this image, as he determines, ultimately, that it is in 
this interruptive gap that viewers “luxuriat[e] in the details” of a story’s construction 
(ibid). Netflix’s model seemingly eliminates this gap but, as we saw in our Stranger 
Things example above, the gap filled with content that is “The Lost Sister” hardly 
inspired feelings of ‘luxuriating in a story’s construction.’ Rather, recalling 
O’Sullivan’s word choice, the viewer is “bobbing” up and down in the middle—




To my mind, the reason it is easy to dismiss streaming television on the 
grounds of pathology or poetics is the way it reveals the unconscious enjoyment of 
narrative seriality. Conflicting with Netflix’s own account of bingeing and bingers, 
Mareike Jenner tells us that “shameful indulgence” and “viewer guilt” arise as a result 
of viewers having too little time to reflect on episodes—or even whole series—while 
bingeing (4). (This seems to dovetail with Van den Bulck’s sleep study.) In effect, the 
attempted refusal of seriality inextricable to bingeing makes people feel bad. As 
Charlotte Brundson puts it, “The nausea implicit in bingeing comes from the 
disturbance of temporal control of this repetition, the failure to understand that a little 
forgetting is a necessary part of the pleasure of more” (66). Brundson adds this 
Freudian clincher to her thought: “Without this forgetting, generic pleasure becomes 
not repetition with difference, but repetition with too much of the same” (ibid). 
Repetition, as Brundson rightly alludes, is the repeating of difference (as in Freud’s 
death drive). It might be appropriate to term the repetition of bingeing that Brundson 
writes about as constituting a continuation, rather than repetition.16 My claim here is 
that even if binge watching does make people feel badly that is the precise reason for 
its popularity. To put it another way, binge viewers desire being submerged in the cask 
of a TV  series. 
Speaking before the release of Transparent’s first season, Amazon Studios 
head Joe Lewis told The Hollywood Reporter, “We’ve never looked at [Transparent] 
as anything but a continuous piece of five-hour entertainment,” with showrunner Jill 
Soloway adding that she thinks of it as “a five-hour movie more than 10 episodes” 




viewer submerged in a cask (of streaming content). As Lewis and Soloway state, the 
goal is to provide a “continuous” viewing experience, one free from gaps or 
interruptions. It is this growing approach in narrative design and television watching 
that Djoymi Baker has recently termed “epic-viewing,” or television viewing that is 
“predicated on spectator endurance of an extensive text” (48). The body grapples with 
bingeing in a way different from other forms of textual reception, “epic-viewing 
becomes a journey that is physically experienced in extended time, as our bodily 
fatigue conjoins with, and partly underpins, our viewing pleasure of this new 
paradigm” (ibid). The binge series, we can extrapolate from what Baker is saying, 
takes up residence in the body. 
Intriguingly, we can take what Brundson says of repetition in bingeing with the 
notion of fatigue found in Baker’s notion of “epic viewing.” For our purposes, this 
pushes the theoretical implications of Brundson—that repetition repeats difference—
and the more “common sense” notion of fatigue found in Baker’s statements. We need 
to look at how three terms intersect: fatigue, repetition, and drive. Starting with the 
idea that what repeats in the drive is difference, not sameness (i.e. when a child asks 
for the same story to be told over and over what repeats is not a carbon copy, for such 
a retelling is impossible, but “minimal difference” from one telling to the next), we 
can see how the “continuation” of the binge model is opposed to the repetition 
fundamental to the serial. It is this insistent continuity of the binge model that Baker 
labels fatiguing. In her recent book What IS Sex?, Alenka Zupancic argues that there is 
a link between Freud’s death drive and fatigue.17 The death drive breaks us out of the 




gives the motto of the drive: Die again, die better! (106). But this, it is crucial to 
understand, is fatigue at the ontological level, not an epi-phenomenon of something 
else (like bingeing). When Baker says that bingeing is fatiguing he means, literally 
that it is an exhausting side effect of bingeing. For Zupančič, fatigue is a primary 
phenomenon. One that grounds life as such and is not a side effect of other activities:  
Life instincts are automatic (on autopilot), but they are not ontologically 
primary (for Freud here, there is actually an ontological primacy of, quite 
literally, “being-toward-death”). Life instincts are a form of “knowledge” 
(know-how) necessary for the preservation of this detour from the fundamental 
negativity implied in life, which is called death (drive). The death drive names 
a kind of fundamental or ontological fatigue of life as such. (96) 
Elsewhere Zupancic writes that the drive is not “necessarily experienced, “felt” as 
fatigue; it is present as a kind of “objective affect” of life” (97). Why this insistence on 
naming the drive as an “objective affect” through fatigue? Why make fatigue a 
primary phenomenon (or, perhaps more precisely, the point at which “phenomena” 
can even be registered)? The answer is in repetition. Fatigue best underlines what is at 
stake in repetition in saying, as I have, that repetition is repeating difference.  
Fatigue is much closer to the kind of compulsion to repeat Freud associates 
with the drive than something like automation. This is no straw man argument. 
“Repetition automaton” is sometimes the preferred translation, instead of 
“compulsion” (even Lacan prefers it at times). Some scholars, such as Friedrich 
Kittler, are keen to emphasize the word automaton or automation because of its 




has recently pointed out, however, “Lacan stresses that the repetition of the drive is 
not designated by Freud by the German word Reproduzieren (reproduction), but rather 
by the word Wiederholung, or hauling back” (“The Inheritance of Potentiality”). 
Indeed, as Lacan says in Seminar XI: The Four Fundamental Concepts of 
Psychoanalysis: “let me remind you once again of the etymological reference that I 
gave you, holen (to haul), of its connotation of something tiring, exhausting” (67). As 
in my example above, when a child asks for a story to be repeated, the adult is “hauled 
back” to repeat the story. There is fatigue in repetition. If there is fatigue in repetition, 
then we can see the body—as understood by psychoanalysis—in repetition as well. 
What we will need to see is that the intimate relationship between repetition, fatigue, 
and enjoyment is concretized in binge watching. 
Emmanuel Levinas is another key touchstone for Copjec on fatigue. In his 
Existence and Existents, “Fatigue is thought by Levinas as part of a complex of bodily 
states—insomnia, exhaustion, sleep, being the others—that resist work” (“The 
Inheritance of Potentiality”). For Copjec, Levinas is developing here a notion of the 
body as “invested in time,” as the body “can be defined as that which wants rather 
than needs sleep,” which recalls Freud’s Wunsch in The Interpretation of Dreams—
the wish to sleep. We can turn back around and use this understanding to extend the 
relationship of binge watching and exhaustion that Baker introduces above. A person 
becomes tired when bingeing a television series, yet this exhaustion “partly underpins” 
the viewing pleasure perhaps unique to bingeing, as he writes. There is an opportunity 
here to explore fatigue at the level of ontology, the territory Copjec and Zupančič 




(exhaustion) of bingeing. The drive is, as Zupančič puts it, what breaks one out of the 
fatigue of life. The drive allows us to repeat difference, it aims at nothing but this 
repetition. Is there a goal to bingeing? It may seem like the goal is to finish the series. 
That there is a specific object to bingeing. This, I contend, is illusory. Bingeing is the 
repetitive failure to obtain an impossible object that always appears in new guises. The 
fatigue of bingeing is not the exhaustion of watching, let’s say, 10 hours of a television 
series in a single day. It is in being “hauled back” to do this again and again. The 
fatigue of bingeing is manifested between binges, rather than during. It arises in the 
gap and touches on Levinas’s bodily states that resist work (insomnia, exhaustion, 
sleep). Further, with bingeing, bingers repeat the “loss” of the series again and again. 
This is what Freud saw when his grandson played “fort/ da”—the repetition of loss 
and the failure to master or obtain an impossible object. We encounter this logic in 
Beyond the Pleasure Principle when Freud famously recounts the story of his 
grandson playing what is known as the fort/ da game. When his grandson’s mother 
leaves, the boy throws a toy attached to a string. He casts the toy away (“fort”) and 
brings it back (“da”) to where he is sitting. In this game, Freud sees his grandson 
repeating a traumatic loss—the disappearance of the object—and finding enjoyment in 
that repetition itself. In casting away the toy and bringing it back, the child reenacts 
the dynamic of absence and presence, of trauma and recovery. But, crucially, though 
there is an attempt at “mastering” the trauma here and steeling oneself to its effects, 
fort/ da is not about the failure to master. It is about the repetition of loss. The child 
repeats loss over and over again. The binger is encouraged by Netflix, Amazon, and 




We can confirm, almost empirically, that seriality affects the body by recalling 
Van den Bulck’s sleep study. Remember it is the complexity of binge serials that 
troubles the mind, refusing to allow it rest. What this pathologizing of binge serials 
does show us is how Bulck, as with Sartre, Wittebols, and Crary are, perhaps, more 
aware of the effects of the serial than other critics. In other words, it takes a thief to 
catch a thief. While, as explained in the Introduction, we cannot totally agree that 
seriality needs to be “overthrown”—further, we have shown that this is not even a 
possibility—it is interesting that those who clearly see the confrontation of seriality, 
the way it challenges the body, are those who most want rid of it. Perhaps surprisingly, 
Freud himself, in his personal correspondence, also links bingeing to the body (Daniel 
Deronda’s serial structure forced him to ‘discount a few hours of sleep’). Freud lets us 
proffer an understanding of seriality at the moment of its historical inception that is 
necessary to grasp in order to fully consider bingeing now. 
We are compelled to return—to repeat—some of the observations we set out in 
the beginning. We can now think about Freud’s experience with serial fiction, 
described in Chapter One, as anticipating current engagement with binge serials. 
Recalling the letter to Martha dated 26 August 1882, Freud writes, “I read [Daniel 
Deronda] with mounting puzzlement and interest until an hour ago, discounting a few 
hours of sleep. My well-known impatience made me hurry to get to the end” (74).  
Freud returns us to the dominant present-day conception of what bingeing is: a 
physically affecting activity where one sacrifices the body (sleep in this case) to push 
ever forward in narrative endeavor. This is the body as understood by Freud and this 




through this consideration of the body is the following: While the contemporary doxa 
concludes that bingeing is an immersive form of textual experience, that one attempts 
to achieve something like a singularity with narrative—to chase the end, to finish the 
show—we should make the further move to see that bingeing gives the appearance of 
immediacy and immersion. Forcing oneself to get to the end actually serves to protect 
the binger from the long-term and ongoing effects of serial narrative. Living with the 
gaps in the serial is the true trauma, as Freud shows in Studies on Hysteria and in his 
refusal to live with an interrupted reading experience of a serial story. Avoiding the 
intellectual hit of the serial—the way it troubles and occupies the mind—and 
absorbing the bodily hit—the missed sleep, in our example—is the enjoyment of the 
binge serial.  
It is not the fact that sessions must have an end that is the trouble. Rather, the 
trouble is the gap that is created. Seeing the clear corollary to serial fiction, recalling 
what Freud writes in Studies on Hysteria, “Every newspaper reader suffers from the 
same drawback in reading the daily installment of his serial story, when immediately 
after the heroine’s decisive speech or after the shot has rung out, he comes upon the 
words: ‘To be continued’” (ibid). This gap in the contiguity of the story, or, in Freud’s 
case, the psychoanalytic treatment, intensifies the importance of “the topic that has 
been raised but not dealt with, the symptom that has become temporarily intensified 
and has not yet been explained, persists in the patient’s mind and may perhaps be 
more troublesome to him than it has otherwise been” (298). This is a vitally important 
point: the content that becomes the interruption—the “To Be Continued”—assumes a 




narrative or the serial narrative) simply played out a little bit longer. This is how 
content, such as “The Lost Sister,” can assume the role of an interruption. The content 
that marks the beginning of the gap grows in importance and engenders greater 
scrutiny than any that came before.19  
Quite often, as in the cases of binge watching or Freud’s account of reading 
Daniel Deronda, we resist the interruptive gap, or attempt to eliminate it. When we try 
to eliminate the gap by bingeing is when we make it most apparent. The gap’s 
capacity to structure our reading or viewing experience of a serial text is evident when 
we resist or refuse it, as one does with bingeing. Living with the “To Be Continued” is 
a primary condition for the reader, viewer, or listener of a serial, as Freud and Mittell 
note. One conditions oneself—indeed, this may be the serial condition—to enjoy the 
gap. A pain that is also a pleasure, a pleasure that is also a pain. It is intoxicating to 
imagine what happens next. It is boring to realize you know what happens next. So, 
we can see here that the gap persists once opened up and cannot be closed by rational 
explanation. It can only be closed by the next installment (only to be opened up again 
by the end of that installment).  
When Freud “binge read” Daniel Deronda, he was anxious to get to the end, to 
avoid the cut of the serial. Though Daniel Deronda was originally published as the 
kind of “To be continued” serial that Freud wrote about in Studies on Hysteria, his 
experience with it was as a bound volume. This is a vitally important point: the serial 
form—even experienced as a single volume—is still punctuated by the gaps of its 
construction (that is, how George Eliot wrote it). It does not matter what form the 




serial, as the delay that Freud wrote about previously is still present. Eliot still wrote 
anticipating story breaks. These delay-anticipating and delay-follow structures are still 
present in the serial experience whether the physical delay of time is there or not and 
are, in fact, made far more manifest by the attempt to eliminate or evade the 
interruptive gap constitutive of seriality.  
Further, in its raw attempted refusal of seriality’s constitutive interruption (its 
constitutive confrontation), the binge model actually makes it more volatile, as we saw 
in the Stranger Things example. The shape of seriality is somehow more present in the 
binge model. The binge serial, while eschewing the “gap filled” network broadcast 
schedule, is not itself free of gaps. This is the important relationship about seriality 
that the binge model opens up for us. At the level of form, the binge model of 
television shows us that the serial gap is inviolable. Bingeing is, in one view, an 
attempt to fill the gap or eliminate the gap. I argue above that this attempt to “forgo 
the gap,” as Mittell puts it, actually calls attention to the gap, making its theoretical 
import more apparent. Bingeing is treated as a pathology and flight from the gap but 
actually sustains it. The viewer model Netflix imagines for its binge series is as a 
content experience free of interruption. What Netflix shows us most clearly is that 
interruption is immanent to the serial form. 
Repositioning psychoanalysis as concerned with thinking the serial shows that 
psychoanalytic theory is intrinsically a media theory. Seriality and analytic 
experiences share, as Freud notes, a frustrating gap. Just as one feels they are on the 
verge of some knowledge—knowing who the killer is in a serial story, or realizing, 




week before—time is up, the narrative suspended. We have to get off the couch and 
wait a week to take up the same topic again. The key is what we make of the 
interruptive gap and how we engage with that gap. The experience of the serial is 
punctuated by punctures—breaks, gaps, caesura, delays and agonizing waits for 
closure. Serial storytelling introduces cuts to the narrative. Binding a narrative and 
then bingeing it, in our example, is an attempt to dress the wound that the cut of 
seriality opens up. This represents an ideal site to proffer fresh inquiry into both 
psychoanalysis and media studies, to widen our appreciation of what seriality is and 
does. 
                                                 
1 I use “binge watching” instead of “binge-watching” to indicate that the practice is not like “high-
jumping”—a discrete activity. I intend “binge” to modify the kind of watching that occurs across 
various television viewing practices. 
 
2 There is also a hint of Noël Burch’s notion of the “Institutional Mode of Representation” (IMR) 
embedded Bulck’s study. Bulck’s study and IMR are premised on the idea that visual narrative, either 
film or television, offers a seamless experience, such that viewers are unaware they are looking at a 
screen. Both of these arguments fail to account for disavowal, or the Freudian idea that one knows very 
well that they are not seamlessly immersed in another reality for the length of a film or television 
episode, but just the same one pretends that they are. Even without recourse to Freud, to believe that 
viewers really believe that they are in “another world” turns the fundamental appeal of fiction—getting 
wrapped up in a diegetic reality as though it’s real—into slight condescension. It’s telling that neither 
Bulck nor Burch indict themselves in this idea of the seamlessness of fictional worlds. 
 
3 Or perhaps Netflix is taking a shot at Amazon and the casual consumer spying the company does 
through Alexa devices. https://www.cnn.com/2019/04/11/tech/amazon-alexa-listening/index.html 
 
4 This is a minor point, but it’s not true that Netflix series have no literal temporal gaps similar to the 
typical network model. Netflix series have a minimal gap—between ten seconds and a minute—that 
arises between episodes and a much longer gap between seasons (up to a year between seasons for a 





6 During the 19th century, serials became “hotter and hotter” commodities and, as such, came to be 
attended by ethical and political problems. The introduction and success of ad revenue allowed for 
newspapers to reduce their price per copy and enjoy wider distribution and consumption. As a result, 
“Britain saw a dramatic rise in the number of printed periodicals: from 643 magazines published in 
1875 to 1,298 in 1885, 2,081, and 2,531 in 1903” (Keating qtd. in Miller 3). In Slow Print, Elizabeth 
Carolyn Miller, notes that a tradition of Marxist critique (seen most notably in the work of Jameson) 
links a “culture of overprint with the production of capitalist ideology” (307). As she writes, “the 




                                                                                                                                            
mass production” (2). Marx is very much responding to the serial moment of his time but also to a 
conflict that the serial has occasioned throughout time. We can see this in Soap Operas, radio plays 
designed specifically to sell consumer products. We can also see this WEBZ Chicago’s Serial, which 
told a true crime story supported in part by ads for the web service Mail Chimp, something many 
listeners found problematic (i.e. should any corporate entity make money off of a grisly true crime 
story?). Marx’s preface to the French edition of Capital brings together a number of issues constitutive 
of seriality: accessibility, speed, the deferral of meaning, the necessity but insufficiency of the 
installment, and seriality’s formal relationship to the logic of capital. What’s missing, of course, in his 
analysis and that of Sartre and his followers, is a notion of the unconscious. 
 
7 There is some disagreement as to whether 2-6 episodes should rightly be considered “a binge.” An 
extensive discussion of the competing standards for what constitutes “a binge” and a recommendation 
for a singular definition can be found in Jenner (2014), with three hours or more of continuous viewing 
of a single series is the emerging consensus as to what constitutes “a binge.” 
 
8 As part of his attempt to return to Freud through structural linguistics I argue that Lacan socializes 
Freud’s concept of Nachträglichkeit. It was no longer the retroactive emergence of a prior trauma that 
neurotic subject had. Instead it became the structure of signification as such. Lacan sees that 
punctuation has determinative effect on signification. Theoretically speaking, Lacan’s notion of the 
quilting point justifies his move from the traditional psychoanalytic session established by Freud to his 
own punctuated sessions. The quilting point acts like the period at the end of a sentence, or in Lacan’s 
example from Seminar III, the button in an upholstered chair. The button keeps the fabric inside the 
chair and also works to provide a level of design coherence for the chair itself, just as the period creates 
a single unit of meaning—the sentence—which can itself have multiple meanings, but the period needs 
to be there to conceive of meaning at all. The point de capiton is the meaning making signifier of a 
given chain of signifiers. The Internet comic Garfield Minus Garfield is a salient example of the point 
de capiton and its meaning-making properties. From the website: “Garfield Minus Garfield is a site 
dedicated to removing Garfield from Garfield comic strips in order to reveal the existential angst of a 
certain young Mr. Jon Arbuckle.” By taking away Garfield—the meaning making signifier of Garfield 
comic strips—Jon turns into an isolated everyman fighting a losing battle against loneliness and 
depression in a quiet American suburb. While the case can certainly be made that removing Garfield 
just reveals what is and has always been there in the comics, it’s clear that this dimension of Garfield 
comics is only comprehensible by shifting the quilting point—by making Jon the meaning making 
signifier of Garfield.  
 
While Slavoj Žižek has never devoted a book-length project to narrative studies, we can locate in his 
work a concern with certain aspects of narrative. In the case of 1991’s Looking Awry, Žižek helps us 
further our understanding of endings, punctuation, and the quilting point. At one point in the book, 
Žižek addresses the Hollywood legend surrounding the final scene of Casablanca (Michael Curtiz, 
1942). As the legend goes, no one involved in the project could decide how the film should end, a 
disagreement that lasted as late as the shooting of the climactic scene itself. Everyone who has seen the 
film knows that Ilsa (Ingrid Bergman) eventually leaves Rick (Humphrey Bogart) for the hero of the 
resistance, Victor Laszlo (Paul Henreid); an ending that actually had been written, contrary to legend, 
long before shooting began. But this is more significant than a mere Hollywood history lesson; it is a 
perfect illustration of how the quilting point functions in narrative. As Žižek writes, “we experience the 
present ending . . . as something that ‘naturally’ and ‘organically’ follows from the preceding action, 
but if we were to imagine another ending—say for example, that Bergman’s heroic husband were to die 
and that Bogart were to take his place on the plane for Lisbon together with Bergman—it, too, would be 
experienced by viewers as something that developed ‘naturally’ out of earlier events.”8 How?  Žižek 
posits, “[the experience of a] linear ‘organic flow of events’ is an illusion (albeit a necessary one) that 
masks the fact that it is the ending that retroactively confers the consistency of an organic whole on the 
preceding events.”8 The end stitches the narrative together, allowing us to perceive contingent narrative 
events as a single naturally flowing unity.  
 




                                                                                                                                            
 
10 As of this writing, Stranger Things has “aired” 17 episodes. The 16th rated episode is season two’s 
“MADMAX” at 8.4 out of 10 on IMDb. “The Lost Sister,” by contrast, comes in at a sickly 6.2. 
 
11 One might rush to dismiss the relevance of this kind of critique, but this IMDb user is inelegantly 
identifying exactly the kind of “ethical” and “aesthetic” flaws in narrative that narrative scholar James 
Phelan brands a “cheap trick” in Experiencing Fiction: Judgments, Progressions, and the Rhetorical 
Theory of Narrative (95). 
 
12 I owe the observation that Phelan’s above quoted remarks graft well onto thinking through the 
cliffhanger to Luke Terlaak-Poot and his essay “On Cliffhangers.” 
 
13 A cliffhanger is simply not worth talking about if our investment in the narrative is not upset in some 
way. When we feel betrayed, we know that the narrative has “worked.” When we feel our time has been 
wasted is exactly what a great serial narrative should aspire to give its readers, viewers, or listeners. 
Especially, I contend, in the case of the so-called “bad ending.” What follows is wildly subjective, 
which is why it is an endnote and not in the text proper. Reacting with revulsion at, say, the end of 
Battlestar Galactica, lays bare one’s investment in the series. A merely “good” or “appropriate” ending 
should never be considered “good enough,” in fact it should be considered worse than “bad.” The 
finales to The Wire and Breaking Bad are fine. They work. They’re appropriate. Almost nobody has a 
problem with the endings to these shows because they end at the status quo level of excellence that each 
show established. Neither finale has inspired the sheer volume of (positive and negative appraisals) that 
The Sopranos and Lost have. This does not make the endings to either show better “ethically” or 
“aesthetically.” I am not calling for a re-appraisal of the bad ending. Simply that worthwhile narrative 
should always raise our expectations for it. Viewers disappointed by Battlestar Galactica had their 
expectations for what a television series could even accomplish raised for them (as Portlandia explores 
in a well-known “binge watching” sketch). It is in moments of elation (the very good ending, such as 
Six Feet Under) and disappointment that the confrontation of the serial form becomes unavoidable. 
These moments should be cherished, not derided (in the case of the “bad” ending).  
 
14 One can easily imagine Freud is speaking on behalf of contemporary television viewers. One needs 
only to think about famous contemporary television series finales—The Sopranos, Lost, Battlestar 
Galactica—to see how an unexpected (or undesired) ending proliferates “more suffering.”  
 
15 I've just become hooked on the X-Files, so I'm a little behind... Does anyone by ANY chance have 
tapes of this show back to season 1 they'd be willing to lend me so I can effectively catch up? I'd be 
more than happy to travel out to wherever to get them and then bring them back (actually there are three 
of us who all got hooked at the same time, so I'd predict that there'd be some MASSIVE binge watching 
right away! :-) 
—Bob Donahue, ne.general, Feb. 9, 1996 
https://www.visualthesaurus.com/cm/wordroutes/keeping-a-watch-on-binge-watching/ 
 
16 One might counter Brundson and offer that the “forgetting” necessary to repetition occurs between 
repeat viewings of a whole season of a series, rather than between episodes or over a longer period of 
time. 
 
17 The idea of fatigue that Zupančič explores comes from Joan Copjec’s recent work. As she explains in 
a recent interview: “Soldiers’ uniforms are called . . . fatigues and “battle fatigue” was the vague name 
given to the psychological disorders resulting from the strain of fight on the war-front. Fatigue rather 
than trauma. If you slightly shift your perspective and focus on fatigue rather than trauma as an entry 
into psychoanalytic theory, its displacement of the notion of the body away from the strictly biolog[ical] 
to the more complex psychoanalytic model that is dependent on the concept of the drive, you can 





                                                                                                                                            
18 Amazon even ran a commercial calling the period between watching binge-worthy television as a 
viewer falling into a “Showhole.” 
 
19 For a contemporary example that shows the serial narrative implications of Freud’s idea, we can turn 
to the closing moments of Breaking Bad’s season three finale, “Full Measure.” What happens in “Full 
Measure” is something we might term an “accidental cliffhanger.” Central character Jesse Pinkman 
(Aaron Paul) rushes to the apartment of a business colleague, Gale (David Costabile), to kill him. 
Gale’s loyalty to protagonist Walter White (Bryan Cranston) has recently come into question and, like 
any sane person in possession of self-preservation might, Walt sends Jesse to kill Gale. Breathlessly, 
Jesse reaches Gale’s apartment. Gale opens the door. Jesse pulls out his gun and fires, killing Gale. The 
cinematographic composition of this final shot to “Full Measure,” however, invites an unintentionally 
ambiguous reading. When Gale opens the door, Jesse is shown from the chest up, arm extended with his 
gun in the foreground of the frame, and the scene is intercut between shots of the two men. In the final 
shot, the camera, facing Jesse, dollies just slightly right so we are “looking down the barrel of the gun” 
from what one assumes to be Gale’s point of view. The shot approximates the famous image of the 
cowboy shooting at the audience in Edwin S. Porter’s The Great Train Robbery (1903).   
In the context of this particular moment in Breaking Bad, however, the camera movement 
makes it appear as though Jesse either took aim at someone else (by moving the pistol leftward) or 
decided not to shoot Gale. With the next installment of Breaking Bad 13 months away, viewers 
speculated wildly about what Jesse might or might not have done.19 This “To Be Continued” was 
entirely unintentional, according to Breaking Bad showrunner Vince Gilligan, and yet—simply because 
that final shot was content raised but not dealt with, as Freud might have it—the implications of that 
final image persisted in viewer’s minds more than it otherwise would have. Viewers refused to believe 
Vince Gilligan that there was no ambiguity intended in that shot. We need to be very clear here, 
however: it is the serial form that makes the content persist. It is not the content of the Breaking Bad 
quasi-cliffhanger that troubled and engaged viewers—it was the form itself. That this was the final shot 
of the season is what caused the scandal here. As Freud points out, “There are patients who, in the 
course of an analysis, simply cannot get free of a topic,” once it has been brought it up and, “are 
obsessed by it in the interval between two treatments; since by themselves they cannot take any steps 
towards getting rid of it” (298). It is this interruption—this instantiation of a gap—that retroactively 








CONCLUSION: MINDING THE GAP 
 
 
This dissertation has examined a range of serial media texts from Victorian 
England to Twitter to podcasts to Netflix series. I have brought into conversation 
classic print media texts in the form of the Victorian serial novel, new media “print” 
texts through Twitter, new audio texts in serial podcasts, and the evolution of 
broadcast television to Netflix’s narrowcast. I’ve also explored a range of theoretical 
texts, from Jean-Paul Sartre’s existential seriality to the narrative poetics of Jason 
Mittell to undertheorized texts and ideas from major twentieth century thinkers such as 
Sigmund Freud and Jacques Lacan. In bringing together these theoretical and narrative 
texts, this dissertation has attempted to cohere a disparate body of thought and codify 
accessible specialist terminology (i.e. the serial gap) to help think through seriality as a 
theoretical problem. For Sartre and others like him, as we have seen, seriality enforces 
a logic of discontinuity and superficial connection between people, politics, and 
culture. For Freud, the serial gap arrives always too soon. It cannot be properly 
anticipated, nor satisfactorily ameliorated or fully understood after the gap’s 
emergence. Lacan acknowledges the same problem that Freud does – that the serial 
gap is a threat to the work of the analytic session. Lacan tries to control when that gap 
occurs with his introduction of the variable length or punctuated session. Lacan, 
however, fails to reckon with his own insights into seriality here, for it is Lacan who 
understands that the serial gap writes its own rules and orders the logic of signification 




Seminar II and the “To Jakobsen” lecture in Seminar XX shows us that seriality is a 
logic of radical coherence. 
Despite the importance of seriality to Freud and Lacan, theorizing seriality has 
been largely been left out of psychoanalytic theory, and psychoanalytic theory is 
largely absent in studies of serial media. By attending to these overlapping oversights, 
this dissertation has advanced a theory of psychoanalysis that realigns the projects of 
Freud and Lacan. By highlighting the serial thread in their respective work, we realign 
psychoanalysis as a mode of inquiry that has thought through seriality, one of, if not 
the most, dominant media forms since the mid-twentieth century. Further, this is a way 
of thinking concerned primarily with how the social and media interact with the 
psyche. To think through seriality means you can think through three things – a 
diverse set of narrative and non-narrative media, social formation, and the role of the 
subject in both. This underscores how both media and the social exert force on the 
subject. Because seriality is in so many things and it affects so much, it is tempting to 
atomize and particularize our investigations, to think very small because seriality is so 
complex. But to study seriality to me means to study nothing less than how the 
subject—all of us—interact with the world of symbols and signification. It’s about 
trying to understand how the group is inflected in the individual, and how the 
individual is inflected in the group. The way we can see this is through a gap.  
What my project tries to do is to bring together some fundamental questions 
and concerns that, for example, would link the early film serial scholarship of Ruth 
Mayer to Lacan and Lacan with the ethical investigations of a podcast such as Serial. 




an interval of time for audiences? Is it a pleasing blank? Is it a bare canvas upon which 
whatever an audience wants is written or thought? Or is it something that resists 
formalization? Is it a site of tension? Is it a place that seems inaccessible but at the 
same time totally orders one’s experience of a serial thing? In the rush to historicize 
and contextualize and come to grips with various mediums’ development in 
technology and what standout serial texts have done, the field of seriality studies at 
large has never really reckoned with this relatively basic question: what is the serial 
gap? What does it do? Why are we drawn to it? Why do we resist it (or do we resist 
it)? Again, these are very basic but very important questions that are yet to be asked of 
a growing field. These are the stakes of this inquiry for seriality studies. 
 For psychoanalytic theory, the stakes are slightly different. Scholars such as 
Tom Eyers, Aaron Schuster, Frank Ruda, Rebecca Comay, Alenka Zupančič, and 
Mari Ruti have, through various projects, written challenging books in the field of 
psychoanalytic theory, broadly defined. In fact, some of the most exciting 
observations and readings are being made now. My hope is to enter into this vibrant 
field of psychoanalytic theory and offer this new inquiry into psychoanalysis as a 
theory of serial media. None of these scholars are as engaged with media as I am in 
this project. What I offer is an opportunity not just to read Freud and Lacan on their 
own terms with their own language but to move psychoanalytic theory into more firm 
media space. Much of psychoanalytic theory’s canonical media theory is through film, 
not television or new media. My hope is to open the door to look at other forms of 





As a book project, I see this pushing further an articulation of the “gapped 
subject,” as well as bringing new serial texts into the fold. This might seem 
superfluous, as the way that I’ve conceived of the serial gap and what it does is as a 
universal. This means it is like the unconscious in the following sense: everybody has 
an unconscious but their unconscious is theirs. Its raw specificity to the subject cannot 
be explicated in detail ahead of time. Accepting my argument means that we have a 
level of expectation about what the serial gap would do in any form of media. But it is 
nonetheless well worth looking into other diverse forms of serial media to see what 
pushes against, reaffirms, or strengths my argument.1  
If seriality is inherently a notion of psychoanalysis, as I have offered here, and 
if seriality is ubiquitous in media, then this means psychoanalysis is itself already a 
theory of media. Observing the importance of the serial gap in the works of Sigmund 
Freud and Jacques Lacan allows us to apprehend an undergirding logic to 
psychoanalytic theory that has not been seized by critics. But this understanding does 
not only go one way, as psychoanalysis enables us to properly theorize seriality in 
media. We learn what it means to observe seriality as both social substance and 
psychic cement. A gap that constitutes both a radical break and an impossible 
coherence. 
                                                 
1 I am particularly interested in video game studies and non-Western texts (the overlap there is 
videogames made for the West by Japanese studies such as From Software). As media scholar 
Katherine Fusco has recently pointed out, there is yet to be a rigorous account of serial forms that are 
non-Western and non-masculine. In a book review for editor Frank Kelleter’s Media of Serial 
Narrative, Fusco writes: “Recent popular arguments about fandom, especially in the context of science 
fiction serials such as Dr. Who and Star Wars, have drawn attention to the problem of assuming a 
work’s audience. Nonetheless, it’s a bit shocking that women fans, feminized art forms, and women as 
creators are so starkly absent in this volume. Though the essays of Media of Serial Narrative are 
conscious of the fact that popular texts are sometimes deemed unworthy of scholarly attention (9-10, 
281), there is little to no acknowledgment in the book that popular texts’ devaluation has historically 
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